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Abstract
On April 20, 2016, Health Minister Jane Philpott announced that legislation legalizing
recreational marijuana would be introduced in Spring 2017, with the goal of keeping
marijuana out of the hands of children and profit out of the hands of criminals. Bill C-45, An
Act Respecting Cannabis passed the second reading in the House of Commons, and contains
restrictions on advertising cannabis, with a few exceptions. Advertising is recognized as a
protected form of expression under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, so if the
government infringes on this right, they must be able to prove that it is justified in a free and
democratic society, pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada has
twice assessed restrictions on tobacco advertising, providing a framework for assessing
whether advertising restrictions pass constitutional muster. Using this framework, this thesis
analyzes whether the proposed restrictions on advertising marijuana are constitutional.

Keywords
freedom of expression, cannabis, drug policy, charter of rights and freedoms, public health,
marijuana, advertising
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1. Introduction
In April 2016, the Canadian federal government announced its intention to legalize and
regulate recreational cannabis. Minister of Health Jane Philpott indicated that legalizing
recreational cannabis would “keep marijuana out of the hands of children and profits out
of the hands of criminals.”1 In April 2017, the government released the proposed
legislation, to come into effect no later than July 2018, legalizing recreational cannabis
use for adults in Canada.2 The proposed Cannabis Act, Bill C-45, will operate
concurrently with the medical cannabis regulations, the Access to Cannabis for Medical
Purposes Regulations (ACMPR)3. Since the initial announcement in April 2016,
academics, politicians, scientists, doctors, and citizens have been clamoring for answers
to a seemingly endless list of questions. What age should the minimum age of purchase
be set at? Who should be able to sell cannabis? Will using cannabis legally in Canada
exclude me from travelling to the United States? How will legalization impact rates of
cannabis use among youth? While the cacophony rages on, an important concern about
the new legislation has received relatively little attention, even though it could have
significant legal and economic consequences – should advertising of cannabis, cannabis
products, and cannabis services4 be permitted? If the answer to that is no, the question
instead becomes, can advertising of cannabis legally be prohibited? There are several
grounds on which advertising restrictions may be challenged5, this thesis focuses

1

Health Canada, “Plenary Statement for the Honourable Jane Philpott Minister of Health – UNGASS on
the World Drug Problem” (April 20 2016) online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/healthcanada/news/2016/04/plenary-statement-for-the-honourable-jane-philpott-minister-of-health-ungass-onthe-world-drug-problem.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true?>.
2

Government of Canada, “Legalizing and strictly regulating cannabis: the facts” (April 13 2017) online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/health/campaigns/legalizing-strictly-regulating-cannabis-facts.html>
[Government of Canada, The Facts].
3

SOR/2016-230 [ACMPR].

4

For the sake of brevity, I do not use this whole phrase throughout this paper. Whenever referencing the
advertising restrictions, the use of the word cannabis includes cannabis accessories and cannabis services,
unless indicated otherwise.
5

For example, on the basis that the federal government does not have jurisdiction to legislate in that area.
Under the criminal law power the federal government has significant jurisdiction to regulate the marketing

2

specifically on whether the proposed advertising restrictions are a justified infringement
of freedom of expression. The purpose of this thesis is to predict how a court will analyze
the proposed restrictions contained in Bill C-45, knowing that they may change as they
are reviewed by the Standing Committee on Health and then Senate. This thesis argues
that cannabis advertising should be afforded a higher threshold of justification than
tobacco advertising, and that as a result, several aspects of the advertising restrictions in
Bill C-45 may be difficult to justify, particularly at the minimal impairment stage.
Chapter two begins with a discussion of the role of “harm” in constitutional adjudication,
highlighting the ways in which the actual or potential harmfulness of the infringed
expression can impact the Oakes analysis. Then, chapter two provides an introduction to
cannabis, emphasizing the properties of cannabis that make it particularly difficult not
only to study, but to regulate. Next, the prevalence of cannabis use in Canada is
considered, to provide an understanding of the burden of risk imposed by cannabis on a
population level. The remainder of the chapter provides a summary of scientific and
medical evidence regarding the safety of cannabis use for medical purposes and
recreational purposes. The purpose of this chapter is to situate the harmfulness of
cannabis in comparison to other types of expression, in order to determine the threshold
of justification for the Oakes analysis.
Chapter three provides a comprehensive summary of the legal and political history of
cannabis in Canada. This chapter first looks at the history of cannabis and the criminal
law, starting with the addition of cannabis to the Opium and Narcotic Drugs Act6 in 1923,
and tracing legislative changes up until the current criminal regime, the Controlled Drugs

and advertising of products. This is where the federal government finds its authority to regulate tobacco
advertising. In RJR-MacDonald v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199, SCJ No 68 [RJRMacDonald (SCC)] the SCC determined the federal criminal law power is broad in scope, and requires only
a prohibition and a penal sanction directed at a legitimate public health evil. Because tobacco was deemed a
public health evil, the federal government’s legislation restricting tobacco marketing was infra vires.
6

SC 1908, c 50.
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and Substances Act7. Next, this chapter looks at the legalization of cannabis for medical
purposes, following the case law and accompanying statutory amendments, followed by a
brief history of past attempts to legalize or liberalize recreational cannabis use in Canada,
culminating with the introduction of Bill C-45, An Act Respecting Cannabis. The purpose
of this chapter is to provide the historical context out of which cannabis legalization
arises.
Chapter four focuses on the legal foundation of freedom of expression, beginning with
pre-Charter rights protection and the pre-Oakes section 1 analysis. Next, this chapter
focuses on the development of commercial speech jurisprudence in Canada, the rationales
underlying freedom of expression, and the scope of what type of speech the freedom
protects. The bulk of this chapter focuses on the judicial application of the Oakes test,
discussing each step of the Oakes test, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of
remedies available upon a finding that a statute or provision unconstitutionally infringes
upon freedom of expression. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a legal framework
for the analysis of Bill C-45 in the following chapter.
Chapter five takes the framework set out in chapter four, and applies it to the proposed
advertising restrictions set out in Bill C-45, identifying what parts of the legislation are
most likely to cause constitutional pause. Particularly, this chapter carves out a new
category of commercial speech, one that is differentiated from tobacco advertising or
advertising to children, in that the harm posed by the commercial speech is not as
concrete, but there are possible benefits that may be realized by Canadians who use
cannabis either medically or therapeutically. This chapter focuses on two aspects of the
promotion restrictions contained in Bill C-45: the general restriction and accompanying
exceptions, and the restriction on sponsorship and facility naming rights.
Before proceeding to the first substantial chapter, there are several scope and technical
issues that warrant some clarification. First, this thesis in its entirety considers only the
cannabis plant and plant products. Unless specifically noted otherwise, comments made

7

SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA].
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about cannabis refer to the plant and plant products and not synthetic cannabinoids.8
Second, although the terms marijuana and cannabis are often used interchangeably, they
have different and distinct meanings. Cannabis is a broad term that describes products
derived from the Cannabis Sativa plant.9 The term marijuana, on the other hand, refers
specifically to the dried buds of a cannabis plant.10 For accuracy, the term cannabis is
used when referring generally to the substance. The term marijuana is used only when
referring to the dried buds, and not other cannabis products. Additionally, when quoting
others or using proper names, the term used by the original author is used.
Third, by nature of the existing case law on commercial speech, tobacco advertising
litigation is used as the primary comparator. However, care must be taken not to compare
the two substances too closely. There are many parallels between tobacco advertising
litigation in the 1990’s and 2000’s, and the potential cannabis advertising litigation. They
are both products with a long social history in North America, accompanied by immense
stigma. But there is one significant difference between the regulatory history of cannabis
and the regulatory history of tobacco: in the case of tobacco, the government was moving
from a liberal regulatory regime to a more heavily regulated one, and in the case of
cannabis, the government is moving from a severely restrictive prohibitory regime to one
that is liberalized, but still heavily regulated. Further, they are both commercial speech
cases involving a possible public health risk. The word possible is emphasized because it
will likely be the key to distinguishing cannabis from tobacco. While the latter is widely
understood to be of almost certain harm to users and those around them, creating a
significant burden on Canada’s health care system and shortening the lives of many
Canadians, the same cannot be said about cannabis. As will be seen in chapter two,

8

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine. The Health Effects of Cannabis and
Cannabinoids: The Current State of Evidence and Recommendations for Research (Washington, D.C.: The
National Academies Press, 2017) at 2-9 [The FDA has licensed synthetic drugs based on cannabinoids, for
example, Dronabinol and Nabilone, synthetic THC products clinically indicated to counteract the nausea
and vomiting association with chemotherapy and to stimulate hunger in AIDS patients] [National
Academies].
9

Ibid at 1-10.

10

Maisto, Stephen A., Mark Galizio & Gerard J. Connors, Drug Use and Abuse, 7th ed (Stamford, CT:
Cengage Learning, 2015) at 259 [Maisto, Galizio & Connors].
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whether or not cannabis is harmful is very much debated, but, there is consensus that at
the very least, it is not nearly as dangerous as tobacco or alcohol.11
In order to contain this project, the analysis focuses on the advertising and promotion
restrictions, and does not analyze the packaging and labelling restrictions. Additionally,
the scope of this project is limited to challenging the promotion provisions on the basis
that they are an unjustified infringement on freedom of expression. A separate analysis
for freedom of expression cases that involve expression on public property has been
developed in Canadian jurisprudence12, but due to the nature of the proposed cannabis
advertising restrictions, this thesis does not analyze the restrictions on the basis of
freedom of expression on public property, and instead focuses on cases where there is a
health element. As alluded to earlier, there are various grounds on which advertising
restrictions could be challenged. In order to contain the scope of this project, division of
powers will not be discussed in depth. This thesis focuses specifically on whether
cannabis advertising restrictions violate freedom of expression. The reason for doing so is
based on past jurisprudential success. In RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney
General)13, the legislation restricting advertising was challenged both as an unjustified
infringement of section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms14, and also
as an unconstitutional use of federal powers pursuant to the Constitution Act15. The
division of powers argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).16 The

11

See e.g., Dirk W. Lachenmeier & Jürgen Rehm, “Comparative Risk Assessment of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Cannabis and Other Illicit Drugs Using the Margin of Exposure Approach” (2015) 5:8126 PMC 1
[Lachenmeier & Rehm].
12

See e.g. Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62 [Montréal (City)].

13

RJR-MacDonald (SCC), supra note 5.

14

Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
15
16

1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution].

RJR-MacDonald (SCC), supra note 5 [Despite the Quebec Superior Court finding that the legislation
infringed up the rights of the provinces to legislate in the area, the SCC held that the Act’s purpose to
protect the public’s health was sufficient to meet the requirements to use the criminal law power, namely, it
is directed at a public health evil, and is accompanied by a prohibition and a penalty].
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remainder of this chapter will discuss the theoretical framework that informs this paper,
in addition to the methodologies used.

1.1. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework guiding this research is premised on the core philosophical
and ethical issue that plagues public health law and policy: the balancing of population
and individual rights. In the context of this project, the population rights include the right
to be protected from fraudulent, misleading, or inciting advertising of marijuana. An
additional concern is exposure to advertising will lead to increased prevalence of use,
particularly amongst youth, and therefore an increase in the occurrence of harms.17 The
individual rights are two-fold, and include the rights of the speaker, in this case,
corporations or individuals wishing to advertise their products for economic reasons, and
the rights of potential consumers, or the hearer, to receive accurate product information,
promoting consumer choice and individual self-fulfilment.
Public health law research has consistently been informed by utilitarianism, liberalism,
and communitarianism when balancing the infringement of individual rights against
government actions to preserve or protect public health.18 A new legal theory in the
public health domain is Wendy Parmet’s population-based legal analysis, which is set out
thoroughly in her book Populations, Public Health, and the Law19. The core tenet of
Parmet’s theory is that the “law ought to protect and promote the health of

17

See e.g. Elizabeth J. D’Amico, Jeremy N.V. Miles & Joan S. Tucker “Gateway to Curiosity: Medical
Marijuana Ads and Intention and Use during Middle School” (2015) 29:3 Psychology of Addictive
Behaviours 613 [D’Amico, Miles & Tucker].
18

See e.g. Dan E. Beauchamp, “Public health and Individual Liberty” (1980) 1 Ann Rev Public Health
121; James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim. “Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A
Framework and Vision for Public Health” (2003) 55 Fla L Rev 1191; James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer.
“Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public Health, and the Legacy of Jacobson v Massachusetts” (2005) 95:4
American Journal of Public Health 51; Lawrence O. Gostin, “Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism:
Rethinking Individual Rights and Common Goods” (2002) 21 Health Affairs 79; Marc Lappé, “Values and
Public Health: Value Considerations in Setting Health Policy” (1983) 4:1 Theoretical Medicine 71; Howard
M. Leichter, “’Evil habits’ and ‘personal choices’: Assigning Responsibility for Health in the 20th
Century” (2003) 81 Millbank Quarterly 603; Wendy E. Parmet, “Liberalism, Communitarianism, and
Public Health: Comments on Lawrence O. Gostin’s Lecture” (2003) 55:5 Fla L Rev 1221.
19

(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009) [Parmet].
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populations.”20 This theory emerged in part as a result of the challenges associated with
the increasing prevalence of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, and particularly the issues
present when attempting to reconcile systemic differences in public health scholarship
and legal scholarship.21 This approach is premised on the concept that one of many
rationales for law is the protection and promotion of public health.22 Population-based
legal analysis is not meant to disparage other values, such as individual autonomy,
democracy, or equality, it merely claims that public health is one goal that needs to be
considered in legal decision making.23 Additionally, Parmet’s theory asserts that law
must acknowledge the importance of populations in addition to individuals, and consider
empirical knowledge as well as probabilistic reasoning, which health law has typically
relied on exclusively.24 Population-based legal analysis challenges individualism, but
strives not to threaten the safeguards developed by law to protect the vulnerable and limit
the intrusion of government into an individual’s choice.25
Parmet has applied her theory to free speech in an American context.26 She asserts that a
population approach views free speech “as designed to protect groups or populations,
rather than merely individual interests.”27 A population approach also insists that we
consider how speech affects populations, particularly the fact that actions and policies
affect populations differently than they do individuals.28 Thus, speech and the laws that

20

Ibid.

21

See Wendy E. Parmet, “Population-Based Legal Analysis: Bridging the Interdisciplinary Chasm
Through Public Health in Law” (2016) 66:1 Journal of Legal Education 100.
22

Parmet, supra note 19 at 2 [This foundation, upon which Parmet’s theory rests has been criticized for
prioritizing public health over other goals of law, however, Parmet clearly states that public health is but
one goal of many that law strives to improve].
23

Wendy E. Parmet & Jason Smith. “Free Speech and Public Health: A Population-based Approach to the
First Amendment” (2006) 39 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 363 at 432 [Parmet & Smith].
24

Parmet, supra note 19 at 2.

25

Ibid at 3.

26

Parmet & Smith, supra note 23 at 432.

27

Ibid at 436.

28

Ibid at 437.
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limit it may have different effects upon different populations.29 Population-based legal
analysis incorporates public health methodologies and approaches, particularly
epidemiology, which is “the study of health events in a population.”30 In doing so,
population-based legal analysis acknowledges that epidemiological information can
inform legal analysis, and should be used by courts in balancing rights in cases of
commercial speech infringement.31 In following Parmet’s approach, this project relies
heavily on scientific and medical research regarding cannabis to inform the constitutional
analysis.

1.2. Methodology
This project utilized two methodologies: (a) doctrinal legal analysis; and, (b) an analysis
of secondary literature relating to (i) freedom of expression; (ii) the benefits and harms of
cannabis use; and, (iii) advertising. Each will be discussed in turn.

1.2.1.

Doctrinal legal analysis

Doctrinal legal analysis is used to determine whether restrictions on advertising cannabis
are constitutional. The analysis in this thesis is primarily centered on case law that deals
with freedom of expression, particularly as it pertains to advertising or other commercial
speech. Jurisprudence was collected by noting up section 2(b) of the Charter and
identifying cases to see how the courts have balanced the right of commercial speech
against competing rights, typically the protection of the public. This project primarily
relies on SCC cases, but refers to appeal and trial level decisions that relate to
commercial speech, particularly where the facts involve public health risks or benefits.
Additionally, in chronicling the history of cannabis laws in Canada, all three medical
cannabis regulatory schemes were noted up: the Medical Marihuana Access

29

Ibid at 432 (Parmet and Smith use the example of children versus adults, and school children as a sub
population).
30

Ibid at 440.

31

Ibid at 440-1.
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Regulations32, the Marijuana for Medical Purposes Regulations33, and the ACMPR, in
order to identify cases challenging each respective regulatory scheme.

1.2.2.

Secondary Literature Analysis

1.2.2.1.

Freedom of Expression

A systematic review of secondary literature (including both monographs and journal
articles) on the topic of freedom of expression was conducted to provide a thorough and
accurate literature review on the topic. To limit the results, it focused on literature
situated in the Canadian context. Given the breadth of literature surveying section 2(b)
broadly, the search was narrowed to return both monographs and articles solely analyzing
commercial speech, and furthermore, commercial speech accompanied by public health
concern. Searches were conducted on legal databases, including LexisNexis Quicklaw,
Westlaw, HeinOnline, and non-legal databases, such as Western’s Library Catalogue and
Google Scholar.

1.2.2.2.

Cannabis

Methodical database searches on PubMed, Google Scholar, Cochrane Databases,
HeinOnline, and Western’s Library catalogue were conducted.34 Additionally,
monographs on the topic released in the last 15 years were identified. This project
required differentiating cannabis, both recreational and medicinal, from tobacco products
in terms of potential and actual harms. To do that, a thorough search on scientific and
social science databases on the population and individual harms of marijuana use was

32

SOR/2013-119, s 267 [Repealed] [MMAR].

33

SOR/2016-230 [Repealed] [MMPR].

34

Using the following search terms combinations to identify any relevant sources:
-

marijuana AND advertis* AND commercial speech

-

marijuana AND advertis* AND freedom of expression

-

marijuana AND marketing AND commercial speech

-

marijuana AND marketing AND freedom of expression

All of the databases selected automatically expand the search term marijuana to include cannabis and
marihuana.

10

conducted. Where possible, systematic reviews or meta-analyses were relied upon. Case
studies, animal studies, or in vitro studies were avoided, relying primarily on human
research, unless they were unavailable. Additionally, research from other jurisdictions
that have legalized recreational marijuana, primarily Washington and Colorado, was
utilized for data on the actual implications of cannabis legalization. Further articles and
reports were identified in the references of the materials returned from searches.

1.2.2.3.

Advertising

In order to assess the advertising provisions contained in Bill C-45, particularly at the
rational connection stage, research regarding advertising practices and their effects on
consumption was conducted, particularly related to youth. Because of the dearth of
research looking at cannabis advertising, research on the impact of various alcohol and
tobacco marketing practices was sought out. Various databases were used, including
Google Scholar, PubMed, and Western’s Library Catalogue.
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2. Introduction to Cannabis & Harms
2.1. Introduction
It has been argued that one of the goals of legalizing cannabis for recreational use is to
reduce the harms35 associated with the criminalization of cannabis, including: interacting
with the black market36, illegal crops, adulterated products, barriers to seeking treatment,
and the burden imposed on the Canadian legal system.37 However, legalization comes
with its own harms, including increased rates of use and associated risks, normalization
of use, and increased availability of cannabis to minors. These harms form the basis for
specific regulations. Cannabis use is not risk-free, and any legalization regulatory scheme
should attempt to mitigate or eliminate harms where possible. The notion of harm will be
particularly important if the regulatory framework is subject to any constitutional
analysis. If the legislation is challenged, potential harms will be considered against the
actual or potential benefits by the court when assessing the objective of the impugned
legislation, as well as the proportionality. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the best
current knowledge regarding the potential for harm with recreational cannabis use, as
well as possible benefits. However, because cannabis is a class of products rather than a
homogenous product, research does not always account for variables between specific
products and how they are used, such as cannabinoid content, history of use, method of
delivery, or individual factors that impact the effects of cannabis, such as age, experience,
tolerance, etc.

35

For the purposes of this thesis, harm is defined as “actual or potential ill effect or danger” including
physical harm, mental or emotional harms, and population-level social harm. In contrast, “risk” refers to
being exposed to a danger. (Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “harm” online:
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/harm>; Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “risk”
online: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/risk>)
36

Harms associated with purchasing and using black market cannabis include, greater likelihood of
encountering weapons, adulterated or contaminated products, being mugged or otherwise assaulted, being
blackmailed, and consumers being less likely to contact the police or other authorities for fear of legal
ramifications.
37

Bill C-45, An Act respecting cannabis and to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the
Criminal Code and other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2017 [Bill C-45].
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As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, cannabis has a long and complex history
with the law. It’s history of being used as a medical and/or recreational substance is even
longer, and arguably, more complex. The earliest recorded use of the cannabis plant can
be dated to more than 10,000 years ago, on the island of Taiwan, where archaeologists
discovered evidence that cannabis was used for rope, cloth, fishing nets and paper,38
although the use of cannabis as medicine and recreational drug did not occur until much
later.39 Over the past 10,000 years cannabis has been used for a variety of religious,
medical, spiritual, and recreational purposes. Cannabis also has a long tradition of being
viewed with suspicion, in some cases being forbidden or discouraged due to the
perceived harms associated with its use. Less than one hundred years ago, cannabis was
believed to be incredibly dangerous. In 1922, Magistrate Emily Murphy wrote Canada’s
first book on drug abuse, The Black Candle, in which she vilified cannabis use. Murphy
wrote:
Persons using this narcotic, smoke the dried leaves of the plant, which has
the effect of driving them completely insane. The addict loses all sense of
moral responsibility. Addicts to this drug, while under its influence, are
immune to pain and could be severely injured without having any
realization of their condition. While in this condition they become raving
maniacs and are liable to kill or indulge in any form of violence to other
persons, using the most savage methods of cruelty without, as said before
any sense of moral responsibility. When coming from under the influence
of this narcotic, these victims present the most horrible condition
imaginable. They are dispossessed of their natural and normal will power,
and their mentality is that of idiots. If this drug is indulged to any great
extent, it ends in the untimely death of its addict.40

38

See Ernest L. Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980) at 4.

39

Andrew Hand et al, “History of Medical Cannabis” (2016) 9:4 Journal of Pain Management 387 [Hand]
[The earliest evidence of cannabis cultivation dates to 4000 BCE in China, where cannabis was farmed as a
major food crop.]
40

Emily F. Murphy, The Black Candle (Toronto, T. Allen, 1922) at 332-33 [Murphy].
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While we have come a long way in our understanding of cannabis and its effects on
humans, there is a lot of debate in the scientific and medical literature, popular media,
and politics about the relative safety or harm of cannabis use. The purpose of this chapter
is not to advocate for a particular view on the safety of cannabis use, or to come to a
conclusion about how risky (or safe) cannabis use is, but instead it aims to provide an
overview of the available evidence in order to determine whether or not the concept of
harmfulness will impact the constitutional analysis of the advertising restrictions
contained in Bill C-45, and if it does, to what degree.
After Part two’s brief summary of the methodology utilized in this chapter, Part three of
this chapter will look at Canadian constitutional jurisprudence on commercial free speech
and the role of harm in assessing section 1 analyses for violations of freedom of
expression. From there, Part four will provide a brief introduction to cannabis and
cannabinoids, followed by a summary of the prevalence of cannabis use in Canada. Part
six describes some of the issues inherent to researching cannabis, such as the
heterogeneity of cannabis products and the different effects cannabis can cause
depending on the mode of administration. Finally, Part seven provides a summary of the
evidence supporting (or refuting) the medical use of cannabis, and Part eight provides a
summary of the evidence regarding the harms associated with cannabis use. The harms of
cannabis use are divided into acute and long-term risks, and long-term risks is further
subdivided into categories by body system, followed by population-level risks.

2.2. The Concept of Harm in Freedom of Expression Litigation
The concept of harm plays a significant role in commercial speech litigation.
Unfortunately, the way that courts have considered and treated harm has been
inconsistent, or even contradictory. In some cases, the concept of harm prevails
throughout the entire judicial decision whereas in others it is not mentioned at all. While
this difference may be explained by the facts of each case41, it nevertheless results in

41

For example, in Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario) [1990] 2 SCR 232, SCJ No 65
[Rocket], the advertising being restricted (advertising for dentistry services) was not being restricted
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confusion about what constitutes harm and how this will factor into the court’s decision.
This section provides an overview of how the concept of harm has factored into the
leading SCC freedom of expression and commercial speech cases. Four ways in which
harm factors into the analysis are considered: (1) at the division of powers analysis, (2) in
determining whether section 2(b) has been infringed, (3) in the use of evidence, and (4) in
the Oakes analysis. Each section also considers how these factors may be relevant to Bill
C-45, should it be challenged.
First, the possibility of harm is relevant to a division of powers analysis. In order for a
law to be classified as a criminal law, and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the
federal government, the law must meet three requirements: a valid criminal law purpose
backed by a prohibition and a penalty.42 Valid purposes of the criminal law were broadly
categorized by Estey J in Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd v Attorney General of
Canada43 to include public peace, order, security, health and morality. In that case, it was
found that that health hazard may be used to ground a criminal prohibition. Therefore,
harm may be used to justify classifying the exercise of powers as properly within the
federal jurisdiction. This principle was affirmed in Keegstra, Swain, and RJRMacDonald. In R v Keegstra44, Dickson CJ (as he then was), writing for the majority
stated that “[i]t is well accepted that Parliament can use the criminal law power to prevent
the risk of serious harms.” 45 In R v Swain46, Lamer CJ (as he then was) stated that “it has
long been recognized that there also exists a preventative branch of the criminal law

because of its potential to cause harm, but rather was restricted by the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of
Ontario. In contrast, in RJR-MacDonald, the advertising was being restricted because of its potential
42

Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), 2000 SCC 31 at para 27.

43

[1980] 1 SCR 914.

44

[1990] 3 SCR 697, SCJ No 131 [Keegstra]

45

Ibid at para 114.

46

[1991] 1 SCR 933, SCJ No 32.
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power.”47 In RJR-MacDonald, the SCC confirmed that the power to legislate with respect
to dangerous goods also includes the power to introduce legislation regarding health
warnings on dangerous goods.48 Therefore, the concept of harm often plays a role in
division of power issues, where the federal government argues that the impugned
legislation is an appropriate use of their criminal law power. In RJR-MacDonald’s Court
of Appeal decision, the Court concluded that the pith and substance of the Tobacco
Products Control Act49 was reducing tobacco use, and therefore, was an attempt to
protect the public from the harmful effects of tobacco.50 At the SCC, however, the court
questioned whether tobacco advertising itself was harmful, entitling Parliament to
prohibit or regulate it under the criminal law. When comparing tobacco advertising to
other types of speech that parliament had criminalized, such as obscenity, the court had
difficultly seeing a comparison.51 It is likely that any challenge to the Cannabis Act will
argue that the legislation is both ultra vires the federal government and that it infringes
freedom of expression, and thus consideration of whether the Act prevents harm,
allowing the federal government to rely on the criminal law power, is an important
consideration. However, as this paper is focused on freedom of expression, it is not
necessary here to categorize the pith and substance of the Act.
Second, there is some question about whether or not commercial speech should be
afforded protection where the product (or service) being promoted is harmful. In Ford v
Quebec (Attorney General)52, the Court supported the argument that Parliament cannot
“suppress truthful and non-misleading advertising of lawful products on the grounds that

47

Ibid at 999.

48

RJR-MacDonald (SCC), supra note 5 at para 41.

49

SC 1988, c-20 [TPCA].

50

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 102 DLR (4th) 289, RJQ 375 (QL) at 34
(CA) [RJR-MacDonald (1993)].
51

RJR-MacDonald (SCC), supra note 5 at paras 203, 206.

52

[1988] 2 SCR 712, SCJ No 88 [Ford].
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the information to be conveyed would have a harmful effect”53, suggesting that harm is
not a sufficient reason to strip commercial expression of protection. In contrast, the
Attorney General in RJR-MacDonald, at the trial level, argued that freedom of expression
does not protect “promotion activities relating to a product described as being harmful, if
not fatal to one’s health.”54 The Attorney General filed evidence in an attempt to
demonstrate the harmful nature of tobacco use, and that advertising is used to increase
consumption.55 The trial court was not convinced by this argument. Chabot J held:
“[a]ssuming…that the evidence before the Court clearly established the harmfulness of
tobacco, the Court must nonetheless conclude that the T.P.C.A. does not in any way
address this harm.”56 Chabot J stressed that it was not the advertising that causes harm,
but using tobacco.57 Chabot J interpreted the Attorney General’s argument to be that
tobacco is so harmful that any expression connected to it, except for the State’s, should
be prohibited, and found this position to be “unacceptable under the Canadian Charter.”58
At the Court of Appeal, the respondent tobacco companies defended their right to
advertise a product widely recognized to be harmful.59 The Court recognized that the
issue was a balancing of the Respondent’s right to promote their economic interests and
the public health concerns connected to smoking tobacco.60 The SCC acknowledged that
the harms associated with tobacco, and the profit motive of the advertisers resulted in the
specific form of expression existing far from the core values underlying freedom of
expression, entitling it to a very low degree of protection. In contrast, expression that is
closely linked to the underlying rationales will be afforded a higher degree of protection.

53

Ibid at para 47 [in reaching this decision, the court referred to the American case Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc.425 US 748 (1976)].
54

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [1991] RJQ 2260, 82 DLR (4th) 449 (QL) (Sup Ct)
at 3 [RJR-MacDonald (1991)].
55

Ibid at 9-10

56

Ibid at 14.

57

Ibid.

58

Ibid at 25.

59

RJR-MacDonald (1993), supra note 50 at 20.

60

Ibid at 25.
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Tobacco advertising serves no political, scientific, or artistic purposes, instead its purpose
is to inform consumers about a product that is harmful and to persuade them to purchase
it.61 While the Attorney General may advance the same reasoning should Bill C-45 be
challenged, it is unlikely to be successful based on the jurisprudence, which clearly
confirms that potential or actual harm of a product or service is not sufficient to strip it of
constitutional protection entirely. It may be sufficient, however, to justify a lower
threshold to pass section 1 scrutiny.
Third, courts have inconsistently utilized scientific evidence for assessing risk and/or
harm; in some cases, significant amounts of scientific evidence have ultimately informed
the section 1 analysis, while in others a common sense causal relationship has been
satisfactory. In the trial decision of RJR-MacDonald, the Attorney General introduced a
significant amount of evidence relating to the health harms of tobacco use; however,
Chabot J stated that it was not the court’s role to decide whether tobacco is or is not
harmful, stating “the expert scientific evidence…was…irrelevant to the case.”62 This
failure to rule on the harmful effects of tobacco was the Appellant’s first ground of
appeal to the Court of Appeal.63 At the SCC, La Forest J (in dissent) disagreed with
Chabot J’s finding, instead finding “the nature and scope of the health problems raised by
tobacco consumption are highly relevant to the s. 1 analysis, both in determining the
appropriate standard of justification and in weighing the relevant evidence.” 64 In
contrast, in R v Butler65 the Court accepted that it would be difficult to show a direct link
between obscenity and harm, but accepted that “it is reasonable to presume that exposure
to images bears a causal relationship to changes and attitudes and beliefs.”66 Further, the
Court noted “[w]hile the accuracy of this perception is not susceptible of exact proof,

61

RJR-MacDonald (SCC), supra note 5 at para 75.

62

RJR-MacDonald (1991), supra note 54 at 28- 29.

63

RJR-MacDonald (1993), supra note 50 at 28.

64

RJR-MacDonald (SCC), supra note 5 at para 66.

65

[1992] 2 SCR 452, SCJ No 15 [Butler].

66

Ibid at para 103
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there is a substantial body of opinion that holds that the portrayal of persons being
subjected to degrading or dehumanizing sexual treatment results in harm, particularly to
women and therefore to society as a whole.”67 In the case of cannabis, harm is not nearly
as clear-cut as it is for tobacco or obscenity, and so how much evidence the Court
considers, if any, could have a significant impact on the Oakes analysis. For example, in
R v Malmo-Levine, a case which involved hearing the appeals of two separate challenges
to the constitutionality of cannabis prohibition, demonstrates the inconsistencies
regarding the acceptance of evidence by the courts. In the case of the first plaintiff,
Malmo-Levine, the trial judge refused to hear evidence regarding the unconstitutionality
of the offence of possession of cannabis; a decision that was later held by the SCC to be
an error.68 In contrast, in the case of the second plaintiff, the trial judge heard extensive
evidence regarding the harm caused by cannabis.69
Fourth, judicial reasoning suggests that the degree of harmfulness of the product being
advertised may affect all stages of the Oakes analysis. Each stage of the Oakes analysis
will be discussed in turn. In determining whether the objective of the impugned
legislation is pressing and substantial, harm is a central concept. Courts have consistently
accepted the avoidance or mitigation of harm as sufficient to satisfy this step. In Butler,
the avoidance of harm was identified by the applicant as one pressing and substantial
objective for overriding the constitutional protection afforded to the distribution of
obscene materials. The respondents re-characterized this as the state acting as a “moral
custodian.”70 In its decision, the majority referred to Keegstra, where the SCC accepted
that the prevention of the effects of hate propaganda was a legitimate objective.71 In
Keegstra, the harm was two-fold: hate speech directly harms those to whom the speech is

67

Ibid at para 50

68

R v Malmo-Levine (1998) 54 CRR (2d) 291 (BCSC) [the SCC later held that trial judge erred in
excluding this evidence].
69

R v Caine (1998) BCJ No 885 (QL) (Prov Ct) [the SCC held that this approach to hearing evidence was
more appropriate]
70

Butler, supra note 65 at para 77.

71

Ibid 15 at para 87.
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directed and it harms society at large.72 The majority questioned whether hate propaganda
was significant enough in Canada to warrant Parliamentary intervention, before
ultimately concluding that it “was not insignificant.”73 In fact, the majority noted that
hate propaganda harms not only the persons on the receiving end of the hate propaganda,
but also those who spew hate propaganda, noting, “breeding hate is detrimental to society
for psychological and social reasons and that it can easily create hostility and aggression
which leads to violence”.74 Based on the jurisprudence, avoidance of harm appears to be
sufficient to pass the pressing and substantial requirement of the section 1 analysis.
The avoidance of harm, when used as the pressing and substantial objective, will impact
the remainder of the Oakes test depending on how narrowly or broadly it is categorized.
If the harm being avoided or mitigated is defined broadly, it is generally easier for it to
pass the rational connection test, because it will be easier to connect the infringement to
the objective of avoiding or mitigating the harm in question. In Butler, Sopinka J, writing
for the majority, conceptualized the harm in question broadly, and in so doing, made it
difficult for the statutory definition of obscenity that was under consideration to fail the
rational connection test.75 When harm is defined more narrowly, however, it will be more
difficult to pass the rational connection test, because it will necessarily be more difficult
to connect the infringement to the objective.76 Harm is also considered in the minimal
impairment analysis. In RJR-MacDonald, the SCC advised the legislature that it needed
to differentiate between harmful advertising and benign advertising, suggesting that
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Supra note 44 at paras 60-62.

73

Ibid at para 59.

74

Ibid at para 10.

75

Supra note 65 at paras 88, 92 [Sopinka J categorized the harm generally as “the harm associated with the
dissemination of pornography.” Earlier, he stated that the materials in question cause similar harms as those
recognized by the courts in the past, namely, they “seriously offend the values fundamental to our society”]
See also Jamie Cameron, “Abstract Principle v. Contextual Conceptions of Harm: A comment on R v
Butler” (1992) 37 McGill LJ 1135 at 1148 [as an example of a more specific articulation of the harms being
avoided by section 163(8), Cameron suggests that protecting victims of sexual assault or victims of sexual
exploitation could have been listed as objective rather than a more generalized protection against societal
level harms.]
76

Ibid at 1150.
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restrictions must be sufficiently specific to prevent the articulated harm, and no more.77 If
the harm is defined more broadly, this will afford the defendant government greater
latitude than if the harm is articulated more specifically, which will require an equally
specific response.
The nature of the harm also impacts the proportionality analysis. In Sopinka J’s
dissenting decision in RJR-MacDonald, he stated: “I believe that any concern arising
from this technical infringement of their rights is easily outweighed by the pressing
health concerns raised by tobacco consumption.”78 In that case, the significant harms
associated with tobacco use made it easy for the dissenting opinion to justify the negative
impact of the legislation on the advertiser’s rights, a position that was later affirmed in
Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-MacDonald79. In JTI-MacDonald, the Court found
significant benefits associated with decreasing tobacco use and discouraging young
people from becoming addicted to tobacco, and that the deleterious effects on the right to
freedom of expression were slight in comparison. Specifically, a unanimous Court noted,
“[w]hen commercial expression is used, as alleged here, for the purpose of inducing
people to engage in harmful and addictive behavior, its value becomes tenuous”,
suggesting that it will be easier to restrict commercial expression if a product is
harmful.80 From this, it is likely that the harms associated with cannabis use will play a
role in the Oakes analysis. What is less clear is just how important harm will be in this
analysis. This will be further explored in Chapter 5.

2.3.

Introduction to Cannabis & Cannabinoids

Before providing a summary of the medical and scientific evidence regarding the harms
of cannabis use, it is worthwhile to explore some of the basic properties of cannabis.
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Supra note 5 at para 188.
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Ibid at para 118.
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Cannabis is an incredibly unique81 and heterogeneous product, which makes it
particularly challenging to regulate. Rather than viewing cannabis as one product –or one
drug – it is more appropriate to view it as a family of drugs, called cannabinoids.82 In the
next chapter, the longstanding relationship between cannabis and the law in Canada is
discussed, but in this chapter the broader history and evolution of the human use of
cannabis is explored. Cannabis is one of the world’s oldest cultivated plants, having been
used by humans for religious, medical, recreational, and spiritual purposes for
millennia.83 Despite its lengthy history of human use, little was understood about the
plant until recently. More than 100 different cannabinoids, which are chemical
compounds in the cannabis plant, have been identified in the cannabis plant, in addition
to other components.84 Of the identified cannabinoids, the two most frequently studied
are delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and cannabidiol (CBD). CBD was first isolated
in 1940, and is touted for its medical applications because it lacks the impairing
properties of THC, and it has antioxidant and anti-inflammatory properties.85 THC,
however, was not isolated until 1964.86 Of all the cannabinoids, THC receives the most
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Johnathan P Caulkins et al, Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012) [Caulkins] at 6 [Cannabis is the only known substance that works on the
endocannabinoid system, and does not fit well into any defined categories of drugs – it is often categorized
as a hallucinogen, but it does not always have a psychotropic effect. Similarly, depending on the strain, it
could be a depressant, similar to alcohol, or energizing, similar to a stimulant. Furthermore, while most
drugs influence dopamine, serotonin, or GABA receptors, cannabis reacts to unique receptors and a unique
neurotransmitter].
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Kathryn Greenaway, “Medical Marijuana proven to help manage pain and ease symptoms” (March 15,
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attention because of its impairing abilities.87 Other components of the cannabis plant
include terpenes, nitrogenous compounds, and plant molecules.88 While cannabinoids are
unique to the cannabis plant, terpenes, which are essential oil components, are present in
a wide variety of plants, and in some insects. For example, pinene, a terpene found in
some strains of cannabis, is also present in conifers, such as pine trees.89 These
components are all important because they work together in what is called the “entourage
effect” to create a unique outcome depending on the extent to which each compound is
present.90 For example, the terpene myrcene is known to have analgesic and sedative
effects, and it is believed that when myrcene is combined with THC, the two together
may produce ‘couch-lock.’91 The entourage effect makes it difficult to both assess the
effects of individual components, because their effects may be altered by the other
compounds present in cannabis, and the effect of the cannabis plant as a whole, because
there is so much variability.
Cannabis works primarily on the endocannabinoid system. Two cannabinoid receptors
have been identified: CB1 and CB2. They are uniquely stimulated by THC.92 CB1
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receptors are located primarily in the areas of the brain that control memory, cognition,
the motor system, and mood, while CB2 receptors are most prevalent in the immune
system, but are also found in other tissues, including the brain.93 The endocannabinoid
system plays a role in brain development and maturation, the regulation of appetite,
memory and cognition, mood, pain, sleep, inflammation, and other physical and mental
functions.94 As a result, cannabis can have incredibly wide-ranging effects on users.
Additionally, there are two species of cannabis plant that are commonly used
recreationally: Indica and Sativa. Although no statistically based studies have been
published regarding the differentiation between Indica and Sativa strains, they are viewed
as two ends of a spectrum, with hybrids, or cross-breeds, in-between.95 Sativa plants tend
to be taller, with narrower leaflets, higher levels of THC, and little or no CBD. 96 Sativas
are generally more potent than Indicas, producing a euphoric, uplifting, and energizing
impairment that is desired for daytime cannabis use.97 In contrast, Indica plants are
shorter with large and wide leaves, containing moderate levels of THC and CBD.98 The
result is a more subdued impairment, characterized by a relaxing ‘body buzz’, stress
relief, and drowsiness, making it more suitable for nighttime use.99
Cannabinoids are not readily available in raw cannabis plant material, but cannabis can
be manufactured into a variety of products that allow for the release of cannabinoids. The
product most commonly associated with cannabis is the dried flower buds, commonly
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referred to as marijuana. Marijuana is most commonly combusted (via application of
heat), to release the cannabinoids into smoke or vapour that is inhaled by the user. The
resin from cannabis plants, referred to as hash, can also be combusted and inhaled.
Additionally, cannabis oil can be manufactured in several ways: dried marijuana can be
cooked in an oil (such as butter or coconut oil) to release the cannabinoids, or a solvent
(such as butane or isopropyl alcohol) can be used to strip the cannabinoids and then
boiled off, leaving behind the oil. Oil can be ingested by baking it into an edible (such as
a brownie or cookie), or in its pure form. Some oil preparations can also be combusted
and inhaled. More recently, alternative cannabis preparations have become more popular,
such as tinctures, topical creams or lotions, and oral sprays. The mode of administration
can affect the onset, intensity, and duration of the psychotropic effects, effects on organ
systems, addictive potential, and negative consequences associated with cannabis use,
resulting in a wide-range of outcomes for users.100
Besides those already mentioned, there are several other properties of cannabis that make
assessing the harms associated with its use problematic. Cannabis has a bi-phasic effect:
low doses often produce outcomes opposite to those resulting from higher doses.101
Additionally, other factors, such as environment, expectations, individual personality,
degree of tolerance, and time-frame, to name a few, will all impact the experience of the
user. 102 Differences in individual rate of absorption and metabolism of THC can also
impact the effects of using cannabis.103 Another relevant property of cannabis is that it is
fat soluble, which means that traces of cannabis can remain in the blood and urine
samples much longer than impairment is experienced.104
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Consequently, the experience of being under the influence of cannabis can vary,
depending on a variety of factors, including: the dose, the type of strain, the user and their
purpose in using, and the social circumstances.105 Although the degree of impairment
experienced by cannabis users varies widely, there are four generally recognized stages
of impairment: buzz, high, stoned, and the comedown. The buzz stage begins shortly
after inhalation106, and users may experience tingling in the extremities, dizziness, lightheadedness, feelings of warmth, increased heart rate, and dry mouth.107 The high stage is
typically accompanied by feelings of euphoria, exhilaration, and disinhibition.108 If a
sufficient dose is taken by the user, the high will progress to the stoned stage. At this
stage, the user typically feels calm and relaxed, and may experience altered sensations,
such as enhanced visual perception, illusions, and slowing of time.109 Lastly, during the
comedown the user will experience a gradual decline of the before-mentioned effects.
The length of the comedown depends on the dose taken and the method of
administration.110 Other acute physiological and psychological responses to cannabis use
will be discussed later in this chapter.

2.4. Cannabis Use in Canada
One of the difficulties in determining the risks associated with cannabis use is
differentiating between the risks to an individual and the risks on a population level. To
assess the population-level burden of cannabis use, it is necessary to understand how
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prevalent cannabis use is in Canada, and how that might change upon legalization. To
determine the impact legalization may have on use, the experiences following
legalization or decriminalization in other jurisdictions can be instructive.111 Cannabis is
the most commonly used illicit substance in the world, and the third most commonly used
recreational drug after alcohol and tobacco.112 According to the 2012 Canadian
Community Health Survey – Mental Health, 43% of Canadians aged 15 or older reported
having used cannabis at some point in their lives, and 12% reported using it in the past
year.113 Between 2002 and 2012, rates of cannabis use declined among those aged 15-17,
remained stable among 18-24 year olds, and increased slightly among older populations.
Daily use was reported by 1.8% of Canadians aged 15 or older, and weekly use was
reported by an additional 3.2%.114 Comparatively, 18.1% of Canadians aged 12 or older
reported being current cigarette smokers in 2014. Of the roughly 5.4 million current
smokers, approximately 4 million were daily smokers.115 Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that the population-level health burden of tobacco is much higher than that of
cannabis.
One of the concerns driving the regulation of the recreational cannabis market is youth
use of cannabis. In Ontario, a 2013 survey of approximately 10,000 students in grades 7
through 12 found that 21.3% reported using cannabis in the past year, down from 28% in
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1999.116 The 2013 study found that males and females were equally likely to use, and that
rates of use increased with each grade level.117 Only 2% of surveyed students reported
using cannabis daily or experiencing symptoms of cannabis dependence.118 While there is
some data from Colorado suggests that rates of youth use may increase following
legalization, the majority of the evidence suggests otherwise. In the two years following
legalization of recreational cannabis in Colorado, reported past month marijuana use in
youth increased 20%, while national past month cannabis youth in youth decreased 4% in
the same time.119 A similar increase was found in college-age Coloradans; past month use
increased 17% in the two years following legalization in Colorado, compared to a
national increase of 2% during the same time.120 However, the most significant increase
was among adult Coloradans. Adult past month cannabis use increased 63% in the two
years following legalization; interestingly, adult past month use also increased 21%
nationally in the same time.121
In contrast, a study conducted by Healthy Kids Colorado found that youth use of
cannabis decreased after legalization, with only 21% of youth reporting use of cannabis
in the last 30 days in 2015, compared to 25% in 2009.122 This finding is more consistent
with the findings in other jurisdictions. Data from Washington state shows that there was
no significant increase in youth use of cannabis in the two years following legalization; in
fact the rates of 8th and 10th grade students who reported using cannabis in the past 30
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days decreased.123 Similarly, the prevalence of cannabis use in the Netherlands, where
cannabis has been decriminalized for over 40 years, is lower than other European
countries, Canada, and the United States.124 Therefore, while it is possible that Canada
will experience an increase in use following legalization, data from other jurisdictions
suggests it is not a certainty. Additionally, legalization may mitigate potential risks, such
as fewer people using adulterated or harmful products, and less interaction with black
market drug dealers, resulting in a net positive benefit.125

2.5. The Problem of Researching Cannabis
One of the reasons that regulating recreational cannabis is so challenging is because of
the difficulties associated with cannabis research that prevent policy makers and
politicians from creating policies based on evidence. Cannabis has been prohibited for
nearly a century, making it difficult for researchers to acquire cannabis material.
Additionally, prohibition makes it difficult to capture accurate data on use, because
participants may be hesitant to admit to using an illegal substance. Notably, it remains a
Schedule I substance in the United States, categorized as having no medical benefit,

123

Washington State Institute for Public Policy, “I-502 Evaluation Plan and Preliminary Report on
Implementation” (September 2015) online: <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1616/Wsipp_I-502Evaluation-Plan-and-Preliminary-Report-on-Implementation_Report.pdf>; Similar results were reported in
Oregon and Alaska. See Alaska Department of Health and Social Services Division of Public Health,
“Alaska Youth Risk Behavior Survey – 2015 Highlights” (October 2016) online:
<http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Chronic/Documents/yrbs/2015YRBS_Highlights.pdf> [youth reporting using
marijuana during the last 30 days decreased from 20.5% in 2007 to 19% in 2015]; Oregon Health Authority
“2015 Oregon Healthy Teens Survey” (December 2015) online:
<http://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/BirthDeathCertificates/Surveys/OregonHealthyTeens/Documents/2015/20
15_OHT_State_Report.pdf> [reporting that current use of cannabis among youth remained stable following
legalization in 2014]; Similarly, a report by the CATO institute reports that legalization had minimal effects
on marijuana use. See Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard & Jeffrey Miron, “Dose of Reality: The Effect of State
Marijuana Legalizations” Policy Analysis (September 16, 2016) CATO Institute, online
<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa799.pdf>.
124
125

UNODC, supra note 112.

For example, with proper standardization and regulations in place, the American Public Health
Association notes that legalization will help protect consumers from adulterants: American Public Health
Association, “Regulating Commercially Legalized Marijuana as a Public Health Priority” (November 18,
2014) online: <https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policydatabase/2015/01/23/10/17/regulating-commercially-legalized-marijuana-as-a-public-health-priority>.

29

significantly impeding research.126 As discussed earlier, cannabis is a heterogeneous
product. The cannabis plant can grow in a wide range of varieties with different
cannabinoid profiles127, it can be ingested in numerous methods with different effects,
and standardized dosages do not exist. Furthermore, some research may look at chronic
use, while others focus only on past use, medical use, or occasional use. So, while one
study may, for example, find that cannabis helps to alleviate the symptoms of anxiety, the
findings cannot definitively be extrapolated to different strains, doses, or methods of
delivery. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn from cannabis research, and
amplifies the number of studies that would need to be undertaken to have a thorough
understanding of cannabis. Presently, while there is a growing body of literature that
examines cannabis use, the findings may only be applicable in very narrow
circumstances, and often research results in seemingly conflicting results.128
Another concern, although not specific to cannabis research, involves the type and quality
of study conducted. Results from an animal study cannot be conflated to human effects,
though they often are in the media.129 Additionally, because various personal
characteristics can impact the effects of cannabis, such as past use and metabolism,
studies in one human population may not be replicated in a different one.130
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Differentiating between correlation and causation in cannabis research is also troubling.
For example, while research may find that adolescents who use cannabis miss more days
of school, this does not tell us that cannabis use causes absenteeism.131 Unfortunately,
that is often how associations are reported in media.132 In the same vein, the inability to
prove causation does not mean that there are no causal effects. While care must be taken
not to be too quick to find a causal relationship, the difficulties in proving causal
relationships are not reason enough to ignore research that finds associations.133 Lastly,
ethical guidelines that govern scientific and medical research prevent a lot of cannabis
research from taking place.134 For example, given the lack of conclusive knowledge
regarding the impact of cannabis use on fetal and adolescent development, it would be
unethical for researchers to give cannabis to pregnant women in a study looking at the
effects of cannabis on birth weight, or to give cannabis to some children, but not others,
in order to be able to control for factors that would allow us to better understand the
causal relationship between cannabis and educational attainment.135 The issues inherent
to understanding and researching cannabis use complicate the ability to project what
harms might or might not arise out of cannabis legalization. Because of the difficulties
associated with researching cannabis, there is still a lot to learn about cannabis and its
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effects, and of the research that has been conducted, very little can be stated conclusively.
Despite the hurdles mentioned here in this section, there has been an immense amount of
research conducted on cannabis in recent years. The following section will look at the
evidence on the medical use of cannabis.

2.6. Medical Uses of Cannabis
While they are treated differently, medical and recreational cannabis are the same
substance. The line between medical and recreational use of cannabis is not clear; many
medical users prefer using cannabis over other conventional medications because of its
desirable side effects (or lack thereof), and many recreational users self-medicate with
recreational cannabis, again because of cannabis’ desirable effects. Upon legalization, it
is probable that many medical users will purchase their cannabis from the recreational
market, and there is anecdotal evidence that medical users use cannabis for recreational
purposes in addition to using it for medical concerns.136 Therefore, it is prudent to
provide a brief history of the medicinal uses of cannabis a well as the current evidence
supporting the medical uses of cannabis.
Cannabis has long been touted for its medical applications. Chinese and Indian medicine
have long histories of using cannabis medicinally. A Chinese Herbal Medicine
compendium from 2800 BCE recommended using cannabis to treat constipation, gout,
malaria, rheumatism, and menstrual problems.137 The Indian Athera Veda, dated from
2000-1400 BCE, references the use of cannabis for its decongestant, astringent, soothing,
anesthetic, aphrodisiac, appetite stimulating, and digestion promotion effects.138 The
earliest documented reference to the use of cannabis as medicine is most often credited to
Chinese emperor Shen Nung, in 2800 BCE, but the earliest physical evidence of medical
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cannabis use is traced to approximately 400 AD.139 Similar indications of cannabis use
during childbirth have been documented in Egyptian Papyri and Assyrian tablets. 140
More widespread use of cannabis as a medicine did not begin until the 1800s, when
physicians such as William O’Shaughnessy, the author of one of the first published
studies on cannabis, popularized its use.141 Cannabis continued to be used medically well
into the 1930s as an ingredient in various over the counter medicines, such as remedies
for stomach pain, restlessness, and coughs, until being taken off the market after
prohibition.142
After decades of total prohibition of cannabis use, both medically and recreationally,
modern science has once again supported the efficacy of cannabis use for many medical
applications. A 2017 National Academies of Science Report analyzed more than 10,700
abstracts involving scientific studies on cannabis use for medical purposes.143 The report
found conclusive or substantial evidence that cannabis/cannabinoids are effective for
treating: chronic pain in adults; chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting; and,
improving patient reported multiple-sclerosis spasticity symptoms.144 However, with
cannabis legalization on the political agenda of many jurisdictions, providing the
motivation to conduct research, there is new research being published every day. A
significant amount of research supports the effectiveness of cannabis for pain relief, both
chronic and neuropathic.145 There is also a significant amount of research supporting the
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use of cannabis to: enhance appetite in HIV/AIDS patients146; ameliorate nausea in
cancer patients receiving chemotherapy147; reduce the severity and occurrence of
epileptic seizures148; temporarily reduce intraocular pressure caused by glaucoma149;
mitigate the side-effects of Hepatitis C treatment150; improve appetite and sleep and
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reduce steroid dependency in patients with Crohn’s Disease151; and, reduce symptoms of
appetite loss, depression, pain, spasticity, and drooling associated with amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS)152. There is also some research suggesting that cannabis may have
applications in treating or managing: dementia/Alzheimer’s153; psychosis154; mania155 ;
depression156; anxiety157; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)158; Parkinson’s159; and
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sleep disorders160. Despite this research, the National Academies of Sciences reported
that there is insufficient evidence to support or refute the conclusion that cannabis or
cannabinoids are effective for treating cancer, cancer-related anorexia, irritable bowel
syndrome, epilepsy, spinal cord injury-related spasticity, ALS, Huntington’s, motor
system symptoms associated with Parkinson’s, dystonia, addiction, and schizophrenia.161
More high-quality, clinical trials on the various medical applications of cannabis are
needed to ascertain the efficacy of cannabis as a treatment option for these conditions.

Phobia Patients” (2011) 36:6 Neuropsychopharamcology 1219 [Bergamaschi et al]; But, see also National
Academies of Sciences, supra note 8 at S-10 [Limited evidence that cannabis/cannabinoids is effective for
improving anxiety symptoms in individuals with social anxiety disorders].
158

See e.g., Marcel O. Bonn-Miller, Alex H. Harris & Jodie A. Trafton, “Prevalence of cannabis use
disorder among veterans in 2002, 2008 and 2009” (2012) 9:4 Psychological Services 404; A. Neumeister et
al, “Elevated brain cannabinoid CB1 receptor availability in post-traumatic stress disorder: a positron
emission tomography study” (2013) 18 Molecular Psychiatry 1034; Katherine A. Belendiuk, Lisa L.
Baldini & Marcel O. Bonn-Miller, “Narrative review of the safety and efficacy of marijuana for the
treatment of commonly state-approved medical and psychiatric disorders” (2015) 10:1 Addiction Science &
Clinical Practice 10; But see also, National Academies, supra note 8 at S-10 [there is limited evidence that
cannabis/cannabinoids are effective for improving symptoms of PTSD].
159

See e.g., Antonio Waldo Zuardi et al, “Cannabidiol for the treatment of psychosis in Parkinson’s
Disease” (2009) 23:8 Journal of Psychopharmacology 979; Marcos Hortes N. Chagas et al, “Effect of
cannabidiol in the treatment of patients with Parkinson’s disease: An exploratory double-blind trial” (2014)
28:11 Journal of Psychopharmacology 1088.
160

See e.g., Antonio Waldo Zuardi, “Cannabidiol: from an inactive cannabinoid to a drug with wide
spectrum of action” (2008) 30:3 Revista Brasileira de Psiquiatria 271; José Alexandre Crippa, Antonio
Waldo Zuardi & Jaime E.C. Hallak, “Therapeutical use of the cannabinoids in psychiatry” (2010) 2:Suppl1
Revista Brasileira de Psiquiatria S56; Peter J. Gates, Lucy Albertella & Jan Copeland, “The effects of
cannabinoid administration on sleep: a systematic review of human studies” (2014) 18 Sleep Medicine
Reviews 477; Thomas Schierenbeck et al, “Effect of Illicit Recreational Drugs Upon Sleep: Cocaine,
Ecstasy and Marijuana” (2008) 12:5 Sleep Medicine Reviews 381 [Schierenbeck et al]; National
Academies, supra note 8 at S-10 [there is moderate evidence that cannabis/cannabinoids are effective for
improving short term sleep outcomes in individuals with sleep disturbances associated with sleep apnea,
fibromyalgia, chronic pain, and MS.
161

Ibid at S10-11.

36

2.7. Harm & Risk
2.7.1.

History of Assessing the Harm of Cannabis

In the past century, many attempts have been made to assess the risks of cannabis use,
and though the results have been consistent, they have largely failed to influence the
public or legal discourse regarding the safety of cannabis use. In 1893, the British
Government commissioned a report on cannabis use in India. The Indian Hemp Drugs
Commission studied the issue and published a 6-volume report that found moderate use
of hemp drugs was “practically attended by no evil results at all.”162 In 1925, the United
States Army investigated cannabis use by soldiers in the Panama Canal zone after the
Army expressed concerns about the effects of cannabis use on military discipline. The
committee reviewed literature, consulted with experts, collected testimony from army
officials, examined personnel records, and found no evidence that marijuana had any
appreciably deleterious influence on the individuals using it. It also concluded that
marijuana was neither habit forming nor risky.163 These studies were published at a time
when information was not easily disseminated, so these reports were not widely
available, which may explain why the results were not widely acknowledged and
prohibition persevered.164
Still puzzled about the harms of cannabis use, New York Mayor La Guardia appointed a
committee of scientists in 1944 to investigate the safety of cannabis use. The committee
concluded that there was no link between cannabis use and crime or violent behavior. It
also refuted the common misperception that cannabis use among school children was
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widespread and acted as a gateway drug to the use of other drugs.165 A few years later, in
1968, the British Home Office established an Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence
and a subcommittee to review evidence on cannabis. The Wootton Report, as it was
known, concluded that while the effects of cannabis should not be underestimated, the
gateway theory was overstated and the criminal sanctions attached to cannabis offences
were overly severe.166 Around the same time, United States President Richard Nixon
appointed the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, also known as the
Shafer Commission, created pursuant to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act167. The purpose of the Commission was to analyze the nature and scope of
cannabis use, the effects of its use, the relationship between cannabis use and other
behaviors, and the efficacy of the existing laws.168 The Shafer Commission Report, titled
“Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding”, presented to Congress in 1972,
recommended decriminalizing private possession and distribution of small quantities of
cannabis for personal use.169 The Canadian equivalent of the Shafer Commission was the
Commission of Inquiry Into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs (commonly known as the Le
Dain Report), appointed by the Canadian Government following the recommendation the
Honourable John Munro, then Minister of National Health and Welfare. The Commission
was formed to address concerns about the social and individual implications of the nonmedical use of drugs. It recommended repealing the prohibition against the simple
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possession of cannabis upon concluding that there was little evidence that cannabis is
addictive.170
Canadian courts have also been tasked with assessing the harms associated with cannabis
in the past, most notably in R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine171. In that case, the appellants
filed a joint statement of legislative facts in which they admitted that cannabis use was
associated with the following risks: dependency, driving a vehicle or operating
machinery, damage to lung, schizophrenia and psychosis, amotivational syndrome,
effects on fetus/newborns, and effects on the reproductive system.172 Ultimately, the SCC
found that “[i]t seems clear that the use of marihuana has less serious and permanent
effects than was once claimed, but its psychoactive and health effects can be harmful, and
in the case of members of vulnerable groups the harm may be serious and substantial.”173
Most recently, in 2015 two researchers published a study confirming that the risk of
cannabis has been overstated in the past. They found that the margin for exposure
(MOE)174 for cannabis on both an individual and population level was high, meaning that
the toxicological threshold was high compared to the estimated human intake. In
comparison, alcohol and heroin had low MOE, meaning the ratio of the toxicological
threshold to intake was low.175 Despite repeated reports of the relative safety of cannabis,
it remains illegal in most parts of the world and many remain convinced of its
harmfulness. These next sections will provide a brief overview of the evidence of the
acute effects and risks of cannabis use, as well as risks associated with long-term or
regular cannabis use.
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2.7.2.

Acute Effects

Though cannabis clearly has valid medical applications, it is most commonly used
recreationally, inferring that it has desirable effects. Potential desirable effects of use
include euphoria, relaxation, decreased anxiety, and reduced inhibitions.176 Because
cannabis can help people feel relaxed and less self-conscious, it often serves as a social
lubricant.177 Some users also report a positive change to sensory perceptions, such as
hunger and music.178 CBD has also been reported to be effective in assisting with public
speaking related anxiety.179 However, there are some undesirable side effects that can
occur following cannabis use.180 Users may experience psychological side effects
including: anxiety, panic, undesirable perceptual alterations or sensory experiences,
paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, and dysphoria.181 There are also numerous
physiological effects of cannabis impairment that may occur, including: dizziness,
increase in heart rate, elevated blood pressure, dry mouth, fluctuations in respiration and
body temperature, hunger, headache, nausea, and dizziness.182 Additionally, cannabis use
may impair short term memory, ability to learn and retain information, motor
coordination, and judgment.183 While many of these effects are unwanted, they typically
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resolve after impairment dissipates. The greater concern is what long-term, irreversible
damage may be caused by using cannabis – these will be discussed in the next section.

2.7.3.

Long term Risks: Physical Health

Beyond the acute effects of impairment, considerable research has been conducted on the
long-term effects of cannabis use. This section examines the effects of cannabis on
physical health. One article suggests that long term studies have confirmed that regular
cannabis use over long periods of time does not lead to a decline in lung function, high
blood pressure, diabetes, or any other deterioration of physical health, and in fact, that the
only negative consequence is more gum disease.184 Other research, however, suggests
this may not be the case. For clarity, this section proceeds by body system, starting with
the respiratory system, followed by the immune, cardiovascular, and
endocrine/reproductive systems, which have been the primary areas of study in the
existing research.185

2.7.3.1.

Lungs

One of the most commonly thought of risks associated with using cannabis is harm to the
lungs. There is good reason for this concern, as cannabis contains more tar than tobacco
cigarettes, and cannabis tar contains more cancerous agents.186 Additionally, cannabis
contains similar carcinogenic chemicals to tobacco, but is typically inhaled more deeply
at a higher combustion temperature, resulting in greater inhalation and retention of tar.187
A significant amount of research has focused on the effects of cannabis on human lungs,
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specifically relating to bronchitis symptoms, lung function, lung cancer, and infection.
Research has shown that people who smoke cannabis are more likely to experience
chronic bronchitis symptoms, coughing, wheezing, and poorer lung function than nonsmokers.188 However, these effects appear to be reversible following abstinence.189
Additionally, they seem to only occur in chronic cannabis users; occasional use was not
associated with adverse effects on the lungs.190 Another possible concern is the increased
risk of infection. A study conducted in 1992 found that smoking cannabis may expose
individuals to pulmonary infection, particularly where the user is immunocompromised,
but this finding has not been replicated in later studies.191
A lot of the research regarding the effects of cannabis use on lung function has produced
conflicting results. One study found that the rate of decline in respiratory function over
eight years was the same between cannabis smokers and non-smokers, but another study
found that respiratory function declined more rapidly in marijuana smokers than in
tobacco smokers.192 The National Academies of Sciences found moderate evidence that
cannabis smoking is associated with improved airway dynamics in acute use, but not
chronic use. Additionally, they concluded that there is moderate evidence that stopping
smoking cannabis is associated with improved respiratory symptoms.193 There is limited
evidence that cannabis smoking is associated with an increased risk of Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), and no or insufficient evidence to support or
refute the association between cannabis smoking and hospital admissions for COPD or
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asthma development or exacerbation.194 The National Academies of Sciences states that
there is moderate evidence that there is no statistical association between cannabis
smoking and lung cancer.195 This finding is consistent with a study that followed 64,000
participants over 8 years and found no increased risk of respiratory cancer among those
who had ever used cannabis or had used cannabis in the past.196 However, case-control
studies in Tunisia, Morocco, and New Zealand all found an increased risk of lung cancer
in cannabis smokers.197 Cannabis smoking also poses potential risks for oral, head, and
neck cancers, however, epidemiological studies have reported mixed results. One study
(with less than 200 study participants) found that cannabis users had an increased risk of
squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck198, but these findings were not replicated
in two similar studies.199 There is some evidence that long-term cannabis use may
increase the risk of respiratory cancer and other pulmonary disease, although no
epidemiological studies show a causal relationship between lung disease and cannabis
use.200 All of these risks are associated with smoking cannabis, and therefore can be
avoided by using alternative delivery methods.
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2.7.3.2.

Immune System

While there is some evidence that cannabis can act as an immunosuppressant, decreasing
resistance to some viruses and bacteria, there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to
suggest that cannabis use poses any significant long term threat to the immune system.201
One animal study found that cannabis impairs immunity and resistance to bacterial and
viral infections, but these findings have not been replicated in humans.202 Though not
directly related to cannabis, there is some evidence to suggest that various methods of
cannabis use can increase the risk of contracting a bacterial or viral disease. The practice
of sharing joints, bongs, vaporizers, and other methods of using cannabis, can spread
bodily fluids and may assist in the transmission of human papilloma virus (HPV) or
hepatitis. 203 The National Academies of Sciences’ position is that there is limited
evidence to suggest that cannabis smoking is associated with a decrease in the production
of several inflammatory cytokines in healthy individuals.204 Additionally, there is limited
evidence to support or refute the assertion that cannabis use is associated with other
adverse immune cell responses in healthy individuals, adverse effects on immune status
in individuals with HIV, and increased incidence of oral HPV.205

2.7.3.3.

Cardiovascular

Cannabis also affects the cardiovascular system. Acutely, cannabis increases heart rate,
supine blood pressure, orthostatic hypotension, and cardiac output, while decreasing
peripheral vascular resistance and exercise performance.206 With prolonged exposure,
supine blood pressure falls, orthostatic hypotension disappears, blood volume increases,
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heart rate slows, and circulatory responses to exercise diminish.207 These cardiovascular
effects do not appear to cause serious health problems in young, healthy users, however,
older users with cardiovascular disease are at greater risk because of the increased cardiac
work associated with the above-mentioned effects.208 The National Academies of
Sciences has stated that there is limited evidence that cannabis use is associated with
triggering acute myocardial infarction, ischemic stroke or sub arachnoid hemorrhage,
decreased risk of metabolic syndrome and diabetes, and increased risk of pre-diabetes.209
However, no association has been found between cannabis use and hospitalizations for
cardiovascular disease.210

2.7.3.4.

Endocrine and Reproductive Systems

Cannabis also affects the endocrine and reproductive systems, including the pituitary
gland, ovary and testes.211 Animal and human studies suggest that cannabis disrupts the
reproductive system in both males and females by decreasing sperm viability and
testosterone secretions in males and producing nonovulatory menstrual cycles in
women.212 But, to date, no epidemiological studies have shown that cannabis use impairs
sexual maturation or reproduction in humans.213 If used chronically, cannabis may reduce
plasma testosterone, retard sperm maturation, reduce sperm count and motility, and
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increase abnormal sperm production, however, the mechanism of these actions is
unclear.214 Studies of the effects of cannabis on human males have produced mixed
results. One study found that cannabis reduced testosterone, sperm production, sperm
motility, and increased sperm abnormalities,215 however these findings were not
replicated in later studies.216 Very few studies on the effects of cannabis on the human
female reproductive system have been conducted, however one study observed hormonal
levels in female cannabis users that had their tubes tied, and failed to find any evidence
the chronic cannabis use affected sex hormones.217 A more recent study found that both
the timing and quantity of cannabis use had a negative impact on in vitro fertilization and
gamete intrafallopian transfer outcomes.218

2.7.4.

Long term Risks: Cognitive Function and Mental Health Risks

This section will look at the impact of cannabis use on various aspects of cognitive
function and mental health. Numerous studies have concluded that cannabis use poses
some risk for mental status, however, it is very difficult to separate the effects of cannabis
use from other factors often seen in cannabis users, such as temperament, personality, and
socio-economic status.219 Cannabis use can affect cognition, motivation, attention,
decision making, and sleep. Additionally, cannabis use can impact the onset and severity
of various mental disorders. Each of these areas of concern will be discussed here.
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The National Academies of Sciences’ concluded that there is moderate evidence that
acute cannabis use is associated with impaired cognitive domains of learning, memory,
and attention, but limited evidence that sustained abstinence from cannabis use is
associated with the same impaired cognitive domains, suggesting that the effects are
reversible upon cessation of use.220 While one study found that frequent cannabis users
performed worse than non-users on numerous measures of cognitive functioning, other
studies have not replicated the same findings.221 Another study found that longer histories
of cannabis use are associated with greater cognitive impairment that persisted even after
cessation.222 However, other research suggests that intellectual impairments associated
with heavy cannabis use are reversible with abstinence.223 Interestingly, medical cannabis
users do not experience the executive functioning deficits which are often observed in
recreational users, and in fact, medical cannabis users showed improvement in various
tasks.224 Additionally, longitudinal studies have associated cannabis use with a reduction
in Intellectual Quotient, even when adjusted for socioeconomic factors.225 All of this
considered, “studies on long-term effects of cannabis on cognition have failed to find
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proof of gross abnormalities, but there is some evidence of mild cognitive impairments,
particularly in the domain of memory and learning.”226
Another commonly held belief about cannabis is that frequent use will lead to
‘amotivational syndrome’, or, reduced desire to participate in social activities, general
apathy, decreased effectiveness, lost ambition, and difficulty concentrating.227 However,
a causal relationship between cannabis use and this syndrome has never been shown.
Anthropological research on cannabis use in other countries has not found the presence of
amotivational syndrome, and similarly, laboratory studies do not support the existence of
the syndrome.228 The World Health Organization reported that “it is doubtful that
cannabis use produces a well-defined amotivational syndrome.”229 However, some
research findings support the premise of amotivational syndrome, that cannabis affects
productivity. One of the most consistent findings is that cannabis use causes problems
with episodic memory.230 Research also shows that cannabis use is associated with
impaired attention and impulse control, difficulty tracking conversations, and deficits in
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processing speed.231 Cannabis use is also associated with impaired decision making, and
impaired short-term memory.232
Cannabis is often used medically to relieve sleep disorders, such as insomnia and sleep
latency disorders, but recreational cannabis use can also impact the quality and quantity
of sleep in users. A narrative study found that cannabis may improve subjective sleep
complaints, particularly when used short-term, but the effects become less pronounced
with continued use.233 Additionally, cannabis has been reported to reduce sleep latency,
improving the ability of users to fall asleep, and decreased time awake after sleep
onset.234 Cannabis use may also impact the quality of sleep by increasing or decreasing
how long the user remains in a specific stage of sleep.235 Chronic cannabis users may also
experience adverse effects on their sleep upon discontinuation of use. Difficulty sleeping,
poor sleep quality, insomnia, and strange dreams are common symptoms of cannabis
withdrawal, making cessation more difficult.236
Cannabis can also affect various behavioral disorders, including anxiety, depression, and
bipolar disorders, though there have been some conflicting research results. Regarding
the link between cannabis use and depression, a 2002 study found only a modest
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association between cannabis use and subsequent risk of a major depressive episode237,
while a 2007 study found a significant association between cannabis use and an increase
in the risk of a first major depression, and a stronger increase in the risk of a first bipolar
episode. The risk of any mood disorder was elevated for weekly and almost daily users
but not for less frequent user patterns. The associations between cannabis and anxiety
were not significant after adjustment for confounders.238 Another study confirmed this,
further finding that early-onset and frequent cannabis use were related to symptoms of
anxiety and depression independent of individual and familial factors or the use of other
illicit substances.239 A 2006 study found that depression among past-year cannabis users
was 1.4 times higher than in the non-using comparator group, although after adjusting for
group differences, this changed to 1.1 times higher odds for the cannabis-using group.
They concluded that past-year cannabis use does not significantly predict later
development of depression. 240
Cannabis use may also impact the onset and severity of anxiety symptoms, but again,
research has produced conflicting results. A 2003 study that looked at the association
between cannabis use and anxiety found no significant association between the level of
anxiety and cannabis use in daily life. Interestingly, they did find that a diagnosis of
agoraphobia was significantly associated with cannabis use, independent of anxiety and
other confounding factors. The same study found no evidence that cannabis use in daily
life provided an anxiolytic or anxiogenic effect, disputing the common perception that
recreational cannabis users often self-medicate.241 However, a 2014 meta-analysis found
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a small positive association between anxiety and cannabis use or cannabis use disorder,
and between comorbid anxiety and depression and cannabis use. Their study controlled
for substance use, psychiatric illness and demographics.242 Cannabis use has also been
found to exacerbate the severity of symptoms in people with bipolar disorder. A 2015
systematic review and meta-analysis found that cannabis use appears to exacerbate manic
symptoms in individuals with bipolar disorders, and was associated with more new
symptoms.243
One of the most prominent concerns with cannabis use is the increased risk of psychotic
disorders. Research shows that cannabis users have a 40% greater chance of developing a
psychotic condition, and the younger the age of the onset of cannabis use, the younger
that psychosis related symptoms appear.244 The increased risk is most prevalent in
persons genetically predisposed, and is present only in heavy users.245 However, it is
important to consider that numerous substances can induce psychosis, such as alcohol,
anxiolytics, hallucinogens, hypnotics, inhalants, sedatives, and stimulants; it is not unique
to cannabis.246 Additionally, this research does not prove that cannabis is responsible for
the increased risk. Instead, it could be the case that the cannabis users being studied had
other shared characteristics contributing to the increased risk.247 So while there is
sufficient evidence that cannabis use may increase the risk of developing a psychotic
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illness, there is insufficient evidence to determine how significant (or insignificant) the
risk is.248

2.7.5.

Long term Risks: Fetal and Adolescent Development

This next section will look specifically at the impact of cannabis use on fetal
development, from conception to birth, through early childhood development, to the
impact of cannabis use on the developing brain in childhood and adolescence. Cannabis
use during pregnancy is not advised249, but the impact of cannabis use on pregnancy is
poorly understood because studying it in a controlled environment is very difficult to do
ethically. Moreover, women who use cannabis are more likely to smoke cigarettes and
use other drugs, have a mental illness, live in poverty, and have poor nutrition, making it
difficult to isolate the effects of cannabis.250 However, there is good reason to be
cautious. Cannabis is known to have a teratogenic effect, meaning that when cannabis is
smoked, the active agents readily cross the placental barrier and expose the fetus to
cannabinoids.251
Using cannabis while pregnant can lead to neurophysiological and behavioral
abnormalities in offspring.252 Cannabis use in pregnant women is also associated with an
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increased risk of premature birth, shorter body length, and lower infant birth weight.253
Newborns of mothers who used cannabis while pregnant have been found to exhibit
tremor, startle response, and altered visual responses.254 Cannabis use while pregnant
may also have lasting effects on childhood development. Additionally, research has
found associations between prenatal cannabis exposure and social, cognitive, and motor
function, particularly executive dysfunction.255 Furthermore, prenatal cannabis exposure
predicts adolescent and young adult cannabis use, even after controlling for exposure to
other drugs, family history, parental strictness, delinquency, and other factors.256 Some
research suggests that cannabis use while pregnant may increase the risk of offspring
developing certain kinds of childhood cancers.257 Cannabis use while pregnant may also
impact the behavioural development of children. Children who were exposed to cannabis
in-utero were found to show deficits on a sustained attention task at age 6258, to be more
impulsive, hyperactive, and delinquent at age 10259, and to have cognitive deficits, poorer
school performance, and increased risk for tobacco and cannabis use later in life.260 THC
can also impact gender development, because estrogen’s effect on the development of the
female nervous system depends on a well-regulated, functioning endocannabinoid
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system.261 However, the National Academies of Sciences found limited evidence that
maternal cannabis smoking is associated with pregnancy complications for the mother or
admission of the infant to the neonatal intensive care unit.262 They also concluded there is
insufficient evidence to support or refute a statistical association between maternal
cannabis smoking and later outcomes in offspring, including SIDS, cognitive academic
achievement, and later substance use.263
Very little is known about cannabis use and lactation. A study conducted in 1982
suggested that THC is present in the breast milk of cannabis users in moderate
amounts.264 Lethargy, less frequent feeding, and shorter feeding times are observed in
babies following exposure to THC through breast milk.265 A 1990 study found that
exposure to THC in breast milk in the first month of life may lead to decreased motor
development at 1 year old266, and a 2005 study found that while cannabinoid exposure
through breast milk has not been shown to increase neonatal risk, it may affect brain
development and should be avoided.267
Youth cannabis use is one of the prominent concerns in legalizing and regulating
recreational cannabis use. While most adolescents who use cannabis do not experience
harmful outcomes, there are various adverse impacts of youth cannabis use, particularly
with regular use.268 Additionally, adolescents are believed to be more vulnerable to the
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negative effects of cannabis on the brain.269 One out of every six adolescent cannabis
users develop cannabis dependence by age 24, much higher than the rate for adult
users.270 Adolescent cannabis use is also associated with the emergence of depressive and
anxiety disorders later in life.271 Moreover, frequent cannabis use in adolescence may
have more pronounced effects on cognitive function, and development of later mental
health concerns, including addiction, when compared to adults. 272 While some research
suggests that cannabis use may result in neurocognitive disadvantages that continue
beyond abstinence and changes to white matter and neural functioning273, other research
found that moderate cannabis use in adolescence did not appear to be neurotoxic.274

2.7.6.

Population Level Risks

This section will look at public health risks of legal, recreational cannabis use. Population
risks are the risk of an outcome in terms of a population, rather than an individual. There
is concern that legalizing recreational cannabis use will lead to an increased prevalence of
cannabis use and a subsequent increase in population level harms. This section provides
an overview of the risks cannabis poses for overdose, addiction/ dependence, withdrawal,
suicide, drugged driving, psychosocial effects, other substance use disorders, violence,
and accidental injuries.

269

Ibid at 1755.

270

Wendy Swift et al, “Adolescent Cannabis Users at 24 Years: Trajectories to Regular Weekly Use and
Dependence in Young Adulthood” (2008) 103:8 Addiction 1100.
271

Wayne Hall & Louisa Degenhardt, “Prevalence and correlates of cannabis use in developed and
developing countries” (2007) 20:4 Curr Opin Psychiatry 393.
272

Grotenhermen, supra note 182.

273

Joanna Jacobus & Susan F. Tapert, “Effects of Cannabis on the Adolescent Brain” (2014) 20:13
Current Pharmaceutical Design 2186 at 2196.
274

Lynn E. Delisi et al, “A Preliminary DTI Study Showing no Brain Structural Change Associated with
Adolescent Cannabis Use” (2006) 3:17 Harm Reduction Journal online:
<https://harmreductionjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1477-7517-317?site=harmreductionjournal.biomedcentral.com>.

55

2.7.6.1.

Overdose

The risk of acute toxicity, or overdose, from cannabis use is extremely low, particularly
when compared to other substances. One estimate suggests that a person would have to
ingest 1500 pounds of cannabis in 15 minutes to die from overdose.275 Another estimate
suggests that a fatal dose could be anywhere between 15-70 grams, much more than even
heavy users276 are likely to consume in a day.277 However, the prevalence of new modes
of delivery, such as dabbing, which uses cannabis concentrates, increase the chance of
overdose.278 Although two deaths have been reported from cannabis poisoning, it is
unclear whether those deaths can be fully attributed to THC.279 Cannabis does not depress
the respiratory system, or have a toxic effect on the heart and circulatory system, in the
way that opioids or stimulants, respectively, do.280 There is some possibility that cannabis
use can incite myocardial infarction in young adults, but it is rare and appears to occur in
persons with pre-existing conditions.281 While there is insufficient evidence to support or
refute that cannabis use is associated with death due to overdose, there is moderate
evidence of an association between cannabis use and increased risk of overdose injuries,
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including respiratory distress, among pediatric populations in states where cannabis is
legal.282

2.7.6.2.

Dependence

Whether cannabis is addictive is a controversial subject. Physical dependence on
cannabis has not been demonstrated, however, psychological dependence on cannabis has
been accepted as a genuine occurrence.283 Cannabis use disorder is included in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), and lists eleven criteria:
using cannabis in greater amounts or for a longer period of time than intended; spending
a great deal of time obtaining and using cannabis; cravings; giving up important life
activities in order to use cannabis; continuing to use despite adverse physical or
psychological problems caused or exacerbated by using; failure to fulfil work, school, or
home obligations; continued use in physically hazardous situations; continued use despite
knowledge of having a problem; tolerance; withdrawal; and, persistent unsuccessful
efforts to quit.284 The International Classification of Disease published by the WHO also
includes cannabis use disorder, stating:
[I]ndividuals who have cannabis dependence compulsively use the drug
but do not usually develop physiological dependence, although frequently
tolerance to the effects of cannabis has been reported by these individuals.
Some users also reported withdrawal symptoms, although the symptoms
have not usually been clinically significant. Frequently people with
cannabis dependence use very potent cannabis over a period of months
and sometimes years, and may spend significant time acquiring and using
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the substance. Cannabis dependence may also persist in using this drug
although knowledge of physical or psychological problems may result.285
The number of individuals who develop cannabis use disorder after having used cannabis
at least once (one out of every eleven) is considerably lower than for other drugs,
signifying that the risk of addiction is much lower.286 However, estimates of cannabis
dependence vary; one estimate suggests that 9% of all Americans use have ever used
cannabis were psychologically dependent, while another estimate suggests that 20% of
worldwide users are psychologically dependent.287
There are a number of factors that may determine the risk of becoming dependent on
cannabis. According to the National Academies of Sciences, there is substantial evidence
that being male and smoking cigarettes, and early onset of cannabis use are risk factors
for problem cannabis use.288 There is moderate evidence that anxiety, personality
disorders, bipolar disorders, alcohol and nicotine dependence, and adolescent ADHD are
not risk factors for developing problem cannabis use, while major depressive disorder
and frequency of use, younger age of alcohol use, nicotine use, parental substance use,
poor school performance, antisocial behaviors, and childhood sexual abuse during
adolescence are all risk factors for developing problematic cannabis use.289

2.7.6.3.

Withdrawal

The existence of cannabis withdrawal syndrome is not universally accepted. While some
argue that there is no identifiable withdrawal syndrome associated with cannabis use,
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others report that withdrawal can involve symptoms of irritability, aggression, anxiety,
sleep difficulty, decreased appetite, restlessness, dysphoria, abdominal pain, shakiness,
sweating, fever, chills, and headaches. 290 Cannabis withdrawal syndrome is said to occur
in frequent users shortly after they quit, with the symptoms lasting a week or more.291
The DSM-V includes Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome, and lists symptoms similar to
those mentioned above.292 At the very least, there is evidence to suggest that ceasing use
can cause temporary physiological effects.293

2.7.6.4.

Suicide

Recreational cannabis use may also impact suicide rates. Some research suggests that
cannabis use may be associated with suicidal ideation. For example, a longitudinal study
of 50,000 Swedish men over 33 years found that cannabis use was associated with an
increased risk of suicide; however, this association was eliminated after adjusting for
confounding factors, such as psychological and behavioral problems. 294 The results
suggest that cannabis is unlikely to impact suicide completion rates. However, another
study found that cannabis exposure does not itself lead to depression, but it may be
associated with later suicidal thoughts and attempts.295 A study by Carrà et al found that
substance use disorders, including cannabis, when comorbid with bipolar disorder, was
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significantly associated with suicide attempts.296 Another study looked at the association
between legalizing medical cannabis and suicide rates, and found that suicides among
young men (ages 20-39) dropped following medical marijuana legalization, compared to
states that did not legalize, consistent with the commonly-held belief that cannabis can be
used to cope with stressful life events.297

2.7.6.5.

Drugged Driving

Drugged driving is one of the greatest concerns associated with the legalization of
recreational cannabis use, particularly because of how prevalent it is among young
drivers.298 Although many scholars call for adopting per se limits for cannabis299, there
are several problems with this approach. Unfortunately, it is incredibly difficult to
determine whether drivers are impaired by cannabis, because there is no reliable test for
impairment, only for past use.300 Additionally, because cannabis is fat soluble, regular or
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heavy users can test positive for THC hours, days, and even weeks following
consumption.301 Even passive exposure to cannabis smoke may result in positive blood
tests, absent any impairment.302 Additionally, there is no well-defined threshold for
cannabis impairment.
Given that cannabis is a central nervous system depressant, and can produce drowsiness,
slower reaction time, decreased memory, decreased attention, impairments in
psychomotor performance, signal detection, and the ability to monitor a moving object,
there are clear implications for operating a motor vehicle after using cannabis.303 The
National Academies of Sciences found substantial evidence that cannabis use is
associated with an increased risk of motor vehicle crash.304 One estimate found that
cannabis use increases the risk of involvement in a motor vehicle accident twofold.305
Laboratory studies using a driving simulator have revealed cannabis use is detrimental to
driving skill. 306 However, it can be difficult to separate the effects of cannabis from other
variables. A study in the United States found a statistically significant increase in
adjusted crash risk for drivers who tested positive for THC, but after adjusting for age,
gender, ethnicity, and alcohol eliminated the association, indicating that these other
factors are much more indicative of crash risk than cannabis use.307 In contrast to this,
another study found that habitual cannabis users had a nine-fold higher crash risk that
persisted after controlling for confounding factors.308
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While there are risks with drugged driving, it would be inaccurate to assume that the risks
are the same as with alcohol impairment and drunk driving. While both activities carry
some degree of risk, driving under the influence of cannabis is much less dangerous than
driving drunk, as drugged drivers are less aggressive and more cautious than drunk
drivers, and are able to mitigate their impairment because they are more aware of their
own impairment. 309 Some users, particularly experienced users, may be able to
compensate for many of the negative consequences caused by using cannabis before
driving, by using behavioural strategies.310 For example, drivers under the influence of
cannabis drive more slowly, and focus their attention when they know a response will be
required. 311 It is the combination of alcohol and cannabis that may be most problematic,
as the two substances are synergistic, and therefore increase the risks of driving under the
influence of either cannabis or alcohol alone. The combination eliminates the ability of
the user to mitigate their impairment.312 Another concern is the almost exclusive focus on
THC in regard to impaired driving. Very little research has been conducted on the other
cannabinoids or cannabis constituents, likely because they are not psychoactive.
However, as mentioned earlier, cannabinoids and other components may alter the effects
of THC, as well as other substances, such as alcohol, which could have implications for
impaired driving. For example, one study found that participants given both CBD and
alcohol showed the same level of impairment as participants given alcohol only, but their
blood alcohol concentration was significantly lower.313 In addition to mixing cannabis
and alcohol, drugged driving is particularly problematic for young drivers, because of the
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combination of impairment and lack of driving experience. Additionally, youth younger
than 21 are at the highest risk of involvement in a fatal motor vehicle crash, and are also
the most likely to use cannabis. 314 Additionally, surveys conducted in various areas of
Canada indicate that a significant number of young Canadians already drive after drug
use, more than do after drinking.315 In 2014-2015, 9.4% of grade 11-12 Canadian
students reported ever driving after using cannabis, and 20% reported riding with a driver
who had been using cannabis.316
Looking at statistics for drug-impaired driving prior to legalization may be useful in
predicting the prevalence of drug-impaired driving post-legalization. In Canada, 16.4% of
drivers killed in motor vehicle accidents between 2000 and 2010 tested positive for
cannabis.317 A random survey of nighttime drivers in British Columbia found 4.6% of all
drivers tested positive for cannabis.318 Another study found that in 2012, cannabisattributable traffic collisions caused 75 deaths and 4407 injuries, costing upwards of $1
billion dollars.319 Additionally, 2.6% of Canadians report driving within two hours of
using cannabis in the past year.320 The concern is that the rates of drugged driving will
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increase exponentially following legalization. Fortunately, this issue has been studied in
American jurisdictions that have legalized recreational cannabis use. In Washington
State, the number of drivers involved in Driving Under the Influence (DUI) or collision
case that tested positive for THC increased from 20% to 30% between 2005 and 2014.
Additionally, the median blood THC level of drivers involved in a collision or pulled
over for a DUI increased from 4.0ng/ml in 2005 to 5.6ng/ml in 2014.321 However,
countries that have not legalized recreational cannabis have also experienced increases in
THC levels found in drivers suspected of drug-impaired driving. For example, in Norway
the mean THC concentrations in blood samples of drivers suspected of drug-impaired
driving increased 58% between 2000 and 2010, while similar increases were not seen
with alcohol or amphetamines322, suggesting that legalization may not be responsible for
the increase seen in other jurisdictions.
In Colorado, cannabis-related traffic deaths, including not only drivers, but passengers
and pedestrians, increased 48 percent in the three years following the legalization of
recreational cannabis compared to the three years prior.323 Additionally, the number of
deaths involving drivers that tested positive for cannabis following a fatal crash doubled
between 2009 and 2015 from 10% to 21%.324 Scholars have indicated that flaws in the
detection and subsequent criminal prosecution of impaired drivers significantly
contribute to the high rates of impaired driving.325 However, this may be explained by the
fact that more people who drive are using cannabis, not necessarily that more people
were impaired by cannabis while driving, due to the inability to test for impairment.
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Because there is no way of knowing whether the THC-positive drivers caused or
contributed to the fatal collisions, it is not possible to conclusively state that the
legalization of cannabis was responsible for the increase.326
A study conducted on bicycle riders further complicates the understanding of the
relationship between cannabis use and operating a vehicle. A study of 14 participants
found only a few driving faults under the influence of very high THC concentrations, and
a defined THC concentration that leads to the inability to ride a bicycle could not be
presented. The participants showed only slight distinctive features that can be
documented using a medical test routinely run for persons under suspicion of driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs.327 The characteristics of cannabis, combined with
individual factors that can impact the metabolism of cannabinoids, call into question the
fairness, and perhaps even the constitutionality, of several efforts suggested for
combatting drug-impaired driving, such as random-breath testing (or saliva or blood in
the case of cannabis), mandatory road checks, and the implementation of per se limits.328

2.7.6.6.

Psychosocial

There are a few psychosocial concerns with recreational cannabis use. There is concern
that legalizing recreational cannabis, even if the legal age is 18, will increase use of
cannabis among youth. However, research suggests that liberalizing cannabis policy will
not cause an increased rate of youth use.329 Because cannabis affects cognitive functions,
some suggest that regular use among youth may impair learning at school, and ultimately
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interfere with achieving education goals, such as graduation.330 There is some research
that early cannabis use is associated with an increased risk of dropping out of school,
however other research suggests that genetic and environmental factors are more likely to
be responsible.331 Castellanos-Ryan et al found that adolescents who use cannabis as
early as 14 years old do worse than non-users of cannabis on cognitive tests and drop out
of school at higher rates, but if they do not use cannabis until they are 17 or older the risk
is lower.332 In contrast, a study in England that sampled over 6000 young people found
evidence that high academic ability was associated with temporary experimentation333
with substance use, including alcohol and cannabis. Although the reason for the
correlation is unknown, the authors suggest that the recognized correlation between high
cognitive ability and openness to new experiences may be a factor.334 Overall, there is
limited evidence that cannabis use is associated with impaired academic achievement and
education outcomes, increased rates of unemployment and low income, or impaired
social functioning or engagement in developmentally appropriate social roles.335 Lastly,
there was a 40% increase in drug-related suspensions and expulsions from Colorado
schools between 2008-2014, suggesting either that cannabis legalization led to higher
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rates of cannabis use among school-aged children, or that schools increased their
surveillance of drug use and possession among their students.336

2.7.6.7.

Other Substance Use Disorders

There is a lot of concern that legalizing cannabis will lead to an increase not only in
cannabis use, but that cannabis use will lead to the use of other, more dangerous drugs.
The “gateway theory”—also known as the stepping-stone theory or the progression
hypothesis— was first proposed in the 1930s, and despite mounting evidence refuting its
existence, it prevails today.337 Some researchers assert that there is considerable evidence
that cannabis acts as a gateway drug to other illicit drugs338, while others insist that there
is no conclusive evidence that cannabis increases the likelihood of progressing to use
other substances.339 While many heroin or cocaine users previously used cannabis, very
few cannabis users will go on to use harder substances.340 Rather than acting as a
gateway, researchers suggest that illicit drug users likely used cannabis first simply
because it is the most widely available illegal drug and is often the first drug most people
encounter.341 As well, most users use alcohol or nicotine before using cannabis,
suggesting instead that alcohol is the gateway substance and should be the focus of
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prevention programming. 342 An alternative to the gateway theory has been proposed,
called the correlated vulnerabilities theory. It suggests that the stepping-stone pattern of
substance abuse is better explained by the common characteristics of those who use
cannabis and other substances.343
The National Academies of Sciences concluded that there is moderate evidence that
cannabis use is associated with developing dependence or a substance use disorder for
substances including alcohol, tobacco, and other illicit drugs, but there is limited
evidence that cannabis use is associated with starting to use tobacco and changes in the
rates and use pattern of other licit and illicit substances.344 Others prefer to call cannabis
an “exit drug”, because of its abilities to help drug addicts transition from other drugs,
such as heroin. Various studies have identified cannabis as a potential substitute for other
psychoactive substances and, in fact, cannabis may be protective against problematic use
of other substances.345 One study of medical cannabis users found that 71% of
respondents reported substituting cannabis for prescription drugs, alcohol,
tobacco/nicotine, or other illicit substances, suggesting that cannabis may have significant
public health implications for replacing other, more dangerous substances.346
Additionally, a study comparing the efficacy of cannabis for treating substance use
disorders found comparable or superior progress at discharge for cannabis users when
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compared to non-cannabis users in treatment.347 Recently, there has been significant
interest in the use of cannabis as a harm reduction technique for opioid addiction, with
research suggesting that cannabis can be an effective intervention.348 While more
research is needed to confirm this benefit, preliminary results suggests that cannabis may
be useful as a harm reduction tool. Lastly, there is some evidence to suggest that cannabis
legalization may lead to an increase in tobacco consumption. Cannabis use is associated
with high rates of tobacco use, may increase the risk of tobacco use initiation, and may
also increase the risk of escalation to daily tobacco use and nicotine dependence.349 On
the other hand, cannabis legalization may decrease the use of legal synthetic cannabis
products, such as Spice or K2, which are associated with much higher rates of accident
and emergency room visits.350

2.7.6.8.

Violence

Despite commonly held beliefs that cannabis causes users to become violent351, there is
conflicting evidence that is the case. There are theories that support both a positive and
negative relationship between cannabis and violence.352 While there is always the
possibility that cannabis will cause aggression or violence in a user with pre-existing
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conditions or predisposition to those traits, there is little evidence that cannabis use will
cause aggression in users without pre-existing conditions or predispositions.353 One study
found that while laboratory-based studies were inconclusive regarding the relationship
between cannabis use and violence, cross-sectional and longitudinal research did support
the association between cannabis use and withdrawal and various types of violence.354 A
study conducted in Norway also found that an increase in cannabis use among youth was
associated with an increased risk of violence.355 Other studies, however, found no
association and some even that found cannabis reduced aggressive behaviour.356 The
relationship between cannabis use and domestic violence has also been examined. Where
one spouse is a cannabis user intercouple violence is less common than if both partners
are non-users, and there is less intercouple violence where both partners are users than in
instances with one partner is a user.357 Additionally, individuals experiencing withdrawal
symptoms from cannabis dependence have also been found to act more aggressively,
although this correlation has not been extended to include violence.358

2.7.6.9.

Accidental Injuries

The potential increase in non-traffic related accidents is also a concern associated with
cannabis liberalization. Though there is insufficient evidence to support the association
between acute cannabis use and non-traffic injuries, this area of study has received
relatively little attention, which could be the reason there is not enough evidence to form
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a stronger association.359 Despite the lack of attention, there are a few specific concerns
associated with increased cannabis use, namely, accidental ingestion of edibles (or nonaccidental over-ingestion of edibles), an increased prevalence of burns, general increase
in cannabis-related hospital visits, and increased risk of occupational accidents or
injuries. Each will be discussed.
One of the results of liberalizing cannabis use is not only an increased rate of use,
particularly among novice users, but also innovation in new ways to use and produce
cannabis, which can result in unexpected health effects.360 One of these unintended health
effects is an increase in the number of cannabis-related burns. The University of
Colorado burn centre had 31 admissions for cannabis related burns between 2013-2015,
with 21 requiring skin grafts, and some cases involving burns of up to 70% of the body.
361

The majority of the burns occurred during THC extraction using butane as a solvent,

which is a process used to create high-potency THC oil, commonly referred to as Butane
Hash Oil (BHO).362 BHO is a potent cannabis concentrate that can contain up to 70-90%
THC (almost 5 times stronger than high potency dried cannabis currently available from
licensed medical producers in Canada).363 BHO is manufactured by using butane as a
solvent, which is highly dangerous because during extraction, butane gas, which is highly
flammable, permeates the air and can easily catch fire.364 BHO is then used for ‘dabbing’,
a method of inhaling a highly concentrated cannabis substance, typically by placing ‘just
a dab’ of the concentrate on a heated surface. Prior to Colorado’s liberalization of
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medical cannabis use, the Colorado Hospital Burn Center received zero cases of cannabis
related burns. In the three years following medical liberalization, 19 cases were seen at
the Centre, and 12 were seen in the eight months following the legalization of
recreational use.365
Colorado has also experienced a growth in the number of emergency room (ER) visits
related to cannabis. In 2013, the number of ER visits related to cannabis was 14,148; in
2014, the number was 18,255.366 The number of hospitalizations related to cannabis also
increased in Colorado following legalization. In 2011, there were 6,305 hospitalizations
related to cannabis; in 2014, there were 11,439.367 Colorado has also witnessed in
increase in cyclic vomiting presentations, the result of frequent use of high THC
products. After medical liberalization in Colorado, two Denver hospitals experienced an
increase in patients presenting with cyclic vomiting, from 41 cases to 87 cases.368 On a
positive note, there is some evidence to suggest that cannabis can be protective against
the occurrence of injuries presenting in the ER. In a Swiss study looking at alcohol and
cannabis as risk factors for injury, the authors found that cannabis had an inverse
relationship with injury, perhaps explained by the fact that cannabis is often used in safer
environments than other substances, or that cannabis users display more compensatory
behaviours that users of other substances.369
Another injury concern associated with cannabis legalization is accidental ingestion of
cannabis edibles, particularly by children and pets. Colorado’s Children’s Hospital
reported only one case of cannabis ingested by a child under the age of 9 in 2009,
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compared to 16 cases in 2015. 370 Similarly, the number of calls to regional poison control
centers in Colorado related to accidental ingestion of cannabis by children increased more
than 5-fold, from 9 calls in 2009 to 47 in 2015.371 Additionally, news reports suggest that
veterinarians are reporting significant increases in the number of pets seen for ingesting
cannabis products, primarily dogs. One veterinarian reported the increase went from an
occasional incident prior to medical legalization, to approximately 2-3 cases per week of
pets accidentally eating cannabis edibles.372
There is also concern about cannabis legalization and safety in the workplace. In the Task
Force on Marijuana Legalization and Regulation Report373, the authors acknowledged
concern expressed by industry stakeholders regarding the impact of cannabis in the
workplace, particularly in safety-sensitive positions, including health-care, lawenforcement, transportation, construction, and resource extraction.374 The Task Force,
however, made no recommendations on this topic, and only recommended continuing
research and monitoring in the area. The National Academies of Sciences concluded that
there is insufficient evidence to support a relationship between recreational cannabis use
and occupational accidents or injuries.375

2.8. Conclusion
The harmfulness of cannabis will inevitably play a role in determining whether
advertising restrictions are a justified infringement on freedom of expression. How
narrowly (or broadly) the government characterizes the harm will impact the rational
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connection stage of the Oakes test, and the degree of harm will also affect the
proportionality analysis; the more potential for harm, the easier it will be for Parliament
to justify their actions. Tobacco advertising litigation is informative. In both RJRMacDonald and JTI-MacDonald, the Courts accepted the clear risks associated with
tobacco use. Unfortunately, the risk is not so clear with cannabis. First, cannabis has
numerous medical applications, and many more currently under investigation, and
therefore has the possibility to provide benefit to Canadians. Tobacco, on the other hand,
has little, if any, medical (or other) benefits to users. Non-therapeutic cannabis use also
has potential benefits, such as decreasing stress. Second, determining the harmfulness of
cannabis use has been complicated by politics. Canada is still transitioning from a
Conservative government that focused on the adverse effects of cannabis, while ignoring
the possible benefits, to a Liberal government that has prioritized legalization.
Contextually, this means that Canadians are not starting from neutral ground. Care must
be taken not to over-correct for the conservative views of cannabis use by overlyfocusing on the benefits of cannabis use. But the historical vilification of cannabis use is
a relevant contextual factor out of which cannabis legalization arises, and should inform
the analysis.
There are some widely-accepted risks of using cannabis, but they are primarily acute,
such as anxiety and paranoia, or associated with smoking, such as bronchitis or decreased
lung function. While there are long-term effects associated with regular cannabis use,
such as decreased cognitive abilities, most long-term effects appear to be reversible with
the termination of cannabis use.376 Additionally, most of the adverse effects are
associated with long-term, regular cannabis use, and a very small portion of the Canadian
population matches this description. While the majority of tobacco users smoke daily,
most cannabis users use infrequently. Unfortunately, the science on the effects of
cannabis are overwhelmingly unsettled, and more research is needed. However, the
potency of cannabis, measured by its THC content, has increased exponentially over the
last few decades. Selective breeding over the last few decades for the illicit market has
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resulted in higher concentrations, with most cannabis now containing over 10% THC,
and even up to 30% in the case of some medical cannabis products.377 While THC
concentrations have risen, CBD content has decreased, dropping to below 0.2%.378 The
increasing THC-to-CBD ratio increases the risk of adverse side effects, psychosis, and
addiction.379 Additionally, higher potency forms of cannabis are being used with greater
frequency, hash oil concentrates, also known as “wax”, “dabs”, or “shatter”, may contain
as much as 80-90% THC.380 The use of high potency products similarly increases the risk
of adverse effects. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive
summary of all the research on the safety and risks of cannabis use. What can be stated is
that while cannabis use is not risk-free, compared to other common substances, including
alcohol, tobacco, and opioids, cannabis attributable disease burden is lower.381
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3. History of Cannabis and the Law in Canada
3.1. Introduction
The history of cannabis, internationally and domestically, is long and complicated.
Understanding the legal and social history of cannabis is necessary to understand the
context from which cannabis advertising, and restrictions on the same arise, and should
be assessed. As will be seen in chapter 4, the context of both the expression, and the
restriction being challenged play an important role in the constitutional analysis. The aim
of this chapter is to summarize the history of the law in Canada, as it pertains to cannabis,
from criminalization to the legalization of cannabis for medicinal purposes, and now to
the legalization of recreational cannabis. Part two explores the development of the
criminal law as it relates to cannabis, starting with the addition of cannabis to the Opium
and Narcotic Drugs Act in 1923 up until the current statutory regime, the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act. Part three reviews the case law that led to the legalization of
medical cannabis use, subsequent constitutional challenges to the first two regulatory
schemes, the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations and the Marijuana for Medical
Purposes Regulations, and the implementation of the Access to Cannabis for Medical
Purposes Regulations, which remain in force today. The fourth section focuses on
recreational cannabis use, looking at past attempts to legalize recreational cannabis use
and the associated obstacles, through the “hollowing out”382 period, and the 2016 promise
from the federal Liberal government to legalize cannabis.
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3.2. Cannabis and the Criminal Law in Canada
In the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, cannabis use was legal, but there is little
information about cannabis use in this time.383 Cannabis was first prohibited in Canada in
1923, when it was added to the Opium and Narcotic Drugs Act, marking the start of an
almost century-long prohibition.384 Cannabis was added to the list of prohibited
substances without any discussion in Parliament.385 Over the course of the 20th century,
cannabis was subject to only three different federal criminal statutory regimes: the Opium
and Narcotic Drugs Act, the Narcotic Control Act386, and the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act. Although there were many amendments to the Opium and Narcotic
Drugs Act, it remained the regulatory regime for cannabis up until 1961, when the NCA
came into effect to implement the provisions of the United Nations Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs.387 The NCA initially set out cannabis possession as an indictable offence
only, but an amendment in 1969 permitted possession to be tried on indictment or
summary conviction.388 This change significantly reduced the number of convictions for
cannabis possession resulting in prison sentences, but almost quadrupled the number of
possession convictions over the span of two years.389
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1974 marked a major legislative attempt to change the regulation of cannabis. The
Trudeau Government introduced Bill S-19, which would have removed cannabis from the
NCA and created a new section of the Food and Drugs Act390 solely for the purposes of
cannabis.391 This bill aimed to implement many of the recommendations set out in the Le
Dain Commission, a report published in 1973 recommending a gradual withdrawal of the
use of the criminal law regarding non-medical use of psychotropic substances392, which
will be further discussed in Part four of this chapter. Under Bill S-19, maximum penalties
for trafficking, importing, and simple possession would have been reduced, but the
penalty for cultivating would have increased. Simple possession would be punishable on
summary conviction only. The bill was passed on third reading in Senate in 1975, and
referred to the House of Commons, where it did not pass second reading.393 Member of
Parliament Mitchel Sharp later stated that the bill would not be reintroduced because
more important legislation was being considered.394
In the years following the failed implementation of Bill S-19, liberalizing cannabis
offences remained on the minds of politicians. In 1979, news outlets reported that three of
the major national political parties were willing to remove criminal penalties for cannabis
possession.395 In 1980, in the Speech from the Throne, Governor General Edward
Schreyer stated, “it is time, too, to move cannabis offences to the Food and Drugs Act
and remove the possibility of imprisonment for simple possession.”396 This, of course,
never happened. In 1981, reports indicated that possessory cannabis offences would be
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subjected to summary conviction only, and the Solicitor General suggested that the
federal government was considering ways to make pardons more effective.397
Despite clear political motivation to reduce the harms associated with the criminalization
of cannabis use, prohibition continued. In 1996, the CDSA received royal assent and
became law, repealing and replacing the NCA. In the first version of the bill that would
become the CDSA, Bill C-85, cannabis was included in Schedule I, the schedule
containing the most dangerous substances, accompanied by the most severe penalties.398
In 1996, Bill C-8, the bill that would become the CDSA, was introduced to replace
previous iterations, and cannabis was removed from Schedule I and added to schedules
II, VII, and VIII.399 The CDSA established eight schedules of controlled substances and
precursors, each with respective penalties for the various offences, including, for
example, possession, trafficking, exportation, and production.400 Section 56 of the CDSA
contains a general exemption to the prohibitions contained within at the Minister’s
discretion, provided it is “necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in
the public interest.”401 Attempts to decriminalize continued following the introduction of
the CDSA; in 2003 and 2004, three versions of a bill to decriminalize minor cannabis
offences were introduced, but none succeeded.402 At the time of writing, the CDSA
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continues to be the statutory authority criminalizing cannabis in Canada. From this
statutory history, it is clear that it was not for want of political will that cannabis laws
were never liberalized. The next section will focus on the introduction of medical
marijuana legislation, the first significant change in cannabis law in 80 years.

3.3. Medical Marijuana Litigation and Regulation
Prior to any medical cannabis regulatory program, the only way to legally possess and
cultivate cannabis for personal medical use was through a section 56 exemption. Section
56 of the CDSA allows the Minister of Health to consider applications for exemptions
from the provisions of the CDSA on a case-by-case basis.403 Initially, the CDSA did not
include a process to apply for a section 56 exemption. This was the basis for the
constitutional challenge in Wakeford v Canada404, the first in a long list of constitutional
cases regarding the use of medicinal cannabis. Wakeford, a person living with AIDS,
used cannabis under the supervision of his physician. He sought a constitutional medical
exemption from the CDSA to allow him to possess, produce, and cultivate cannabis.405
Wakeford alleged that the CDSA violated his section 7 right to life, liberty, and security
of the person by preventing him from accessing a helpful medical treatment, and also
violated his section 15 right to equality by denying him equal benefit of the law because
of his disability.406 Wakeford’s first application for relief was unsuccessful; LaForme J
found the impugned provisions violated section 7, but that this violation was in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because of the ability to apply for
an exemption under section 56, and therefore was constitutionally valid.407 Wakeford
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sought leave to have the matter reheard, introducing new evidence that there was no real
process to apply for a section 56 exemption, and was granted an interim constitutional
exemption from the relevant sections of the CDSA until the Minister of Health made a
decision regarding Wakeford’s section 56 exemption.408 Wakeford was granted one of the
first section 56 exemptions in Canada on June 9, 1999, allowing him to possess and
cultivate cannabis for medical purposes.409 He nevertheless further challenged the
exemption on the basis that it only applied to his personal use and cultivation, preventing
his caregivers from assisting him.410 Further, after receiving the exemption, Wakeford
still had to engage with the illicit market because there was no legal supply of cannabis or
cannabis seeds. This application, and subsequent appeal, were both dismissed.411
The next cannabis case that led to a significant change in the law is R v Parker412, which
led to Canada becoming one of the first countries to legalize cannabis for the terminally
ill in 2001. Parker suffered from epilepsy and had exhausted all pharmacologic and
surgical interventions with little success, so he began to grow and use cannabis
medically, and was subsequently charged with cultivation under the NCA and possession
under the CDSA.413 Parker challenged the charges against him, arguing that the
prohibitions on the cultivation and possession of cannabis infringed his section 7 rights
by forcing him to choose between his health and imprisonment. At trial, Sheppard J held
that Parker’s section 7 rights had been infringed, and the charges against him were
stayed. Additionally, the trial judge read an exemption into the legislation for persons
possessing or cultivating for medically approved use. The Crown appealed to the Ontario
Court of Appeal, but a unanimous court dismissed the appeal, mostly agreeing with the
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trial judge. However, rather than reading a medical use exemption into the legislation, the
Court of Appeal instead declared sections 4 and 7 of the CDSA to be of no force and
effect. The Court, suspended its declaration of invalidity for one year in order to give
Parliament time to make the necessary amendments, and provided Parker with a personal
exemption until that time.414 The result of this case was the introduction of the first
federal medical marijuana regulations, the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

3.3.1.

The Marihuana Medical Access Regulations

On July 30, 2001, as a result of the above decisions, Health Canada introduced the
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (the “MMAR”).415 Under the MMAR, an
individual could apply for an Authorization to Possess (ATP) cannabis for medical
purposes. If granted, an ATP allowed the holder to possess a 30-day supply of cannabis
without fear of prosecution.416 An ATP holder could also apply for a Personal-Use
Production License (PUPL) to grow their own cannabis, or a Designated Person
Production License (DPPL), to permit a designated person to grow cannabis on their
behalf.417 The MMAR had three categories of applicants, based on the risk to the
individual and the evidence to support the use of cannabis in the situation. Category 1
included patients with terminal illnesses and a prognosis of death within 12 months, and
therefore required a less stringent application process because the risk of harm was
low.418 Category 2 was for patients suffering from specific symptoms, found in a
schedule to the regulations, associated with serious medical conditions, and required
documents from a specialist in support of the application stating that conventional

414

Ibid at para 210.

415

Supra note 32.

416

Ibid at s 11(3) [in the application for an ATP, the physician writing the medical document had to
specify how much cannabis, and the form and route of administration, the holder used per day].
417
418

Ibid at ss 34 and 24.

Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Canada Gazette Part I,
Vol 135, No 14 (April 7, 2001) online: <http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2001/2001-04-07/pdf/g1-13514.pdf>
at 1215

82

treatment was either not appropriate or had not been successful.419 Symptoms and
conditions were added to the regulations on the basis of scientific and medical reports
confirming the potential benefit.420 Category 3 was for applicants that did not fit into
either Category 1 or 2, and required support from two specialists, again stating that all
conventional therapies had been tried or considered.421 A higher standard was required
for category 3 applicants on the basis that less evidence existed to support the use of
cannabis for conditions not included in Category 2.422 This process was onerous, and
there was still no legal supply of cannabis for those who possessed an ATP. Furthermore,
numerous medical regulatory bodies and associations expressed concern about the role
physicians were put in, as under the MMAR physicians were acting as gatekeepers for a
substance they were largely unfamiliar with.423 There were also concerns about the
potential liability that could result from supporting the use of medical cannabis, an
unapproved medicine.424
Between 2001 and 2014, the MMAR was amended on numerous occasions following
various challenges to the regulations. In 2003, the Ontario Court of Appeal released the
decision Hitzig v Canada425, which found various aspects of the MMAR to be
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unconstitutional. In particular, the Court held that the requirement for the second
specialist for category 3 applicants and the prohibitions against payment for and
supplying cannabis to more than one person violated section 7 and were not saved by
section 1.426 As a result, the court struck down: the prohibitions on compensating DPPL
holders; the requirement that a DPPL holder could only cultivate cannabis for one ATP
holder; the rule that no more than three DPPL or PUPL holders could cultivate cannabis
together; and, the provision requiring category 3 applicants to acquire a medical
declaration from a second specialist.427
Following the decision in Hitzig, the MMAR was amended in 2003. These amendments
allowed ATP holders to obtain marijuana from their physician, a DPPL holder, or Health
Canada428, and allowed DPPL holders to mail cannabis to ATP holders and to be
compensated for their services.429 They also created a lawful supply of cannabis to ATP
holders and cannabis seeds to PUPL and DPPL holders430, and, repealed the provision
requiring category 3 applicants to obtain a medical document from a second specialist.431
Contrary to the decision in Hitzig, the amendments did not repeal the provisions
prohibiting DPPL holders from cultivating cannabis for more than one ATP holder or the
provisions prohibiting PUPL and DPPL holders from cultivating cannabis with more than
2 other licensees.432
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Finding the above MMAR provisions constitutionally invalid proved to be problematic in
the decision R v J.P.433 J.P. was charged with possession of marijuana on April 12, 2002,
but succeeded in getting the charges dismissed on the basis that there was no offence of
possession of marijuana in force at the time he was charged. Recall that in Parker, the
Ontario Court of Appeal found section 4 of the CDSA (the prohibition on possession of
cannabis) to be of no force and effect, suspending the declaration of validity for one year.
Rosenberg JA, writing for the Court, made it clear that without a constitutionally valid
medical exemption, the prohibition against possession of cannabis in the CDSA was of no
force and effect.434 The MMAR was brought into force one day before the suspension of
declaration of invalidity would have lapsed, however the Ontario Court of Appeal
subsequently found that the MMAR did not create a constitutionally valid exemption in
Hitzig. Consequently, at the time J.P. was charged, there was no constitutionally
acceptable medical exemption, and as a result, per Parker, the criminal prohibition was of
no force and effect and J.P. could not be prosecuted.435
In 2005, the MMAR were further amended. Application Categories 1 and 2 were merged,
leaving two categories, and the need to have a specialist sign the medical document was
eliminated.436 Further amendments permitted ATP holders to apply to access a
government supply of dried marijuana from Prairie Plant Systems Inc., the sole federally
licensed dealer, and allowed PUPL and DPPL holders to access seeds from the same.437
The amendments streamlined the application process for an ATP, and provided limited
authority for pharmacists to supply cannabis to authorized persons.438
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Despite the 2005 amendments, the MMAR continued to be challenged. In Sfetkopolous v
Canada (Attorney General)439, the applicants sought to have subsection 41(b.1) of the
MMAR declared invalid as a violation of section 7 of the Charter. Subsection 41(b.1)
gave the Minister of Health power to refuse to issue a DPPL if the designated person
would be the holder of more than one licence to produce.440 The Federal Court declared
the impugned section to be invalid, declaring it to be of no force and effect.441 This
finding was based on the fact that only 20% of those eligible to possess medical cannabis
could access it, or did access it, making cannabis for medical purposes not practically
accessible. Further, there was no evidence to support the government’s restrictions on
license holders.442 In the year following Sfetkopolous, the constitutionality of subsection
41(b.1) came before the courts again, along with a challenge to the prohibition on more
than three license holders growing in any one location.443 In R v Beren and Swallow444,
the defendant was charged with production, possession, and controlling marijuana for the
purposes of trafficking, contrary to the CDSA.445 He argued that he produced large
quantitates for medical and research purposes only, and that his prosecution was a breach
of his section 7 right to liberty and security of the person.446 The British Columbia
Supreme Court found both aspects of the MMAR to be contrary to section 7, and not
saved by section 1. Following these decisions, the MMAR was amended again in 2009.
These amendments permitted individuals to hold two DPPLs instead of one, but they had
to be applied for and approved separately. Additionally, the amendments raised the
number of DPPL or PUPL holders that could cultivate cannabis together from three to
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four. An amendment also permitted ATP holders to hold both a DPPL and a PUPL,
allowing them to produce cannabis for themselves and one other ATP holder.447
Again, despite the 2009 amendments to the MMAR, they continued to be challenged. R v
Mernagh448 proved to be the last straw. Mernagh applied for a stay of a charge of
production of marijuana. He suffered from various medical conditions, and cultivated and
used marijuana to ease his symptoms. Mernagh had been unable to find a doctor to sign
the necessary paperwork, so his cultivation and possession was deemed illegal. Mernagh
argued that his prosecution violated his section 7 Charter rights. In response, the Crown
argued that deprivation of rights had to result from government action or legislation.
Consequently, the Crown asserted that the actions of individual physicians did not engage
section 7. Taliano J of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that it was “practically
impossible to obtain the requisite support of a medical doctor for the lawful use of
medicinal marihuana under the MMAR”449, because doctors had widely refused to
participate in the program. The lack of viable exemption to the prohibitions in the CDSA
constituted a violation of section 7 that did not accord with principles of fundamental
justice. Furthermore, this violation could not be saved by section 1, because the
requirement for a doctor’s declaration was not rationally connected to the objectives of
the MMAR.450 Taliano J permanently stayed the charges against Mernagh and found the
entirety of the MMAR and relevant provisions of the CDSA to be constitutionally invalid
and thus of no force and effect, suspending the declaration of invalidity for three months,
and Mernagh was granted a personal exemption to possess and produce cannabis in the
meantime.451 The Government appealed the Superior Court’s decision, which was
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dismissed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.452 The federal government responded to this
finding by introducing the Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations.

3.3.2.

The Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations

The finding in Mernagh, coupled with financial and administrative concerns with the
MMAR453, ultimately led to the introduction of the Marihuana for Medical Purposes
Regulations (MMPR)454. The MMPR were enacted in July 2013, and ran concurrently
with the MMAR until its repeal on March 31, 2014.455 ATPs under the MMAR remained
in effect until March 31, 2015, after which they had to re-register under the MMPR.
PUPL and DPPL holders were required to sell their plants and seeds to a licensed
producer. Under the MMPR, Health Canada authorized licensed producers to cultivate
and sell medical marijuana to patients that have acquired a medical document from a
physician authorizing them to order marijuana. Health Canada played no direct role in the
registration of patients. Instead, licensed producers registered patients and verified the
information. Patients could then order marijuana from their licensed producer by phone,
fax, mail, or online, and have the marijuana shipped directly to them. This new regulatory
scheme no longer specified the disease conditions required for medical authorization to
use cannabis, and eliminated the need for a specialist’s approval.
Like its predecessor, the MMPR was also challenged. There were two controversial
aspects of the MMPR that led to constitutional challenges: the prohibition on residential
cultivation of marijuana, and the exclusion of cannabis derivatives from the MMPR. The
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latter provided the basis for R v Smith456. Smith worked for a retail store selling marijuana
and cannabis derivatives, including edibles and topical cannabis products such as oils and
patches, but did so without authorization from Health Canada. Smith was subsequently
charged under the CDSA. At trial, Smith argued that the prohibition on possession in
combination with the exemptions under the MMAR457 were inconsistent with the
Charter.458 The trial judge found the restriction to dried marijuana deprived Smith and
other users of their liberty by imposing a threat of prosecution and depriving medical
users of the liberty to choose how to take medication they are authorized to possess.
These limits were found to be arbitrary, and not rationally connected to the objectives of
the regulations.459 The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s
decision460, and the SCC confirmed that prohibiting non-dried forms of medical
marijuana violated section 7 in a manner not consistent with principles of fundamental
justice and could not be justified under section 1.461 Therefore, the restriction was
deemed of no force and effect, and the appeal was dismissed. The Trial Judge initially
ordered that the word “dried” and the definition of “dried marijuana” to be deleted from
the Regulations.462 The Court of Appeal varied this order, instead holding the limitations
in the MMAR to be of no force and effect to the extent that a person who has been granted
an ATP is permitted to possess only dried marijuana, suspended for one year.463 The SCC
varied the Court of Appeal’s order by removing the suspension of its declaration,
declaring sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA “of no force and effect to the extent that they
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prohibit a person with medical authorization from possessing cannabis derivatives for
medical purposes.”464 Smith was acquitted of all the charges against him.
Allard v Canada465 was a challenge to the MMPR brought by four individuals regarding
the restriction on residential cultivation of medical cannabis. The plaintiffs sought: a
constitutionally valid exemption to cultivate or produce cannabis; a declaration that the
MMPR was unconstitutional by unreasonably restricting the plaintiffs’ section 7 rights to
access a safe and continuous supply of cannabis by failing to allow personal or
designated production; and, a declaration that the prohibition on producing outdoors or in
a dwelling-house and the 150 gram maximum were unreasonable restrictions not saved
by section 1.466 In regards to the cultivation issue, the plaintiffs demonstrated that
cannabis can be produced safely with limited risk, and that the restriction on cultivation
was not minimally impairing. Regarding the restriction on maximum possession
quantities, the Court found the limit was not overbroad or grossly disproportionate. The
Court found it was not feasible to strike out certain words or provisions, so instead
declared the MMPR invalid and suspended invalidity for 6 months to allow Parliament to
enact a new or parallel regime.467

3.3.3.

The ACMPR

As a result of the decision in Allard, the Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes
Regulations came into effect on August 24, 2016. The ACMPR, a hybrid of the MMAR
and MMPR, reintroduced cultivation by registered and designated persons, allowing
patients to access medical cannabis from licensed producers, personal production, and
designated production. The application process for licensed producers was streamlined,
and licensed producers are permitted to supply registered growers with starting materials
and interim supplies. Health Canada continues to oversee the commercial industry and
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register individuals for production licenses.468 At the time of writing, no challenges to the
ACMPR have been decided, however there are indications that challenges are
forthcoming.

3.4. Legalization of Recreational Cannabis
The road to legalizing cannabis use for recreational purposes has been a long one.
Canadian governments have been promising to liberalize cannabis use for decades. In
1970, then Minister of National Health and Welfare John Munroe announced that the
federal government was considering transferring cannabis from the Narcotic Control Act
to the Food and Drug Act.469 This announcement came just one year after the formation
of the Commission of Inquiry in the Non-Medical Use of Drugs (known commonly as the
Le Dain Commission)470, and two years prior to the submission of their report to the
House of Commons. The Le Dain Commission sought to address concerns with drug use
and the appropriate government response, and to analyze the impact of criminalization
both on individuals and society generally.471 The Le Dain Commission made numerous
recommendations, including a gradual withdrawal of the use of criminal law against nonmedical uses of all drugs, repealing the offence of possession of cannabis, and a general
reduction of penalties for all other cannabis offences.472 This report was widely praised,
but the conclusions were largely ignored for decades.473 Similarly, cannabis was never
moved from the Narcotic Control Regulations to the Food and Drugs Act.
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In 2002, the topic of cannabis legalization resurfaced. A report of the Senate Special
Committee on Illegal Drugs, Cannabis: Our Position for a Canadian Public Policy,
proposed a public policy self-described as “provocative.”474 It expressed the following
fundamental premise:
[I]n a free and democratic society, which recognizes fundamentally but
not exclusively the rule of law as the source of normative rules and in
which government must promote autonomy as far as possible and
therefore make only sparing use of the instruments of constraint, public
policy on psychoactive substances must be structured around guiding
principles respecting the life, health, security and rights and freedoms of
individuals, who, naturally and legitimately, seek their own well-being and
development and can recognize the presence, difference and equality of
others.475
The Senate Report, building on the work done by the Le Dain Commission, reported that
“used in moderation, cannabis in itself poses very little danger to users and to society as a
whole, but specific types of use represent risks for users.”476 Furthermore, the Report
argued that the continued prohibition of cannabis “jeopardizes the health and well-being
of Canadians much more than does the substance itself or the regulated marketing of the
substance.”477 The Report recommended amending the CDSA to create an exemption
scheme, making cannabis available to those over the age of 16, and permitting the
production and sale of cannabis.478 This Report was commended by those advocating for
legalization, but ultimately was never implemented.479
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Over the past few decades, Canada has witnessed a gradual, but significant, “hollowing
out” of the criminal laws relating to cannabis. Hollowing out is described by William
Bogart as small changes, such as shifting public opinion or variations in the application
of the law, which indicate a more significant change on the horizon, even if the path
forward is not clear.480 In this case, the hollowing out of cannabis policy refers to the
significant reduction in the enforcement of cannabis-related criminal offences leading
towards the decriminalization of cannabis.481 For example, in 2015 the Deputy Chief of
Police in Vancouver released a report indicating that the use of the criminal law in
response to the increased presence of illegal cannabis dispensaries in the city was
ineffective and not the best use of limited resources.482 Even further, Vancouver decided
to regulate the illegal dispensaries via business by-laws, despite being in direct violation
of federal criminal laws.483
In April 2016, the federal government announced its intention to legalize and regulate
recreational cannabis. Minister of Health Jane Philpott indicated that legalizing
recreational cannabis would “keep marijuana out of the hands of children and profits out
of the hands of criminals”.484 A Task Force was assembled to conduct public
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consultations and consult with experts to make recommendations to the federal
government. They released their final report in December 2016, containing over 80
recommendations. The primary recommendation relevant to this thesis suggests
“apply[ing] comprehensive restrictions to the advertising and promotion of cannabis and
related merchandise by any means, including sponsorship, endorsements, and brand,
similar to the restriction on promotion of tobacco products.”485 In April 2017, the
government released the proposed legislation, to come into effect no later than July 2018,
legalizing recreational cannabis use for adults in Canada.486 The proposed Cannabis Act
is intended to operate concurrently with the ACMPR. The purposes of the Act include:
•

Restricting youth access to cannabis;

•

Protecting young people from promotion or enticements to use cannabis;

•

Deterring and reducing criminal activity;

•

Protecting public health;

•

Reducing the burden on the criminal justice system;

•

Allowing adults to possess and access regulated, quality controlled cannabis;
and,

•

Enhancing public awareness of the health risks associated with cannabis.487

The recreational use of cannabis remains illegal until the bill becomes law. The proposed
minimum age for purchase and possession of cannabis is 18, however the provinces will
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be able to raise the minimum age, but not lower it.488 Bill C-45 will create two new
criminal offences: giving or selling cannabis to youth, and using a youth to commit a
cannabis-related offence, both with maximum penalties of 14 years in jail.489 It will also
prohibit products that are appealing to youth, packaging or labelling cannabis in a way
that makes it appealing to youth, selling cannabis through self-service or vending
machines, and promoting cannabis, except in narrow circumstances where the promotion
cannot be seen by a young person.490 At the date of writing, Bill C-45 has passed second
reading in the House of Commons and was referred to the Standing Committee on
Health.491

3.5. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to document the complex relationship between cannabis
and the law. The road to legalizing cannabis, for both medical and non-medical purposes,
has been plagued by fear-mongering, misinformation, and political and legal roadblocks.
A prohibitionist regime has dominated for almost an entire century, despite repeated
attempts to loosen, and in some cases, entirely withdraw criminal sanctions. As one of the
first countries to have a government-sanctioned medical cannabis program, the Canadian
government has had little international experience to draw on in the development and
implementation of this program. Since its inception, the medical cannabis regulations
have been subject to numerous constitutional challenges, have undergone numerous
revisions with significant changes, and the current iteration is still being challenged
fifteen years after the first iteration of medical marijuana regulations were implemented.
Legalizing recreational cannabis use has been on the minds of Canadian politicians for
decades. Now, with the proposed Cannabis Act poised to become law by 2018, there are
concerns regarding several elements of the legislation. Concerns about the appropriate tax
rate, how to prevent impaired driving, and minimum purchasing age, among others,
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highlight the difficulties of regulating recreational cannabis in a way that will protect
Canadians from the risks associated with cannabis and cannabis use. One aspect of Bill
C-45 that has received relatively little attention, however, is the proposed advertising
restrictions, and whether they are a constitutionally valid infringement on freedom of
expression. The legal foundation for freedom of expression will be discussed in the
following chapter. Additionally, a historical summary of cannabis law in Canada leading
up to and including Bill C-45 provides the necessary background information that plays a
role in determining the purposes of the legislation, interpretation of the legislation, and
contextual analysis of the infringement, which will be relevant considerations in later
chapters.
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4. Freedom of Expression & The Charter
4.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is chronicle the development of freedom of expression in
Canada. This chapter will follow the legislative protection of freedom of expression, from
the Canadian Bill of Rights (“CBR”) to the introduction of the Charter, and the
development of jurisprudence in the area. This chapter will summarize how courts have
decided commercial free speech cases in order to provide a road map for analyzing how
the courts will approach cannabis advertising restrictions. Part two of this chapter begins
with a discussion of pre-Charter rights protection, namely the CBR. Part three compares
the protection offered by CBR to the protection offered by the Charter. Part four focuses
on freedom of expression protection under the Charter and explores the rationales
underlying the importance of this right. Part five explains the scope of the protection of
section 2(b), exploring what types of expression are protected by section 2(b) and to what
extent. Part six explains the judicial threshold for determining whether a governmental
act has infringed upon section 2(b), either in purpose or in effect. Part seven focuses on
section 1 of the Charter, starting with how courts determined whether a Charter
infringement was justified prior to the introduction of the Oakes test, compared to after
the development of the Oakes test. Each step of the Oakes test is discussed with relevant
references to jurisprudence, followed by a discussion of the factors that can influence the
analysis, namely, context, deference, and standard of proof. Finally, remedies available
upon finding a piece of legislation, or a specific provision, unconstitutional are discussed.
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4.2. Pre-Charter
Prior to the introduction of any enshrined protection of human rights in Canada, an
implied bill of rights existed in the common law, a remnant from Canada’s history as a
British Colony.492 The first federal expression of human rights law in Canada, the CBR,
was enacted on August 10, 1960. Section 1 of the CBR, titled “Recognition and
declaration of rights and freedoms” recognized freedom of speech as a human right and
fundamental freedom.493 Under the CBR, rights conflicts were resolved primarily by
Parliament. The Justice Minister was responsible for examining all bills introduced to the
House and reporting any inconsistencies with the CBR.494 The consequences of a bill
violating these rights were much less significant than they are under the Charter; the
resources that go into a Charter challenge are significant, and the legal consequences are
more severe.495
While the CBR was an important step in the history of human rights law in Canada, it has
several deficiencies, such as its reliance of the government to self-report how bills
violated the rights of Canadians.496 In 1958, the standard for the Justice Minister to report
inconsistencies in bills lowered; where the Minister previously had to ‘ensure’ that bills
introduced with consistent with the CBR, the language changed to ‘ascertain’, suggesting
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much less onus on the Department of Justice to draft bills with an eye to Charter
rights.497 Those in favor of the CBR hoped that the self-governance would encourage the
federal government to ensure that bills were consistent with the CBR from the outset,
though that did not appear to be the case.498 Additionally, the CBR was widely regarded
as ineffective because it was a federal statute and thus only applied to the federal
government, and could be repealed at any time by Parliament.499 These practical and
legal limitations were a significant factor in establishing the Charter as an
unambiguously constitutional document with the patriation of the Constitution of Canada
in 1982.

4.3. Introduction of the Charter
Canada’s introduction of the Charter shifted the balance of power in rights conflicts;
where the onus was once on Parliament to avoid rights conflicts, under the Charter the
judiciary offered the final judgement on rights conflicts.500 A once hands-off judiciary
was now viewed as the “Guardian of the Charter”, responsible for evaluating conflicting
values.501 There are some similarities between the CBR and the Charter. For example,
under the Charter the federal Minister of Justice has a similar reporting requirement to
the one in the CBR, obliging the minister to certify that bills have been assessed in light
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of the Charter and to report any inconsistencies. But, in a lot of ways, the Charter is very
different from the CBR. The Charter is a constitutional document, which means it applies
to all levels of government – including government agencies. As a constitutional
document, it impacts what happens when a bill is found to be inconsistent with the
Charter. While the impact of the CBR on inconsistent statutes was unclear, under the
Charter, courts had the power not only to review legislation, but to grant remedies, such
as striking down offending legislation or provisions.502 Though the government process
of reviewing bills is often secretive, there is some indication that analysis of bills under
the Charter is more sensitive to rights breaches than it was under the CBR.503
Additionally, the introduction and interpretation of the Charter led to a more rigorous
approach to rights than the CBR. Under the CBR, only one statute was found to be
inoperative, in the case R v Drybones504. Courts made it explicit that under the Charter,
the government would have the burden of persuading the court that its actions were
reasonable.505 Early Charter cases, such as Singh v Minister of Employment and
Immigration506, Schachter v Canada507, R v Oakes508, and Hunter v Southam509, not only
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confirmed that the burden rested with the government responsible for the limitation, but
emphasized the significance of the introduction of the Charter for government.510 For
example, in Singh, Wilson J stated “[i]t seems to me rather that the recent adoption of the
Charter…has sent a clear message to the courts that the restrictive attitude which at times
characterized their approach to the CBR ought to be re-examined.”511 Despite the
expansion of power that the introduction of the Charter afforded the courts, limits on the
courts’ power existed in the forms of the section 1 limitation clause, as well as the section
33 override clause. Together, these clauses ensure that the ultimately, the power rests
with the respective legislative body to draft and implemented legislation as they see fit. 512

4.4. Freedom of Expression and the Charter
One of the rights guaranteed under the Charter is freedom of expression. Section 2(b) of
the Charter protects “freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression.”513 Freedom of
expression has been described as “an essential feature of Canadian parliamentary
democracy”514, and “little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is to his
physical existence.”515 There is no question that the right to express oneself freely is an
incredibly important right. Because of its importance, and the importance of all Charter
rights, the SCC in Hunter adopted a purposive approach to interpreting and applying
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Charter rights.516 This approach requires interpreting each right in light of the underlying
interests it protects.517 With respect to the freedom of expression, in Ford, the Court
identified the values underlying the freedom to be democracy, truth-seeking, and selfrealization.518 The majority in Irwin Toy affirmed these rationales in its articulation of the
test for determining whether an infringement on freedom of expression occurred.519
Similarly, in Butler the majority stated, “[i]n assessing whether the proportionality test is
met, it is important to keep in mind the nature of expression which has been infringed.”520
Despite widespread agreement that the underlying values are important, to date, section
2(b) jurisprudence has provided little guidance in defining or applying these rationales,
making it difficult to predict how expression will be evaluated in the future. Each of the
values underlying freedom of expression will be discussed in turn.

4.4.1.

Truth-Seeking

The origins of the argument that freedom of expression promotes truth-seeking is most
commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill. Mill argued that the public is more likely to
recognize truth if they are permitted to hear all available views, even those that may be
false.521 McLachlin J (as she then was) accepted truth-seeking as a valid rationale for
freedom of expression in Keegstra, stating that “[w]hile freedom of expression provides
no guarantee that the truth will always prevail…it assists in promoting the truth in ways
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which would be impossible without the freedom.”522 However, McLachlin J qualified her
endorsement of the rationale by noting that justification for freedom of expression cannot
be confined to truth-seeking because “many ideas and expressions which cannot be
verified are valuable.”523 While the SCC has been unclear about what expressive
activities contribute to truth-seeking, it has found that obscenity and hate speech do
not.524 The truthfulness of the message, the likeliness that the expression will elicit
rational responses, and the openness of the marketplace to which the expression
contributes, all appear to be relevant factors in determining the degree of protection
afforded.525

4.4.2.

Democracy

Second, freedom of expression is necessary for the proper functioning of a democratic
society.526 Canadian jurisprudence has not clearly defined the relationship between
freedom of expression and democracy, but it has utilized the rationale to help define the
scope of the right.527 In a democratic society, the ability to freely hear information and
ideas concerning public issues is imperative to advancing the common good. Courts have
consistently emphasized the strong relationship between freedom of expression and
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democracy. In fact, in Keegstra, Dickson CJ (as he then was) described the relationship
between politics and freedom of expression as “the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee.”528
Furthermore, freedom of expression ensures that the political process is accessible to all
persons and that the best decision can be made from all possible options.529 Cory J,
writing in Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General)530, stated “[t]he concept of
free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and institutions.”531
While this underlying reason is clearly linked to the protection of political speech, it also
extends to support the protection of other types of speech. L’Heureux Dube J commented
on the invaluable nature of political expression, stating “[t]he liberty to comment on and
criticize existing institutions and structures is an indispensable component of a ‘free and
democratic society’…[i]t is imperative for such societies to benefit from a multiplicity of
viewpoints which can find fertile sustenance through various media of
communication.”532

4.4.3.

Individual Self-Realization

Third, protecting freedom of expression promotes individual self-realization, or selffulfilment.533 This is the broadest rationale, and has been found to protect “commercial
expression, hate speech, obscenity, child pornography, promotion of leisure activities,
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employment-related speech, consumer expression, and participation in the political
expression.”534 Freedom of expression promotes self-realization because it permits an
individual to realize their intellectual capacities by expressing their own ideas and
listening to the ideas of others.535 Expression allows an individual’s identity to emerge
through communication and interaction with others, and thus is more than an individual
right, it is a social right.536 In Keegstra, McLachlin J (as she then was) found this
rationale too broad to support constitutional protection of speech on its own, but
conceded that the intrinsic value of expression to “the self-realization of both speaker and
listener” would ensure that some types of expression, such as artistic expression, that
might not be protected under the other rationales, benefit from Charter protection.537 That
was the case in Butler, where the Attorney General for Ontario argued that pornography
was only related to the underlying value of individual self-fulfilment, and even then, only
because it is related to physical arousal.538 However, civil liberties groups countered with
the argument that “pornography forces us to question the conventional notion of sexuality
and thereby launches us into an inherently political discourse”539, and that “[g]ood
pornography has value because it validates women’s will to pleasure.”540 The Court
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ultimately sided with the Attorney General of Ontario, finding that the expression in
question was not equivalent to other types of expression that directly engage the values
underlying freedom of expression.541 Other types of expression are more easily connected
to individual self-fulfilment. For example, in Ford the Court considered whether freedom
of expression protected the right to express oneself in the language of their choice.
Language was described as “the means by which the individual expresses his or her
personal identity and sense of individuality,”542 and was found to be protected under
section 2(b). Similarly, in Committee for the Commonwealth, L’Heureux Dube J
discussed the value of political expression specifically, stating that is “is valuable in part
because it enhances personal growth and self-realization.”543
Of course, separating these three rationales is only necessary for the sake of clarity and
organization; the lines between democracy and self-realization, or truth-seeking and
democracy are not sharp, but blurry and overlapping. This has been recognized in
jurisprudence. For example, L’Heureux Dube J in Committee for the Commonwealth
noted, “reliance on any rationale in isolation is fraught with difficulty.”544 Expression
may promote all three rationales, or only one. Additionally, often times protecting
expression that promotes one rationale will inevitably impact the other rationales as well.
For example, truth-seeking helps to support not only a strong democracy but may also
support individual self-realization. Additionally, the connection of a particular type of
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expression to these rationales is only one of many factors to be considered in balancing
competing rights. This was confirmed by McLachlin J’s (as she then was) dissenting
opinion in Keegstra, when she noted that each of the rationales is useful in guiding
section 2(b) analysis, but that their importance to each case will vary, confirming that
expression need not be closely tied to all three rationales in order to be deserving of
greater protection. 545

4.5. The Scope of Freedom of Expression Protection
There are three steps in a freedom of expression challenge. First, it must be determined
that the expression in question is expression that is protected by section 2(b). Second, the
courts will determine whether the freedom has been infringed upon, either in purpose or
in effect, by the government act. Lastly, if the first two steps have been met, the courts
will determine whether the infringement is justified in a free and democratic society,
pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. This section will focus on the first step. It is well
established that Charter rights should be interpreted broadly.546 As such, the protection
provided by section 2(b) is afforded a large and liberal interpretation to protect a broad
scope of expression.547 Courts have confirmed that “activities cannot be excluded from
the scope of the guaranteed freedom on the basis of the content or meaning being
conveyed”548, because the purpose of section 2(b) is to ensure that thoughts and feelings
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can be communicated freely without fear of censure.549 The court in Irwin Toy confirmed
that “[a]ll expression of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to
the mainstream”550 deserves constitutional protection. Additionally, the protection
extends both to speakers and listeners.551 But, this does not mean that all types of
expression are protected or that all types of expression are equally protected.552 For
example, political expression is typically afforded more protection than commercial
expression, as the values underlying political speech have been deemed to be of greater
importance than those underlying commercial speech.553 In contrast, violent speech will
not be afforded the same protection.554 Additionally, in Montréal (City) v 2952-1366
Québec Inc., relying on Committee for the Commonwealth, the majority considered
whether the location of the expression at issue can cause the expression to be excluded
from the scope of 2(b). 555 The majority recognized that freedom of expression includes
the right to express oneself in certain public spaces, and so a freedom of expression
analysis must not only consider whether the specific activity in question is protected, but
whether the freedom protects their right to do that activity in a certain place (i.e. a public
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street).556 In Committee for the Commonwealth, the majority agreed that there is no prima
facie right of free expression on all government owned property, but developed multiple
tests for determining whether government-owned property is public or private in
nature.557 The majority in Montréal settled the matter, adopting the following test for the
application of section 2(b) to public property: Is the place a public place where one
would expect constitutional protection for free expression, on the basis that it does not
conflict with the values underlying the freedom?558 In answering this question, the
historical or actual function of the place, as well as whether other aspects of the place
suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying freedom of
expression, should be considered.559
This step of the analysis is typically met easily. The majority in Irwin Toy stated that if an
“activity coveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima
facie falls within the scope of the guarantee.”560 Therefore, the burden is on the defendant
government to show that the activity that is restricted or banned is either a form of
expression not protected by section 2(b), or that it does not convey or attempt to convey
meaning.
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Whether commercial speech constitutes expression protected by section 2(b) has been
considered by the SCC in numerous cases. In Ford, the Court first recognized
commercial advertising as deserving of constitutional protection, proclaiming: “there is
no sound basis on which commercial expression can be excluded from the protection of s.
2(b).”561 This overturned previous arguments562 that the Charter was not intended to
protect economic interests. The Court in Ford, however, refuted these claims by stressing
that commercial speech involves more than just economics, identifying informed choice,
individual self-fulfillment, and personal autonomy as intrinsic values of commercial
expression.563 This reasoning has been repeated by the Court on various occasions,
solidifying the constitutional protection afforded to commercial advertising. For example,
In Irwin Toy, when tasked with determining whether advertising aimed at children
constituted expression, the Court, referring to Ford, found such expression to be
protected.564 Similarly, in Rocket the Court found professional advertising to meet the test
set out in Irwin Toy for what constitutes expressive activity.565 Today, little question
exists as to the constitutional protection afforded to advertising.
The important role of commercial speech in modern society that justifies Charter
protection has been recognized in jurisprudence. In the Court of Appeal decision Rocket v
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Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario566, Cory JA emphasized the importance of
advertising in a free market, stating that the rights of the consumer to receive information
may be a better justification for protecting commercial speech than the rights of the
advertiser to expression.567 In contrast, the harms of advertising have equally been
recognized. In Irwin Toy, the Court recognized that there existed a general concern with
the impact of media, particularly television advertising, on the development and
perceptions of young children, which motivated legislative restrictions on commercial
speech.568 Similarly, in JTI-MacDonald, the Court stated “when commercial expression
is used…for the purposes of inducing people to engage in harmful and addictive
behaviour, its value becomes tenuous.”569 This statement establishes that the purpose of
the commercial speech seeking protection will be an important factor in balancing the
rights of the speaker against the government’s actions.

4.6. Finding Infringement
Once it has been established that the activity constitutes expression, the second step of
the analysis is determining whether freedom of expression has been infringed, either in
purpose or effect.570 If the government’s purpose was to restrict expression, either by
restricting the content of expression or by restricting the form of expression tied to
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content, the guarantee has been infringed.571 This is differentiated from situations where
the government instead aims only to control the physical consequences, in which case
freedom of expression has not been infringed.572 If the government’s purpose was not to
restrict expression, a plaintiff can still claim that the governmental action had the effect
of restricting expression if a meaning being conveyed can be identified and can be related
to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual self-fulfillment.573
The decision in Irwin Toy discussed this stage of the analysis at great length. Regarding
infringement of a right in purpose, the majority stated:
If the government’s purpose is to restrict the content of expression by
singling out particular meanings that are not to be conveyed, it
necessarily limits the guarantee of free expression. If the government’s
purpose is to restrict a form of expression in order to control access by
others to the meaning being conveyed or to control the ability of the one
conveying the meaning to do so, it also limits the guarantee. On the other
hand, where the government aims to control only the physical
consequences of certain human activity, regardless of the meaning being
conveyed, its purpose is not to control expression.574
The majority held that the purpose of the advertising restrictions contained in the
Consumer Protection Act was to restrict content and specific types of expression in order
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to protect children.575 The impugned provisions restricted not only the manner in which a
particular content must be expressed, but also directly restricted content, and therefore
infringed upon section 2(b) of the Charter.576 However, courts typically do not spend
much time on this part of the analysis, as infringement is usually easily met. In fact, in
both RJR-MacDonald and JTI-MacDonald, the respective Attorney Generals conceded
that the impugned legislation was an infringement of freedom of expression, so the courts
wasted little ink exploring this step.577

4.7. Section 1 Analysis
If the government action is shown to infringe freedom of expression, either in its purpose
or in its effect, then the analysis turns to the third step. The third step requires
establishing whether the infringement can be justified under section 1 of the Charter.
Section 1 confirms that while the rights set out in the Charter are guaranteed, the
government can limit an individual’s Charter rights, provided that such a limitation can
be justified. Section 1 has been used to justify the restriction of a variety of objectionable
expression, including hate speech and obscenity.578 When the government limits an
individual’s rights, the onus is on the Crown to show, on a balance of probabilities, that
the limitation was prescribed by law, and that it be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. In R v Therens579, Le Dain J, in dissent, explained that for a limit to
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meet the prescribed by law requirement, it must either be “expressly provided for by
statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or
regulation or from its operating requirements… [or] from the application of a common
law rule.”580 For the most part, provided it is a statute or regulation being challenged,
there is little question that the prescribed by law requirement will be satisfied.
The test to determine if the purpose is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society was set forth in Oakes. Prior to the adoption of the Oakes test, a similar section 1
analysis was employed, with slightly less structure. In Big M Drug Mart, for example, the
similarity between the analysis employed by the majority and the Oakes test is obvious.
In Big M Drug Mart, Dickson CJ, who wrote on behalf of the majority in both Oakes and
Big M Drug Mart, noted that not all government objectives will be entitled to section 1
consideration, only if a “sufficiently significant government interest is recognized” will
the analysis progress to the proportionality test.581 At that point, he stated, “[t]he court
may wish to ask whether the means adopted to achieve the end sought do so by impairing
as little as possible the right or freedom in question.” 582 This is the same language that is
now used in the minimal impairment step of the proportionality analysis in the Oakes
test.
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The Oakes test asks whether the objective of the impugned legislation is of significant
importance and if the means are proportional.583 The first step of the Oakes analysis is the
pressing and substantial requirement, which sets out to determine whether the objective
of the impugned legislation is “of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a
constitutionally protected right or freedom.”584 Ascertaining the legislative objective is
achieved by determining what the legislator’s intent was in drafting the limit.585 The
standard for this requirement is high “in order to ensure that objectives which are trivial
or discordant with the principles integral to a free and democratic society do not gain s. 1
protection.”586 However, jurisprudence in the area suggests that courts do not often hold
parties to a high standard. In Edmonton Journal, Cory J accepted the objectives of
protecting individual’s privacy and ensuring a fair trial as pressing and substantial,
though with little conviction. Regarding the second impugned provision, which
prohibited publishing specific trial information prior to a trial or other determination of
the proceedings, Cory J stated, “I will assume…that s. 30(2) as well meets that first test
and that both the objectives, that of securing a fair trial and that of protecting the right to
privacy with regard to pre-trial documents constitute pressing and substantial objectives
sufficient to permit the overriding of the right to freedom of expression.”587
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In the context of commercial advertising restrictions, arguments for the pressing and
substantial restrictions typically rely on protecting populations from the harms associated
with advertising. In Irwin Toy, the Attorney General of Quebec demonstrated that the
legislation restricting advertising to children met the pressing and substantial threshold
because its goal was to protect a vulnerable population, children, from known harms
associated with the impact of media.588 In RJR-MacDonald the pressing and substantial
objective was preventing Canadians from being persuaded to use tobacco products by
advertising and promotion and to discourage people who see tobacco packaging from
tobacco use.589 Similarly, the objective of the impugned legislation in JTI-MacDonald,
stated broadly, was to protect the health of Canadians and respond to a public health
problem.590 In all cases, the requirement of a pressing and substantial objective was
met.591
The second part of the Oakes test is proportionality, which has three sub-requirements:
rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality between the effects of the
legislation and the objective. Rational connection requires the government to establish
that the infringement of freedom of expression is rationally connected to the legislative
goal.592 The threshold for this element is not high; it must simply be plausible that the
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means may help to bring about the objective. Rational connection does not require direct
causal scientific information, instead, a court may find a causal connection on the basis of
logic or reason. For example, in RJR-MacDonald, a sufficient link between certain forms
of advertising, warnings, and tobacco consumption was established on a balance of
probabilities, primarily relying on logic and common sense, rather than scientific causal
proof.593 However, McLachlin J (as she then was), found section 8 of the TPCA, which
imposed an absolute prohibition of using tobacco trade marks on articles other than
tobacco products with the objective of decreasing tobacco consumption, failed the
rational connection test because “there is no causal connection based on direct evidence,
nor is there, in my view, a causal connection based in logic or reason.”594 In sum, either
direct scientific evidence of a causal connection, or a logical connection between the
objective and the measures adopted is sufficient to meet this requirement.
To pass the second proportionality requirement, “the government must show that the
measures at issue impair the right of free expression as little as reasonably possible in
order to achieve the legislative objective.”595 This step does not require that the
government implement the law that is the least impairing, but rather that the law “falls
within a range of reasonable alternatives.”596 However, the law may fail if the
government fails to explain why a less intrusive measure was not chosen.597 In RJR-
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MacDonald, McLachlin J (as she then was) found the absolute ban in the TPCA was not
minimally impairing, referring to jurisprudence supporting that it is more difficult to
justify a complete ban as opposed to a partial ban.598 In contrast, the Tobacco Act, which
was under consideration in JTI-MacDonald, was considered to be a partial ban on
advertising that was justified under section 1.599 While the Tobacco Act permitted
information and brand-preference advertising, it prohibited lifestyle advertising and
promotion, advertising appealing to young persons, and false or misleading advertising or
promotion, it also increased the size of mandatory health warnings on packages from
33% to 50% of the principal display surface.600 Characterized as a partial ban, the
Tobacco Act was found to be minimally impairing.601
At the minimal impairment stage, a court may also consider whether the impugned law is
overbroad, or vague. A limit will be overbroad where it catches more than necessary to
meet the objective of the legislation. In contrast, a limit will be vague where the language
is general or imprecise to the point that a citizen may stifle their speech too much, out of
fear for being caught on the wrong side of the law. In JTI-MacDonald, the Court laid out
two things that must be proven in order to repudiate a claim of vagueness or overbreadth:
(1) the law must give sufficient guidance to those expected to abide by it; and (2) the law
must limit the amount of discretion held by the state officials responsible for enforcing
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the limit.602 Of course, absolute certainty of the law is impossible, and often times
language is specifically general to permit flexibility for technological or societal
advances, but the limit must provide enough guidance for citizens to guide their
behaviour.603
The last requirement of the proportionality analysis asks whether the objective is
proportional to the effect of the law. Specifically, it asks whether the negative effects of
the infringement of rights are proportional to the benefits associated with the legislative
goal. In Irwin Toy, the majority found this component easily met, stating “there is no
suggestion here that the effects of the ban [on advertising to children] are so severe as to
outweigh the government’s pressing and substantial objective.”604 In that case, the
advertisers were still able to develop new marketing strategies for children’s products,
including targeting ads at the ultimate purchasers, parents. In RJR-Macdonald,
McLachlin J (as she then was) still commented on this step of the analysis despite finding
that the legislation failed on the minimal impairment step. She stated that any law that is
not minimally impairing will necessarily fail the proportionality between effect and
objective step as well.605 In JTI-MacDonald, the impugned provisions passed the
proportionality assessment in whole upon consideration of the low value of the prohibited
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commercial expression and the “matter of life or death for millions of people” associated
with restricting certain types of tobacco advertising.606

4.8. Flexibility, deference, and standard of proof
4.8.1.

Flexibility
There are three concepts that impact the section 1 analysis: flexibility, deference,

and standard of proof. Each will be discussed in turn. The Oakes test is meant to be
“applied flexibly, having regard to the factual and social context of each case.”607 In the
early days of the Charter, Justice Bora Laskin insisted that adjudication of Charter
conflicts should consider the social, economic, and political factors, which may impact
the application of the law.608 The contextual approach can be found in early Charter
jurisprudence, though it is not necessarily explicit. In Big M Drug Mart, for example,
Dickson J (as he then was), writing for the majority, considered the broader legislative
context, the legislative history, and prior interpretations in Canada and abroad, before
turning to the impugned provision to ascertain its purpose and effects.609 Similarly, in her
decision in Big M Drug Mart, Wilson J considered the broader legislative context,
domestic and international jurisprudence, and academic authorities in her assessment of
the relevant Charter provision, summarizing her approach as follows:
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In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or
freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger
objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right
or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where
applicable, to the meaning and purpose of other specific rights and freedoms with
which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should
be… a generous rather than legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the
guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s
protections. At the same time, it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose
of the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted
in a vacuum, and must, therefore…be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic,
and historical contexts.610
The first formal articulation of the contextual approach to Charter conflicts is most often
attributed to Wilson J’s decision in Edmonton Journal, where she differentiated the
contextual approach from the abstract approach. The contextual approach recognizes that
the right being infringed upon may have different value depending on the context.611
According to Wilson J this approach “attempts to bring into sharp relief the aspect of the
right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the relevant aspects of any
values in competition with it.”612 In utilizing the contextual approach, the courts may be
better able to find a compromise between the competing values.613 The abstract approach,

610

Ibid at para 117.

611

Supra note 530 at para 51.

612

Ibid.

613

Ibid.

121

in comparison, attempts to compare concepts that are incomparable, as rights such as
freedom of expression or the right to privacy have little meaning without context.614
Wilson J’s approach has been widely cited in subsequent Charter litigation615, but it has
not been developed much further. For example, in R v Laba616, the majority of the SCC
simply stated “[i]t is now well established that the Charter is to be interpreted in light of
the context in which it is being applied.”617 The social context proved to be crucial to the
decision in JTI- MacDonald. There, the court moved away from its previous decision in
RJR-MacDonald. As the court noted, “RJR was grounded in a different historical context
and based on different findings supported by a different record at the time…[t]he
Tobacco Act must be assessed in light of the knowledge, social conditions and regulatory
environment revealed by the evidence presented in this case.”618
The contextual approach has been affirmed in other cases as well, but these cases tend to
focus on the relation of the expression to underlying values rather than a full contextual
approach considering the social, economic, and political factors surrounding both the
expression and the infringement. In Rocket, McLachlin J (as she then was) affirmed
Wilson J’s approach, maintaining that “[p]lacing the conflicting values in their factual
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and social context when performing the s. 1 analysis permits the courts to have regard to
special features of the expression in question.”619 This is particularly important because
of the fact that not all expression is equally worthy of protection, nor are all
infringements equal in their effects. In Keegstra, the majority justified contextualizing the
expression in question, noting that “[w]hile we must guard carefully against judging
expression according to its popularity, it is equally destructive of free expression
values…to treat all expression as equally crucial to those principles at the core of s.
2(b).”620 The majority ultimately opined that the expression in question, hate propaganda,
contributed little to the values underlying the freedom and therefore “restrictions on
expression of this kind might be easier to justify than other infringements of s. 2(b).” 621
The Court has adopted similar approaches in its assessment of pornography and
prostitution, subjecting each to a lower level of protection.622

4.8.2.

Deference

Additionally, section 1 analysis can be affected by the degree of deference afforded to
Parliamentary decisions. The type of legislation may dictate the degree of deference. In
RJR-Macdonald, the court stated “[i]n according a greater degree of deference to social
legislation than to legislation in the criminal justice context, this Court has recognized
these important institutional differences between legislatures and the judiciary.”623 In the
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same decision, the Court stated that the Tobacco Act was the exact type of legislation to
which a high degree of deference should be given, because the decision to legislate
tobacco advertising was one best left to elected representatives with the resources to
undertake them.624 In affording deference to Parliament, courts recognize that it is not the
job of the judiciary to strike out legislation and replace it with its own opinion just
because the courts can think of an alternative scheme that seems to be less restrictive. 625
The deference accorded to Parliament or the legislatures varies with the context of the
limitation. For example, greater deference to Parliament or the Legislature may be
appropriate if the law is concerned with competing rights between different sectors of
society than if it is a contest between the individual and the state.626 Additionally, the
situation or problem that the limit is attempting to mitigate may impact the degree of
deference accorded to Parliament.627 If the focus of the limitation is a social problem that
is not fully understood, for example, the degree of deference afforded may be affected.
This is judicial recognition of the difficulty with drafting laws to addresses such
concerns.628 Such deference is necessary to allow legislature the room required to balance
conflicting interests, but the amount of room that is reasonable depends on the context,
including the nature of the interest infringed and the legislative limit being
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implemented.629 However, deference “must not be carried to the point of relieving the
government of the burden which the Charter places upon it of demonstrating that the
limits it has imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable.”630 Doing so
would belittle the role of the judiciary, and “weaken the structure of rights upon which
our constitution and our nation is founded.” 631 As a result, courts must strike a balance
between affording enough deference to permit Parliament to address complex social
issues, but not so much as to undermine the responsibility of Parliament to demonstrate
that an infringement upon Charter rights is justified.
Deference may also be appropriate in the rational connection stage of the Oakes test,
particularly where the issue being addressed is a complex social problem. That was the
case in JTI-MacDonald, where the court recognized that there was not necessarily a clear
or simple solution to the public health problems associated with tobacco use, and
therefore Parliament should be given “considerable deference”.632 The court afforded
Parliament deference to the state at the minimal impairment stage as well, stating:
There may be many ways to approach a particular problem, and no
certainty as to which will be the most effective. It may, in the calm of the
courtroom, be possible to imagine a solution that impairs the right at
stake less than the solution Parliament has adopted. But one must also ask
whether the alternative would be reasonably effective when weighed
against the means chosen by Parliament. To complicate matters, a
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particular legislative regime may have a number of goals, and impairing a
right minimally in the furtherance of one particular goal may inhibit
achieving another goal. Crafting legislative solutions to complex problems
is necessarily a complex task. It is a task that requires weighing and
balancing. For this reason, this Court has held that on complex social
issues, the minimal impairment requirement is met if Parliament has
chosen one of several reasonable alternatives.633

4.8.3.

Standard of Proof

Lastly, “proof to the standard required by science is not required”634, instead the civil
standard of proof on a balance of probabilities is more appropriate. In Oakes, Dickson CJ
(as he then was) explained, “the alternative criminal standard, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, would, in my view, be unduly onerous.”635 The civil standard, proof by a
preponderance of probability, must nevertheless be applied rigorously, to all stages of the
proportionality analysis.636 In practice, this means that the balance of probabilities “may
be established by the application of common sense to what is known, even though what is
known may be deficient from a scientific point of view.”637 Together, context, deference,
and standard and proof are essential aspects of the section 1 analysis, but they must not
weaken the burden on the government to demonstrate that their action is reasonable and
justified in a free and democratic society.638
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4.9. Remedies
Pursuant to the Constitution Act, there are two types of remedies available if a Charter
challenge is successful. Section 52 is a general remedy provision, and states “any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.”639 Section 24, on the other hand, is specific to the
Charter. It states that “[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter,
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”640 Section
24 remedies are more personal in nature, with the goals of compensating the victim,
vindicating the rights breached, and deterring state agents from future breaches.641
Plaintiffs cannot typically apply for both section 52 and section 24 remedies, but must
choose one.642

4.9.1.

Section 52 Remedies

The general remedy available pursuant to section 52 is a declaration of invalidity of the
legislation in question. As a result, the legislation or provisions will remain on the statute
books but will be subject to the declaration of invalidity, to the extent of the
constitutional inconsistency.643 However, there are also more specific remedies available
under section 52 that allow the courts to strike down only the parts of the law that are
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unconstitutional, ensuring that the remedy interferes as little as possible with legislative
objectives.644 Indeed, courts have some degree of flexibility in determining what course
of action is most appropriate to take following a finding that the impugned legislation or
provisions violate the Charter and are not found to be justified pursuant to section 1.645
Courts may first consider whether there is an interpretation of the statute that could
remedy the constitutional problem.646 For example, in JTI-MacDonald, the court stated:
The minimal impairment analysis in this case will also be coloured by the
relationship between constitutional review and statutory interpretation.
Before engaging in constitutional review, the law must be construed. This
may have a critical effect at the stage of minimal impairment, where
overbreadth is alleged. The process of interpretation may resolve
ambiguity in favour of a more limited meaning. This may only be done in
cases of real ambiguity in the statute. In cases of ambiguity, therefore,
claims of overbreadth may be resolved by appropriate interpretation.647
Finding that one of the statutory provision before them “seems to make no sense,”648 the
Court interpreted the provision to resolve the ambiguity of whether the provision imposed
a total ban on sponsored scientific research. After considering the primary objective of
the provision in its entirety, the court interpreted “promotion” to mean commercial
promotion directly or indirectly targeted at consumers. This interpretation meant that
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tobacco manufacturers could not pay for a “particular brand to be included in a
commercial scientific work directed at consumers”, but did not prohibit legitimate
scientific research.649 The Court in JTI-MacDonald also relied on interpretation to resolve
ambiguities in an additional provision before them. Section 22(3) of the Tobacco Act
banned advertising that “could be construed on reasonable grounds to be appealing to
young persons.”650 The trial and Court of Appeal decisions provided differing opinions as
to the interpretation of this provision.651 After ascertaining the intention of Parliament,
protecting young persons from inducements to use tobacco, the Court was tasked with
finding a common meaning between the English and French texts. The conclusion was
that section 22(3) was interpreted to require “the prosecution in a given case to prove that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the advertisement of a tobacco product at
issue could be appealing to young persons, in the sense that it could be particularly
attractive and of interest to young persons, as distinguished from the general
population.”652 Having interpreted the provision as such, the Court then conducted the
section 1 analysis, finding that the limitation in section 22(3) was justified.653
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Interpretation is not always sufficient for remedying a constitutional issue.654 Where that
is the case, the court must choose another remedy available under section 52. Other more
tailored remedies available to the court include severance and reading in. Where part of a
statute or provision is found unconstitutional, courts may sever that from the rest of the
statute, declaring only that part to be of no force and effect, thus avoiding striking down
the entire piece of legislation.655 Severance allows courts to interfere with the laws
adopted by legislatures as little as possible, allowing the legislative purpose of the entire
statute to be realized as much as possible.656 Like interpretation, severance is not
appropriate in all situations, and cannot be used if the provision at issue is “inextricably
bound” with the rest of the statute, such that the remaining portions cannot survive
independently.657 Additionally, courts may consider whether the “legislature would have
enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires.”658
Another remedy available under section 52 is reading in. Reading in is a remedy that
permits a court to read in words to the offending legislation to remedy constitutional
deficits.659 It allows courts to “fulfil the purposes of the Charter and at the same time
minimize the interference of the court with parts of legislation that do not themselves
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violate the Charter. 660 Unlike severance, where the inconsistency is something in the
statute that can be severed and struck down, reading in is useful where the inconsistency
is something the statute excludes, and therefore reading in will have the effect of
extending the reach of the statute.661 Like severance, the purpose of reading in is to be as
authentic to the scheme enacted by legislature as possible, within the requirements of the
Constitution.662
In Schachter, the majority provided a step-by-step guide for choosing an appropriate
remedy. First, the extent of the inconsistency to be struck down must be identified. This
typically involves considering how the law violates the Charter, and where the law fails
in the section 1 analysis.663 For example, where legislation or particular provisions do not
pass the pressing and substantial requirement of the Oakes test, it will “almost always” be
the case that the inconsistent portion to be struck down will be defined broadly, perhaps
even the entire piece of legislation.664 This was the case in Big M Drug Mart, where
Dickson CJ found the purpose of the impugned legislation, which he defined as
compelling religious observance, was contrary to the values of a free and democratic
society, and therefore the appropriate remedy was to strike down the legislation in its
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entirety.665 Where a statute or provision fails at the rational connection stage, the
inconsistency to be struck down will typically be the whole portion of the legislation that
fails the rational connection test. This type of inconsistency is typically defined more
narrowly.666 However, this is not a strict rule. In RJR-MacDonald, McLachlin J (as she
then was) found one of several impugned provisions failed at the rational connection
stage.667 The remaining provisions failed at the minimal impairment stage. The remedy
provided in RJR-MacDonald was a declaration that not only the impugned provisions,
but also two other related provisions were to be of no force and effect because
severability in this instance was not possible.668 Finally, where the minimal impairment
or proportionality requirements are not met, the majority in Schachter stated that there is
more flexibility in defining the inconsistency.669 In these situations, striking down,
severing, or reading in may be appropriate.
After identifying the inconsistency, courts must determine whether the inconsistency can
be dealt with alone by way of severance or reading in, or whether other parts of the
legislation are inextricably linked.670 Deciding which remedy is appropriate will be
guided by considerations of precision, interference with the legislative objective, and how
excision of a specific provision or part of a provision will impact the rest of the
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legislative or provision.671 According to the majority in Schachter, “severance or reading
in will be warranted only in the clearest of cases”, where: (a) the legislative objective is
obvious, and severance or reading in would further that objective, or would interfere less
than striking down would; (b) the means used by the legislature to achieve the objective
are not so unambiguous that severance or reading in would be considered an
unacceptable intrusion into legislative decision making; and (c) severance or reading in
would not change the nature of the legislative scheme.672
After identifying the extent of the inconsistency and determining whether to strike down
the inconsistency, sever it, or read in, the court must then determine whether to suspend
the declaration of invalidity.673 Doing so provides Parliament or provincial legislatures
with an opportunity to fix the inconsistency. This approach will be appropriate where
striking down a provision poses a risk of danger to the public, offends or threatens the
rule of law, or where it will deprive a person or persons of a benefit.674 The aim of
suspending the declaration of invalidity is to give legislative bodies the time to
appropriately respond to the court ruling and draft new legislation that does resolves the
constitutional issues.675 For example, many of the successful challenges to the various
medical cannabis regulations were suspended to allow Parliament to bring the existing
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regulations into constitutional compliance, or to introduce new regulations.676 Delayed
declarations are not entirely unproblematic; in Charter cases, they allows an existing set
of laws or rules, which have been found to violate the Charter, to remain in force for a
designated period of time, prolonging the rights violations.677
To prevent rights claimants from being subjected to an unconstitutional law on an
ongoing basis, claimants may apply for interlocutory injunction.678 When considering
whether an injunction should be granted, the majority in Harper v Canada679, set out
three considerations: (a) whether there is a serious issue to be tried680; (b) whether not
granting an injunction would cause irreparable harm to the individual seeking the
injunction; and, (c) the balance of convenience.681 In RJR-MacDonald, the applicants
sought interlocutory relief from the Tobacco Products Control Regulations682 in addition
to challenging the constitutional validity of the TPCA. In 1991, the Quebec Superior
Court found the TPCA ultra vires Parliament and unconstitutional.683 The respondent
appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal, and while waiting for the Court of Appeal’s
judgment, the applicant applied for interlocutory relief, permitting them to breach certain
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provisions of the TPCA for up to 60 days following the judgment.684 Upon consideration
of the three factors articulated in Harper, the majority found the “balance of
inconvenience weighs strongly in favor of the respondent and is not offset by the
irreparable harm that the applicants may suffer if relief is denied…[t]he public interest in
health is of such compelling importance that the applications for a stay must be
dismissed.”685

4.9.2.

Section 24(1) Remedies

Where section 52 is not engaged, section 24(1) of the Charter may be available. This
may arise in instances where the statute or provision itself is not unconstitutional, but
some action taken pursuant to it infringes a person’s Charter rights.686 Section 24(1)
remedies will rarely be available where a section 52 remedy is also sought. If a provision
or statute is declared unconstitutional and struck down pursuant to section 52, there is no
retroactive applicability of section 24(1) remedies. Similarly, where a declaration of
invalidity is suspended, section 24(1) remedies will not be available.687 Where section
24(1) is available, it provides a flexible remedial power, allowing individuals whose
rights have been infringed to seek “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and
just in the circumstances.”688 The flexibility permits judges and courts to come up with
appropriate remedies for each particular case. In choosing a remedy, the court’s decision
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is to be guided by the effectiveness of the remedy in vindicating Charter rights, respect
for the separation of powers and the role of democratic bodies, realization of the limits on
courts, including procedures and precedents, and fairness for all parties.689 The remedy
must also be sufficiently clear to ensure parties are able to comply following the
decisions.690
Where a breach of legal rights has rendered a trial unfair, a stay of proceedings may be an
appropriate remedy, but only following a full consideration of the social interest in the
trial proceeding and other possible remedies that could correct the wrong.691 In some
situations, a declaration regarding the constitutional requirements of the legislation in
question may be an appropriate remedy, and additionally allows the courts to address an
issue while leaving sufficient room for the government to operate.692 Where declaratory
relief is insufficient, an injunction ordering a specific course of action may be
appropriate, particularly where a constitutional problem of inaction relating to a positive
obligation on the government is involved.693 Where legislation severely effects an
individual or individuals, despite generally being justified, those individuals may apply
for an exemption from the offending legislation, though this remedy has been rejected in
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cases where doing so contradicts the legislative intent.694 Damages may also be available
where there is no section 52 claim possible, for example, in cases where state action
against an individual results in a Charter breach.695 Lastly, advanced costs may be
awarded to a litigant who shows an inability to pay with no realistic funding options, a
meritorious case, and the presence of issues of public importance.696

4.10. Conclusion
Freedom of expression litigation typically proceeds in three parts. First, the court will
determine whether the expression in question is protected by section 2(b). Advertising
has been found to be expression protected by section 2(b) in numerous cases, although
courts have stated that it will be easier to justify infringing commercial speech than other
types of speech. Second, the court will determine whether the freedom has been infringed
upon, either in purpose or effect. If both steps are satisfied, then the court will turn to a
section 1 analysis to determine whether the infringement can be justified. The bulk of
constitutional challenge analysis takes place in the section 1 analysis utilizing the Oakes
test. The Oakes test asks whether the objective of the impugned legislation or provisions
is pressing and substantial, whether the means of achieving the objective are rationally
connected to the objective, whether the legislation infringes the right or freedom as little
as possible, and whether the negative effects of the infringement are proportional to the
benefits achieved by the legislative objective. The Oakes analysis is meant to be a
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contextual exercise, with consideration of the context surrounding both the expression in
question and the infringement. Additionally, courts afford a significant amount of
deference to Parliamentary decision making, particularly where vulnerable populations
are involved, or in cases of complex social issues. There are a variety of remedies
available in Charter challenges, though a declaration of invalidity is most common. The
purpose of this chapter was to provide a road map for the following chapter, which will
provide an analysis of the three-part assessment to determine the constitutionality of the
proposed advertising restrictions in the Cannabis Act.
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5. Analysis of Bill C-45
5.1. Introduction
Licensed medical cannabis producers in Canada with plans to expand into the
recreational market have already expressed an intent to challenge the advertising
restrictions to be placed on recreational cannabis.697 The purpose of this chapter is to
determine whether or not a challenge would succeed, and to recommend any changes to
bring the provisions into compliance with the Charter, where necessary. This analysis
will utilize the framework for a section 2(b) challenge set out in the previous chapter, as
well as the legal, social, and evidentiary context surrounding cannabis legalization
discussed in the previous chapters. Part two will summarize the relevant statutory
provisions of Bill C-45, the proposed Cannabis Act, including an interpretation of
undefined, ambiguous, or vague phrases. Part three will examine the first step of a
freedom of expression challenge, by determining whether the activity in question,
advertising cannabis, is expression that is protected by section 2(b). Included in this
section is a contextual analysis of the value of cannabis advertising, which will inform
the section 1 analysis in Part five. Part four examines whether or not Bill C-45 infringes
upon freedom of expression, either in purpose or in effect. Lastly, Part five contains a
section 1 analysis of the advertising restrictions. Two aspects of the advertising
restrictions are focused on: the general prohibition with exceptions, and the prohibition
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on sponsorship of events or naming facilities.698 In sum, this chapter determines that as a
whole, it is clear that Parliament has made a sincere effort to infringe upon freedom of
expression as little as possible, however, there are as few aspects that may be particularly
challenging to justify. Specifically, the prohibition on point of sale promotion and the
prohibition on sponsorship contained in sections 17(4), 21, and 22 should be more
carefully tailored to ensure that they do not capture more than intended.

5.2. The Cannabis Act
The advertising provisions in Bill C-45 loosely follow the recommendations of the Task
Force, with a few changes. The Task Force recommended applying “comprehensive
restrictions to the advertising and promotion of cannabis and related merchandise by any
means…[and] allowing limited promotion in areas accessible to adults.”699 Bill C-45
contains a general prohibition on promoting700 cannabis or cannabis accessories,
including communications regarding price and distribution, promotions that are appealing
to young persons, the use of testimonials or endorsements, the depiction of characters,
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whether real or fictional, and lifestyle advertising.701 There is an exemption from the
restrictions on promoting cannabis for ‘literary, dramatic, musical, cinematographic,
scientific, educational, or artistic work, production or performance.”702 There are also
exemptions for reports, commentaries, and opinions, promotions between those
authorized to produce, sell, or distribute cannabis, and similarly, between those who sell
or distribute cannabis accessories or that provide a service relating to cannabis.703 Bill C45 is less stringent than the Task Force recommendations in that it permits informational
or brand-preference promotion in limited circumstances. Subsections 17(2) and (3) of Bill
C-45 permit the promotion of cannabis and cannabis accessories or services by means of
informational or brand-preference promotion subject to the following conditions: the
communication is addressed and sent to an individual who is at least 18 years old and is
identified by name; the promotion is in a place where people under the age of 18 are not
permitted; the promotion is via telecommunication and reasonable steps have been taken
to ensure the promotion is not accessible by persons under the age of 18; or, the
promotion is in a prescribed place or manner.704 Subsections 17(4) and (5) permit
promotion of cannabis and cannabis accessories and services at the point of sale, but only
through indication of availability, price, or availability and price.705 Bill C-45 also
includes an exemption for the promotion of cannabis, cannabis accessories or services by
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displaying a brand element on items that are not cannabis or cannabis accessories, so long
as the item is not associated with young persons, is not appealing to young persons, and is
not associated with a way of life such as glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk or
daring.706 Sections 21 and 22 prohibit the display of a brand element of cannabis, or the
name of a person or corporation that produces, sells, or distributes cannabis or cannabis
accessories707, or provides a service related to cannabis via sponsorship of a person,
entity, event, activity, or facility, or to display the same on a facility.708 Bill C-45 also
prohibits publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise disseminating any promotion that is
prohibited on behalf of another person, except for imported publications.709 Additionally,
those who sell cannabis or cannabis accessories are prohibited from offering or providing
cannabis or cannabis accessories, or the right to participate in a contest, for free or in
consideration of the purchase of cannabis or a cannabis accessory.710 There are several
aspects of the advertising restrictions that require interpretation before undertaking a
freedom of expression analysis. They will be discussed in the next section.
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5.2.1.

Interpretation

The modern principle of statutory interpretation that has been accepted and endorsed by
the SCC is that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”711 Additionally, as a federal law, Bill C-45 must
be interpreted in accordance with the Interpretation Act712. Section 12 of the
Interpretation Act requires that courts use the purposive method of statutory
interpretation, which means the statute must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with its intended purpose.713 There are several aspects of the promotion provisions that
require interpretation. Interpretation of the phrases brand characteristic, character,
reasonable steps, and appealing to youth will all be discussed here.

5.2.1.1.

Brand Characteristic

Brand-preference promotion is defined as the “promotion of cannabis by means of its
brand characteristics, promotion of a cannabis accessory by means of its brand
characteristics or promotion of a service related to cannabis by means of the brand
characteristics of the service”714, however neither brand characteristic, nor characteristic
is defined in the bill. Turning to the ordinary meaning, characteristic is defined in the
Oxford English Dictionary are “a feature or quality belonging typically to a person, place,
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or thing and serving to identify them.”715 Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines
characteristic as “a distinguishing trait, quality, or property.”716 Brand element, on the
other hand, which is present in sections 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, and others, is defined in Bill
C-45 as “a brand name, trademark, tradename, distinguishing guise, logo, graphic
arrangement, design or slogan that is reasonably associated with, or that evokes, (a)
cannabis…or (b) a brand of any cannabis.”717 It would be reasonable to presume that
brand element is intended to be synonymous with brand characteristic, as the definition of
element is similar to characteristic.718 However, this interpretation is contradictory to the
presumption of consistent expression, which states that the use of a different word
implies a different meaning.719 Based on that interpretation principle, it can be assumed
that brand characteristic is intended to mean something different than brand element. The
specific definition of brand element, in comparison to the broader ordinary meaning of
characteristic, suggests that brand characteristic should be interpreted more broadly than
brand element.
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5.2.1.2.

Character

Character is not defined in the bill, and it was not interpreted in RJR-MacDonald or JTIMacDonald. However, it could have several meanings. Indeed, Merriam-Webster
dictionary has several definitions for character, including “a conventionalized graphic
device placed on an object as an indication of ownership, origin, or relationship; a
graphic symbol; a magical or astrological emblem; the alphabet; style of writing or
printing; and, a symbol.”720 It seems unlikely that Parliament intended for such a
comprehensive interpretation of the word character, as this would leave no means for
advertisers to advertise, rendering the promotion provisions meaningless. Instead, based
on the other categories included in this provision, it is more likely that Parliament
intended for the word character to be interpreted more along the lines of the definition
provided by Oxford English Dictionary: “a person in a novel, play, or film, or a part
played by an actor.”721 This definition may be too narrow to capture some of the
characters that Parliament intended to capture, particularly taking into consideration the
objective of protecting children. Parliament likely intended for the phrase “character” to
include not only a person in a novel, play, film, but also cartoons and mascots, which is
more aligned with the definition for character provided by The Free Dictionary: “a person
portrayed in an artistic piece, such as a drama or novel; a person or animal portrayed with
a personality in comics or animation.”722 This broader definition is likely more accurate
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in consideration of the purpose of the provisions, which is to protect children. In utilizing
a purposive approach, it is likely a court would read the word character as broader than
the definition provided by the Oxford English Dictionary, to include mascots and
cartoons.

5.2.1.3.

Reasonable Steps

It is unclear upon reading subsections 17(2) and 17(3) what would be considered
“reasonable steps” for ensuring that youth cannot access cannabis promotions. A similar
issue was encountered in JTI-MacDonald, where the Court pointed out that the phrase
“on reasonable grounds” was problematic.723 Ultimately, the Court determined that the
common meaning of “on reasonable grounds” was “reasonable grounds to believe that
the advertising in question falls within the prohibition.”, an objective standard with clear
legal content.724 However, this does not offer much assistance for determining what
would or would not be considered “reasonable steps” to ensure cannabis promotion is not
accessible by minors. For example, would putting an age-gate on a cannabis retailers
website be sufficient as a reasonable step to preventing youth from accessing the
promotion materials? Age-gates require the user to self-report their date of birth, or age,
before they can view a specific website. They are commonly used in the tobacco and
alcohol industries, despite the fact that the evidence is clear that they are not effective for
preventing minors from viewing their advertisements.725 Notwithstanding the evidence to
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the contrary, the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration in the
United States still recommend that alcohol and tobacco vendors utilize age-gates, giving
the perception that putting up an age-gate would be considered a reasonable step.726
The prevailing rule of statutory interpretation provides some guidance in determining
what is meant by “reasonable steps.” Nowhere else in the legislation itself or the debates
leading up to the bill is there a discussion about what amounts to reasonable steps to
preventing youth from accessing advertisements. Moreover, the provision applies to all
promotion via telecommunication, which includes television, telephone, broadcasting,
and the internet, and each of those mediums would presumably require different
reasonable steps to be taken to prevent youth from being exposed to the promotion. The
phrase reasonable steps suggest that actual outcome is not important in evaluating
whether reasonable steps were taken, just that some steps were taken. The vagueness of
this provision makes it difficult for those permitted to advertise to know whether they are
satisfying the requirement of taking reasonable steps or not. Furthermore, transitioning
cannabis from an illicit product to a legal product may influence what is considered
reasonable, further confusing the issue.

290:10 JAMA 1356; Rebecca S. Williams & Kurt M. Ribisl, “Internet Alcohol Sales to Minors” (2012)
166:9 Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine 808.
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Another useful principle of statutory interpretation for this phrase is that Parliament does
not speak in vain.727 This principle means that Parliament is presumed to have a purpose
for each provision included in a statute, and to avoid superfluous or meaningless
language.728 Therefore, no provision should be interpreted in a way that renders it
surplusage.729 Therefore, the phrase “reasonable steps” must be interpreted to mean
something above and beyond what steps are already required by the legislation. To do
otherwise would render the phrase reasonable steps, and the provision that contains it,
meaningless. Additionally, reading “reasonable steps” with the rest of the provision,
which states that reasonable steps must be taken to “ensure that the promotion cannot be
accessed by a young person”, implies that persons responsible for promotion cannot
simply take one step that will stop some youth from accessing the promotion, but that
advertisers will be held to a higher standard.
Another tool useful for statutory interpretation is to look at other legislation that uses the
same words or phrases. The statutory interpretation maxim, in pari materia, states that
two statutes on the same subject matter may be interpreted in the same way. This is
further supported by the Federal Interpretation Act.730 However, this principle does not
mean that a definition can be imported from one statute to another; other factors must be
considered, such as the purpose of the provision.731 Furthermore, in pari materia does not
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replace the presumption that the ordinary meaning of the phrase should be imported.732
Just because two statutes are similar, does not automatically permit the usage of a
definition from one statute in the other, or vice versa. For example, in Claridge
Development (Hawthorne) Ltd v British Columbia, Duff J held that relying upon in pari
materia was inappropriate after consideration of the Legislature’s intention to utilize the
ordinary meaning of the word in question, parcel.733 Additionally, Duff J noted that the
word had been defined in other statutes, signaling that, with the lack of definition, the
Legislature intended for the ordinary meaning to be used.734 Unfortunately, in this case,
the plain meaning of “reasonable steps” is not very helpful, as reasonableness varies
depending on the context. The phrase “reasonable steps” is not defined in dictionaries, or
in case law. Importing the plain meaning of reasonable offers little assistance also.
Merriam-Webster defines reasonable as “being in accordance with reason; not extreme or
excessive.”735 This definition is hardly precise enough to assist in the interpretation of the
relevant provisions.
The phrase “reasonable steps” has been discussed by courts in relation to the offences of
child internet luring and sexual assault. Though the subject matter is not similar to Bill C45, the purpose of both statutes is to protect children, so it may still be persuasive. In R v
Morrison736, Gage J of the Ontario Court of Justice stated “[t]he ‘reasonable steps’
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requirement…does nothing more than require the accused to demonstrate a degree of care
in ensuring that he was not dealing with a minor.”737 In R v Ghotra738, Durno J of the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice stated that reasonable steps “does not require active
steps on the part of the accused to ascertain the other person’s age. It requires the accused
have information upon which it would be reasonable to conclude the other person was an
adult. It does not require that all reasonable steps be taken.”739 He went on to say
“‘[r]easonable steps’ does not require the accused to have taken active steps nor to have
asked questions. It requires him or her to take the steps reasonable people possessed of
the same information as the accused would to ascertain the other person’s age.”740 In
consideration of all the above reasons, ‘reasonable steps’ in the context of Bill C-45 does
not mean that all steps need to be taken by the advertiser to prevent youth from accessing
the promotion, but that some steps must be taken.
Additionally, had Parliament intended for every reasonable step to be taken, they would
have used the phrase “all reasonable steps” instead of “reasonable steps”. In R v Barton,
the Alberta Court of Appeal stated that “[r]easonable steps depend on the circumstances
and they may be as many and varied as the cases in which the issue arises. That said, we
reject the view that reasonable steps can equal no steps whatsoever.”741 Leaving the
meaning of ‘reasonable steps’ fluid also allows for its meaning to change over time,
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allowing for technological advances or new evidence to inform what would be considered
reasonable steps in the context of cannabis advertising. This is particularly relevant given
the changing nature of advertising towards the use of smart phones, social media, and
location-based advertising for product promotions. Based on all of this, “reasonable
steps” would require the person responsible for advertising to take some steps that a
reasonable person in their position, having all the same information and knowledge of the
advertiser, would take to ensure, as much as is possible, that the promotion will not be
accessible by minors.

5.2.1.4.

Appealing to Young Persons

The phrase appealing to young persons appears in subsections 17(1) and 17(6) of Bill C45. As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, the phrase “appealing to young
persons” was interpreted in JTI-MacDonald.742 The Court grappled over whether the
word “appealing” was meant to be read as an adjective, or a verb. The Court stated:
In the English version, “appealing” could arguably be read as a verb, in
the sense of “making an appeal to”, although its adjectival sense of
something that is “attractive [and] of interest” appears to be more
natural (Canadian Oxford Dictionary (2nd ed. 2004), at p. 61). In French,
the phrase “attrayante” is clearly adjectival — the question is whether the
advertisement could be “attrayante” or appealing to young persons. I
conclude that “appealing” must be read as an adjective in English as
well.743
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Next, the Court grappled with the scope and breadth of what types of advertising might
be captured by the phrase “appealing to young persons”. On this point, the Court held
that “appealing to young persons” was not meant to include advertising that is primarily
appealing to adults, but could be appealing to young persons, but rather that the exception
was intended to capture advertising that is primarily appealing to young persons.744 The
Court concluded that the provision containing the phrase ‘appealing to young persons’
“must be read as creating a ban for information and brand-preference advertising that
could be appealing to a particular segment of society, namely young people…as
distinguished from the general adult population.”745 The reasoning for this finding was
that the purpose of s 22(3) was to protect a specific subset of the population. To read it as
inclusive of all advertising would render the section permitting information and brandpreference advertising meaningless. Additionally, the words “young persons” must have
been included for a specific purpose, and to interpret the provision as extended to all
persons would render the phrase “young persons” meaningless, which is contrary to the
rule that the legislator does not speak in vain.746 Therefore, in following the precedent set
in JTI-MacDonald, “appealing to young persons” in the context of Bill C-45 is likely be
interpreted in the same manner, that its purpose is to target advertising that is specifically
appealing to young persons, not advertising directed at adults that could possibly be
construed as appealing to young persons. The remainder of this chapter will consider
whether these provisions are a justified infringement on freedom of expression.
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5.3. Is it Expression?
The first step in a freedom of expression challenge is to determine whether the activity in
question is protected by section 2(b). As discussed in Chapter 4 it is well established that
advertising is a protected form of expression. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider
why cannabis advertising is worth protecting.747 Determining how cannabis advertising
promotes (or obstructs) the rationales underlying freedom of expression informs the
justification threshold for infringing upon it. This is consistent with the approach
proposed in Hunter, where the court held that it must interpret each right in light of the
interests it protects.748 This approach was confirmed in Keegstra where Dickson CJC
applied a contextual approach, finding that not all forms of expression are closely linked
to the rationales underlying freedom of expression.749 Delineating between high and low
value expression has no bearing on whether the expression in question is constitutionally
protected, instead it speaks only to what standard of justification the Court will hold the
infringement to.
Quantifying the value of cannabis advertising can be ascertained through an analysis of
how closely related cannabis advertising is to the values that underlying freedom of
expression discussed in chapter 5: truth-seeking, democracy, and individual selfrealization.750 Cannabis advertising has strong connections to the values underlying the
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right, and should be subjected to a high threshold to justify infringement. However,
whether or not listener’s rights are advanced as part of the argument could have a
significant effect on the outcome. The connection of cannabis advertising to each of the
rationales underlying freedom of discussion will be discussed in turn.

5.3.1.

Truth Seeking

The first value underlying freedom of expression and the one that cannabis advertising is
most closely linked to, is truth-seeking. As mentioned in the previous, the truthfulness of
the message, the likeliness that the expression will elicit rational responses, and the
openness of the marketplace to which expression contributes are all relevant factors in
determining the connection of the expression in question to the rationale of truth seeking.
Restricting advertising of cannabis fails to promote truth-seeking by limiting the
informational market. If Canadians cannot hear information via advertisements, they can
only receive information about recreational cannabis through alternative channels, most
likely through word-of-mouth, the media, or via the internet. These channels are much
more likely to disseminate incorrect, or biased information about cannabis, increasing the
likelihood that those exposed to such messaging will misuse cannabis, or develop an
incorrect perception of the safety of cannabis.751 For example, a study that analyzed
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tweets from a popular pro-cannabis twitter handle, with over 1 million followers
(primarily under the age of 19) found that 82% of the tweets were positive about
cannabis, while only 0.31% appeared negative, inundating followers with positive
messaging regarding cannabis while ignoring the harms.752 Furthermore, in a survey of
Canadian youth, participants cited the media and the internet as major influencers of their
understanding of cannabis.753
The ability to share product information is particularly important with a heterogeneous
product such as cannabis. Over 500 different constituents have been identified in
cannabis.754 These components are not equally present in all strains, and therefore
different strains can have a variety of effects on users. If sellers are unable to share
information about the specific properties of the strains they sell that are supported by
evidence, it makes it difficult for consumers to purchase the products that are most
suitable for their needs, or to predict the outcome of using specific products. Ultimately,
while restrictions on cannabis advertising may lower consumption levels, it may also
prevent Canadians who do choose to use cannabis from using from doing it as safely as
possible. For example, if a consumer wanted to purchase cannabis, but had never used
cannabis before, then it is much safer for them to use a product with lower cannabinoid
levels.755 If they are unable to determine the cannabinoid levels by viewing the products,
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or if retailers cannot label their products as suitable for novice users, then users may end
up selecting and using a product that is inappropriate for them. Similarly, even just being
aware of the common side effects of a specific strain could prove useful to consumers. If
a retailer was able to label a product as commonly causing dry mouth, for example, this
information is useful to the consumer, and could help to prevent health anxiety in the
event that the side effects do occur. Not being able to display common side effects is also
antithetical to the purpose of promoting safety, as the absence of such information may
be construed by potential consumers to mean that there are no side effects, which is not
the case.
Furthermore, due to the complexity of cannabis and its long history with prohibition,
there is still a lot that is unknown or unsettled about the substance. As new scientific
information becomes available, producers, retailers and other industry players need to be
able to share that information with potential consumers. The unique properties of this
substance, combined with the complex social and cultural factors associated with it make
it vital that information can flow freely, so that misconceptions can be dispelled and
emerging research can be shared with those it will affect. The prevalence of
misinformation on cannabis is immense. Even Parliament falls prey to it. A review of
House of Commons debates reveals that many elected officials believe and rely upon
information about cannabis that has long been disproven, or is supported by flawed
evidence. For example, on June 1, 2017, The Honorable Gérard Deltell of the
Conservative Party of Canada stated “Why is it dangerous to legalize cannabis? Because
it is a gateway drug. Cannabis can directly kill brain cells…and they do not
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regenerate.”756 This is problematic because cannabis has not been proven to kill brain
cells, and in fact, may even be neuroprotective, and the gateway theory has been widely
dispelled.757
While it may be possible for individuals to seek out information on their own, in order to
promote safe and healthy consumption of cannabis the information should be easily
available, rather than possible to access with some difficulty. While advertising
restrictions may not entirely impede a retailer’s ability to share information, the
restrictions will make it more difficult to access. Additionally, as misleading or false
advertising is prohibited, allowing cannabis retailers and producers to share information
ensures that the information is regulated to some degree. Information shared on the
internet by lay citizens, medical professionals, and other individuals or organizations is
entirely unregulated and they are not responsible for the consequences of those who take
their information at face value.

5.3.2.

Democracy

Democracy is another rationale that underlies the Charter’s protection of freedom of
expression. Though it is not necessary to demonstrate a specific type of expression’s ties
to all the rationales for protecting freedom of expression, cannabis advertising can be
linked to the remaining two rationales, though perhaps not as strongly. Advertising
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cannabis may not be as closely related to democracy as political speech, however, it is
more closely related than other types of commercial speech, such as advertising directed
at children. Cannabis has a distinctly political element. Advocates have been fighting for
access to medical and recreational cannabis for decades, and the fight will not stop upon
legalization. Future issues that will need to be resolved include cannabis use in the
workplace, private and public health insurance coverage of cannabis, and cannabis use
and operating motor vehicles, to name a few. In this case, the line between commercial
and political speech becomes a little less clear, particularly where you have employees or
management of a cannabis producer or retailer promoting a specific political stance. For
example, would lobbying for national coverage of medical cannabis by an investor in a
cannabis producer be considered political or commercial speech? If commercial speech is
defined as coming from someone who stands to earn a profit from the speech in question,
then that definition will be met, but there is also a clear political element to that speech.
While the relationship between cannabis advertising and democracy is not a strong as to
the other rationales, a strong connection to all rationales is not required to require a high
standard of justification.

5.3.3.

Individual Self-Realization

Lastly, advertising cannabis promotes individual self-realization and autonomy, both
from the perspective of the advertiser, and the consumer. Many of the arguments that
pertain to truth-seeking are also relevant to autonomy, and will not be reproduced here.
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Autonomy is defined as “freedom from external control or influence; independence.”758 If
retailers, producers, and other actors in the legal cannabis industry are not allowed to
disseminate information to individuals about the properties and quality of their product or
their facilities, individuals cannot be truly autonomous in their decision whether to use
cannabis or not, or, if they do decide to use cannabis, which product to use. Censorship
does not promote autonomy, and disrespects an individual’s right to receive and assess
the messages of others as they see fit. Censoring cannabis advertising makes it difficult
for individuals to develop or change their opinions and perspectives as new information
becomes available. It also impedes socially-driven change about the value of cannabis in
society. Additionally, advertising promotes consumer autonomy by allowing legal
retailers, producers, and others permitted to advertise cannabis to differentiate themselves
in a variety of ways, including but not limited to: growing methods, products used on the
plants, environmental stewardship, sustainable business practices, self-imposed
production standards, craftsmanship, innovation, and treatment of employees. Making
this information available to consumers allows them to use their purchasing power to
support the organizations they wish to. In sum, the ability to advertise cannabis has a
strong connection to the values underlying freedom of expression, particularly to truthseeking and individual self-fulfilment, if it is limited to purely informational promotion,
and should be subjected to a high justification threshold to be lawfully infringed. The
next section will look at whether Bill C-45 infringes upon freedom of expression, either
in purpose or effect.
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5.4. Is there an Infringement
Based on the past jurisprudence759, it is likely that the Attorney General will concede that
Bill C-45 infringes upon freedom expression, while maintaining that it is a justified
infringement. This assumption is supported by the Charter Statement released by the
Department of Justice in 2017 following the introduction of Bill C-45, stating “[t]he
restrictions on promotion, packaging, and labelling would limit the right to freedom of
expression.”760 If that is not the case, there is little argument to support the notion that the
relevant provisions in Bill C-45 do not infringe upon the right to freedom of expression,
both in purpose and effect. Recall that to meet this step, the government act must restrict
the content of expression or the form of expression tied to content.761 It is clear that the
intent, or purpose, of the promotion provisions in Bill C-45 is to limit advertising,
therefore meeting the requirement of infringing freedom of expression in purpose. There
is no information to suggest that the government is actually aiming to control only the
physical consequences of cannabis advertising, which would not be sufficient to meet this
step.762 While highly unlikely, if a court deems that the provisions of an act do not
infringe freedom of expression in purpose, it may still be argued that they infringe
freedom of expression in effect. To do so, a plaintiff must show that a meaning being
conveyed can be identified and related to the rationales underlying freedom of
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expression.763 Again, it is clear that cannabis advertising, regardless of the medium or the
specific content, seeks to convey a meaning, whether that is categorized as product
information, service availability, or some other meaning. As shown above, should the
analysis progress to this step, a plaintiff will likely be able to successfully argue that
cannabis advertising has at least some relation to the values underlying freedom of
expression.

5.5. Section 1 Analysis
Having determined that the cannabis promotion provisions in Bill C-45 infringe upon
freedom of expression, the next step is to determine whether the provisions are saved by
section 1. Recall that section 1 of the Charter permits government infringement on rights
and freedoms, provided the infringement can be “demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”764 Having determined that cannabis advertising is closely linked to
the values underlying the freedom, and is therefore more valuable than certain types of
expression, such as tobacco advertising or hate speech, but less valuable than political
speech765, it follows then that it will not be subjected to the high standard of justification
afforded to political speech, or to the low standard of justification, which was the case in
JTI-MacDonald.766 As noted in chapter 1, if cannabis is categorized as harmful, that may
provide another ground for lowering the justification threshold, as was the case in JTIMacDonald. Whether or not cannabis is harmful was discussed thoroughly in chapter 1,
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with the conclusion that there is not enough research to definitively categorize cannabis
as inherently harmful or non-harmful, and the research that does exist is flawed for many
reasons. For example, research that uses specific strains, methods of administration, or
doses cannot be extrapolated to other strains, methods of administration, or doses.
Consequently, the cannabis industry will have many opportunities to challenge or
undermine evidence that is submitted as part of an attempt to prove the harmfulness of
cannabis. In this respect, cannabis differs from tobacco, where the harm of tobacco use
has been widely accepted.767 Additionally, unlike tobacco, there is research that
establishes the benefits of cannabis and that it can be used safely. Therefore, the potential
harmfulness of cannabis is likely insufficient to lower the section 1 justification threshold
to the same level as the court did in JTI-MacDonald. The next section will begin with a
section 1 analysis of section 17, followed by a section 1 analysis of sections 21 and 22.

5.5.1.

Section 17

Section 17 of Bill C-45 sets out the following:
Promotion
17 (1) Unless authorized under this Act, it is prohibited to promote cannabis or a cannabis
accessory or any service related to cannabis, including
(a) by communicating information about its price or distribution;
(b) by doing so in a manner that there are reasonable grounds to believe could be appealing
to young persons;
(c) by means of a testimonial or endorsement, however displayed or communicated;
(d) by means of the depiction of a person, character or animal, whether real or fictional; or
(e) by presenting it or any of its brand elements in a manner that associates it or the brand
element with, or evokes a positive or negative emotion about or image of, a way of life
such as one that includes glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk or daring
Exception — informational promotion — cannabis
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(2) Subject to the regulations, a person that is authorized to produce, sell or distribute cannabis
may promote cannabis by means of informational promotion or brand- preference promotion if
the promotion is
(a) in a communication that is addressed and sent to an individual who is 18 years of age or
older and is identified by name;
(b) in a place where young persons are not permitted by law;
(c) communicated by means of a telecommunication, where the person responsible for the
content of the promotion has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the promotion cannot
be accessed by a young person;
(d) in a prescribed place; or
(e) done in a prescribed manner.
Exception — informational promotion — cannabis accessories and services
(3) Subject to the regulations, a person may promote a cannabis accessory or a service related to
cannabis by means of informational promotion or brand-preference promotion if the promotion is
(a) in a communication that is addressed and sent to an individual who is 18 years of age or
older and is identified by name;
(b) in a place where young persons are not permitted by law;
(c) communicated by means of a telecommunication, where the person responsible for the
content of the promotion has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the promotion cannot
be accessed by a young person;
(d) in a prescribed place; or
(e) done in a prescribed manner.
Exception — point of sale — cannabis
(4) Subject to the regulations, a person that is authorized to sell cannabis may promote it at the
point of sale if the promotion indicates only its availability, its price or its
availability and price.
Exception — point of sale — cannabis accessory and services
(5) Subject to the regulations, a person that sells a cannabis accessory or provides a service
related to cannabis may promote it at the point of sale if the promotion indicates only its
availability, its price or its availability and price.
Exception — brand element on other things
(6) Subject to the regulations, a person may promote cannabis, a cannabis accessory or a service
related to cannabis by displaying a brand element of cannabis, of a cannabis accessory or of a
service related to cannabis on a thing that is not cannabis or a cannabis accessory, other than
(a) a thing that is associated with young persons;
(b) a thing that there are reasonable grounds to believe could be appealing to young persons;
or
(c) a thing that is associated with a way of life such as one that includes glamour, recreation,
excitement, vitality, risk or daring.768
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5.5.1.1.

Pressing and Substantial

The first step of the section 1 analysis asks whether the objective of the infringement
relates to a concern that is pressing and substantial. To answer this, the objective of the
statute as a whole, and specific provisions must be ascertained. Ideally, legislative intent
is explicitly stated in the preamble or purpose section of the legislation in question.
Where that is not the case, courts may look to the text of the bill, amendments, the record
of hearings on the topic, legislative records or journals, speeches or floor debates, or
other relevant statues to shed light on the objective. Courts have recognized the
difficulties inherent to ascertaining the objective of legislation, as “[s]tatues may have
different objectives, at different levels of abstraction.”769 This is certainly the case with
Bill C-45, as there are many stated reasons for legalizing recreational cannabis use,
coupled with more specific reasons for various aspects of the bill. The Task Force Report
recommended advertising restrictions in their section on “Minimizing Harms of Use”,
noting that “[i]n taking a public health approach to the regulation of cannabis, the Task
Force proposes measures that will maintain and improve the health of Canadians by
minimizing the harms associated with cannabis use.”770 This is similar to the purpose in
the preamble of Bill C-45, which states that, “[t]he objectives of the Act are to prevent
young persons from accessing cannabis, to protect public health and public safety by
establishing strict product safety and product quality requirements and to deter criminal
activity by imposing serious criminal penalties for those operating outside the legal
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framework.”771 Additionally, the Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould, Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada, stated the following purpose of the act in the second
reading of Bill C-45 before the House of Commons:
Simply put, its purpose is to protect the health and safety of Canadians.
Specifically, it aims to protect the health of young people by restricting
their access to cannabis; to protect young people and others from
advertising and other promotional activities that are likely to encourage
them to use cannabis; to provide for the lawful protection of cannabis to
reduce illegal activities in relation to cannabis; to deter illegal activities
in relation to cannabis through appropriate sanctions and enforcement
measures; to reduce the burden on the criminal justice system in relation
to cannabis; to provide Canadians with access to a quality-controlled
supply of cannabis; and to enhance public awareness of the health risks
associated with cannabis use.772
Liberal Member of Parliament Pat Finnigan similarly summarized the objectives of the
legislation to include delaying the first use of cannabis, reducing frequency of use, but
still ensuring that adults can access clear and objective information that will allow them
to make informed decisions.773 Liberal Member of Parliament Marco Mendicino further
confirmed that the objectives of Bill C-45 are: to protect youth; to prevent them from
accessing and using cannabis; and, to ensure the public is aware of the risks associated
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with cannabis use.774 Specifically referring to the advertising restriction, Mendicino
stated the purpose as “to protect youth from being persuaded through marketing or
advertising to consume cannabis. At the same time, consumers need access to clear,
objective information to help make informed decisions about consumption.”775
From this, the purposes of the legislation as a whole can be summarized as protecting
health and safety, specifically youth, as well as reducing illegal activity, reducing the
burden on the criminal justice system, providing access to safe cannabis, and enhancing
public awareness. From the above ascertained purposes, the objectives of the proposed
advertising restrictions include: preventing young persons from accessing cannabis or
being encouraged to use cannabis, and ensuring that Canadians are presented with only
accurate information regarding cannabis, including the harms and risks. The former is
supported by the numerous references to preventing young persons from viewing
cannabis promotions, while the latter is supported by the presence of the exception for
informational and brand-preference promotion contained in section 17 of Bill C-45. It is
likely that Parliament will categorize the objectives broadly, because, as discussed in the
previous chapter, it will be easier for broad objectives to pass the rational connection
stage, as well as the minimal impairment stage, which is clearly advantageous for the
Federal government.776
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Renowned constitutional law scholar Peter Hogg stated that an objective “will be deemed
proper if it is for the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.”777
Protecting Canadians from the harms associated with advertising has been accepted as
sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom,
meeting the first step of the section 1 analysis in cases such as Irwin Toy778, RJRMacDonald779, and JTI-MacDonald780. Though the threshold for this step is meant to be
high, considerable deference is often afforded to Parliament in drafting legislation. Based
on past jurisprudence, it is likely that the above-mentioned objectives will be sufficient to
pass the pressing and substantial requirement.
As a counter argument, while preventing young people from starting to smoke tobacco
makes sense because it is addictive and places an incredible burden on the health care
system, the consequences of smoking cannabis are not the same. As discussed in Chapter
1, a much smaller portion of cannabis users become addicted or regular users, and their
burden on the health care system is much less significant, even when considering that
consumption may rise after legalization. Most tobacco smokers begin smoking during
childhood or adolescence, and nicotine addiction begins during the first few years of
tobacco use. Extensive research shows that if people do not begin to use tobacco when
they are young, they are unlikely to initiate use as adults.781 However, smoking cannabis
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at a young age poses different risks.782 The concern most commonly cited for
discouraging youth use of cannabis is the effect that cannabis use has on the developing
brain.783 While the connection between cannabis use among youth and adverse cognitive
effects or impact on brain development is not as strong as the connection between youth
tobacco use and the risk of addiction or tobacco use and cancers, the seriousness of the
claim would almost certainly be considered pressing and substantial.
Similarly, JTI-MacDonald supports the finding that ensuring Canadians are also exposed
to accurate claims regarding cannabis is a pressing and substantial objective sufficient to
meet the first step of the Oakes test. The SCC stated that “Parliament’s objective of
combating the promotion of tobacco products by half-truths and by invitation to false
inference constitutes a pressing and substantial objective.”784 In fact, it may even be more
important in the case of cannabis, which has been plagued by misinformation and
unreliable research, both from cannabis legalization proponents and opponents. Strict
regulation of cannabis advertising will help to ensure that untruthful claims do not
influence Canadian consumers.785

5.5.1.2.

Rational Connection

The next step asks whether there is a rational connection between the infringement and
the objective. In this case, the question is whether restricting advertising is rationally
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connected to ensuring Canadians are only presented accurate information about cannabis
and preventing young persons from being encouraged to use cannabis? As stated in JTIMacDonald, to demonstrate a rational connection “[a]t the very least, it must be possible
to argue that the means may help to bring about the objective.”786 Parliament is often
afforded significant deference in cases where clear answers to complex social problems
are not evident, as was the case with tobacco consumption, and is similarly the case with
cannabis legalization. Each component of section 17 will be discussed and analyzed in
terms of rational connection to the stated objective, with this low threshold in mind.

5.5.1.3.

Prohibition on appealing to young persons

Unfortunately, there is not a lot of data to support or refute the effect of cannabis
advertising on youth consumption, as recreational cannabis is a nascent industry in the
United States, and the only other countries to liberalize cannabis, Portugal, the
Netherlands, and Uruguay, have very different regulatory schemes that do not permit
advertising. There has been one study conducted that looked at whether medical cannabis
advertisements impacted intent to use and use of cannabis among middle school-aged
children in California.787 This study found that greater exposure to medical cannabis ads
was associated with greater probability of cannabis use and stronger intentions to use one
year later. However, the authors acknowledge the study was limited because it relied on
self-reported data and it lacked control for variables such as whether the child’s parents
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were medical cannabis users.788 Additionally, since initiation of cannabis use is common
among middle-school age children, it is possible that initiation of use may have occurred
regardless of exposure to cannabis advertisements.
While there may not be much evidence specific to cannabis advertising, it is well
established that limiting exposure to marketing and advertising can assist in reducing the
favourable attitudes towards substance use that come from exposure to promotions.789
There is a well-established link between exposure to alcohol and tobacco marketing,
branding and advertising (including product placement in movies, television, and radio)
and increased use of those drugs, making it reasonable to assume that cannabis promotion
would have a similar effect, supporting the rational connection between the objectives
and proposed restrictions.790 For example, a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies found
that exposure to tobacco advertising was associated with the initiation of tobacco use in
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adolescents.791 Further, a study of teenagers found that the influence of cigarette
advertisements outweighed whether the teenagers’ parents, siblings, or peers smoked as a
predictor of cigarette use initiation, providing further proof of the power of advertising to
encourage youth use.792 Based on this, coupled with the amplified risks associated with
youth cannabis use, there is a very clear connection between the proposed restrictions on
advertising to minors and the objective of protecting minors from being encouraged to
use cannabis, sufficient to pass this step of the analysis.

5.5.1.3.1.

Prohibition of testimonials or endorsements

Subsection 17(1)(b) of Bill C-45, which prohibits promoting cannabis via testimonials or
endorsements, is analogous to subsection 21(2) of the Tobacco Act.793 The sole difference
between the two provisions is the Tobacco Act specifies that no person shall use
testimonials or endorsements for promotion purposes, while Bill C-45 instead states that
it is prohibited to promote cannabis by endorsements or testimonials. Promote is defined
in Bill C-45 as making a representation about the thing or service for the purpose of
selling the thing or service.794 This definition implies that the prohibition on the use of
testimonials or endorsements only applies to persons who sell cannabis products, which
will be up to the provinces to regulate. In contrast, promotion is defined in the Tobacco
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Act as a representation about a product or service that is likely to influence attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviours, which implies that it could apply to anyone representing a
tobacco product.795 Therefore, Bill C-45 differs from the Tobacco Act in that it does not
apply to third parties who provide an opinion, including a testimonial or an endorsement,
so long as it is not in exchange for consideration.796 In sum, testimonials, endorsements,
or other opinions relating to cannabis products, services, or accessories are permitted,
provided they are not made for the purpose of selling the thing or service (by a legal
seller or retailer), and no consideration is provided for the opinion, endorsement or
testimonial.
Various countries have imposed restrictions on the use of endorsements and testimonials
in advertising, a testament to their power to influence consumers. Indeed, testimonials
and endorsements are recognized as being able to more easily gain the trust of consumers
and facilitate the decision of the consumer to purchase the product or service being
advertised.797 Endorsements and testimonials could include celebrity testimonials, expert
testimonials, and lay testimonials. 798 Of the three, celebrity endorsements are likely the
most concerning. Celebrity endorsements have been found to be particularly effective, as
they affect advertising effectiveness, brand recall and recognition, and purchase
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intentions and follow through.799 Role models, such as athletes and celebrities, have been
shown to influence adolescents’ consumption intentions and behaviors in studies
conducted in the United States as well as South Africa.800 Since the threshold of the
rational connection step is not meant to be high, this is likely sufficient evidence to
support a connection between the prohibition on celebrity testimonials and endorsements
and the objective of preventing children from being encouraged to use cannabis.
The impact of lay person or expert testimonials is not quite as clear as with celebrity
endorsers. In fact, prohibiting expert testimonials may be counterproductive to the other
objective of restricting advertising, ensuring that Canadians have access to accurate
information about cannabis. However, advertising literature suggests that expert
testimonials or endorsements are effective because of their ability to persuade consumers
through their inherent credibility as experts.801 Lastly, lay testimonials or endorsements
are able to persuade consumers because of the similarity between the endorser and the
consumer.802 That being said, there is some research to support that lay person or patient
testimonials and endorsements may potentially be misleading, or at the very least, do not
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often provide a comprehensive covering of information.803 Based on this evidence, there
is likely sufficient evidence, both scientific, and common sense, to meet the rational
connection threshold for all three types of testimonials.

5.5.1.3.2.

Prohibition of the use of persons, animals, and characters

Whether this prohibition is rationally connected to either objective can be answered both
with logic and evidence. It is logical that the use of persons, animals, and characters may
be particularly appealing to children, and thus prohibiting their use in advertising
cannabis is rationally connected to the objective of not encouraging youth to use
cannabis. Additionally, research suggests that the use of animated spokes-characters
influence children’s attention to an ad, and also influences the positive attitude towards
the product.804 Another study found that the use of animals with human characteristics in
commercials was one of the most common elements used to attract the attention of
children.805 This research further supports the rational connection between prohibiting the
use of animals, persons, and characters and not encourage youth use of cannabis.
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5.5.1.3.3.

Prohibition on lifestyle advertising

This wording is identical to the wording used in the Tobacco Act, which was found to be
constitutional in JTI-MacDonald.806 Specifically, the SCC held that even advertising that
does not appear on its face to connect a lifestyle with a tobacco product is prohibited if it
subliminally connects it with a lifestyle, but should not be read so broadly as to
encompass every possible impression. In addition, the Court stated that the words ‘such
as’ in the phrase ‘such as one that includes glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk,
or daring’ indicated that the list is meant to be examples of lifestyle advertising, not as a
complete list of the types of lifestyle advertising that are prohibited.807 The Court was
convinced that the evidence “amply establishes the power of such advertising to induce
non-smokers to begin to smoke and to increase tobacco consumption among addicted
smokers.”808 Based on existing jurisprudence, there is likely satisfactory evidence to
establish a rational connection between the ban on lifestyle advertising contained in
section 17 and the objective of preventing youth from being encouraged to smoke, and
also from ensuring that Canadians are only presented with accurate information regarding
cannabis products.

5.5.1.3.4.

Exception for informational or brand-preference promotion

Subsection 17(2) permits the use of informational or brand-preference promotion,
provided that the promotion meets a number of criteria, including: it is in a
communication addressed and mailed or an adult; it is in a place where young people are
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not permitted by law; it is communicated by telecommunications, and reasonable steps
have been taken to ensure young people cannot access the promotion; or, it is in a
prescribed place or prescribed manner.809 There is a very obvious connection between the
objective of ensuring that adults have access to accurate information about cannabis
products, and the provisions in section 17 that permit information and brand-preference
advertising. Additionally, the restriction on addressing and sending such advertisements
to a person 18 years of age or older is also easily connected to the objective of not
encouraging youth use of cannabis by limiting their exposure to advertising. Similarly,
restricting information and brand preference advertising to places where young persons
are not allowed, or where reasonable steps have been taken to ensure young persons
cannot access it, are both logically connected to the objective of preventing young
persons from being exposed to cannabis advertising. This provision should easily pass the
rational connection step.
However, it is difficult to comment on the rational connection of the exception for
information and brand-preference advertising in prescribed places or prescribed manners,
because they have not yet been prescribed. It is possible that regulations may be passed
permitting promotion in retail storefronts, provided that it is not a place that also sells
alcohol or tobacco, or to persons who appear to be impaired or under the influence of
another substance. Both of these would likely pass the rational connection test, as there is
sufficient evidence regarding the dangers of mixing cannabis with other substances.810
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Similarly, restrictions based on proximity to things such as schools, parks, playgrounds,
or other areas commonly frequented by children are likely restrictions, that would easily
pass the rational connection stage, provided they are not so onerous as to make it
practically impossible to operate a retail storefront within the regulations.
Restrictions on the manner in which cannabis is sold may include times of the day when
cannabis may not be sold, much like with alcohol. Such a restriction would likely be
sufficiently connected both to ensuring that consumers don’t mix cannabis with other
substances (by prohibiting the sale of cannabis after 11p.m., for example), and that
consumers do not overuse, or misuse cannabis products. Another possible regulation that
could stipulate the manner in which cannabis is sold may include maximum quantities
that can be sold at one time, a mandatory certification or other educational or professional
requirement for persons selling cannabis (similar to Smart Serve for alcohol), or the
collection of consumer information, all of which would likely be sufficient to pass the
rational connection test.

5.5.1.3.5.

Exception for point of sale promotion

Subsection 17(4) permits point of sale promotion, but only pertaining to the availability
and price of cannabis. While it permits point of sale promotion, what is permitted is so
limited that it may still be challenged. Permitting point of sale promotion can logically be
connected to the objective of ensuring that adults have access to accurate information
about cannabis products, as it allows legal customers to gain more information about the
products or services they may purchase. Additionally, point of sale advertising is
recognized as being particularly effective, because, unlike more traditional advertising
where there is a time and geographical distance between seeing the advertisement and
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purchasing the produce, point of sale advertising reduces or removes that gap.811
Restricting other types of information, such as health claims, is also logically connected
to the objective of ensuring that Canadians are only presented with accurate information.
One possible complication with this restriction is not permitting the display of various of
cannabis characteristics at the point of sale, including, but not limited to: terpene content,
growing conditions, use of specific pesticides or other chemicals, or the age of the
cannabis. All of this information can be useful to potential consumers in informing what
products they would like to use and how to use them. For example, as cannabis ages,
some cannabinoids and terpenes degrade, lowering their availability, and create byproducts that can impact the effects of the product. In fact, many cannabis users
purposefully age cannabis to achieve a specific cannabinoid or terpene content, and so it
is not unlikely that a retailer may do the same. However, these concerns are likely better
addressed at the minimal impairment stage. Restricting point of sale advertising will
likely be held to be rationally connected to the objective of ensuring that Canadians are
only exposed to accurate information about cannabis, but not the objective of preventing
youth from being encouraged to use cannabis by advertisements.

5.5.1.3.6.

Exception for promoting brand elements of cannabis

This exception permits the promotion of brand elements of cannabis on things that are not
cannabis accessories, provided they are not on a thing associated with, or appealing to,
young persons or on a thing associated with a specific way of life. This restriction can
clearly be linked to preventing youth from being exposed to cannabis advertising that
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would encourage them to use cannabis. For example, it makes sense that promotion of a
cannabis brand element on a Frisbee or basketball might influence a child perception of
cannabis, or that cannabis branding on fidget spinners may increase an adolescent’s
exposure to cannabis advertisements. However, there are examples that come to mind
that are less clear. Would a cannabis brand element on a clothing item be prohibited
under this restriction? It is unclear whether it is only items that are exclusively appealing
to young persons are prohibited, or whether items that are appealing to a person
regardless of age would also be prohibited. Certainly, a children’s sized clothing item
would be considered to be associated with young persons, but can the same be said about
adult sized clothing, which could fit many teenagers? Another example is alcohol.
Alcohol is not a thing that is legally associated with young persons, however, we know
that young persons are regularly exposed to alcohol advertising, so promoting brand
elements of cannabis on a beer cozy is not a thing that should be appealing to young
persons, but likely would be. However, based on the interpretation of “appealing to
young persons” in JTI-MacDonald, it is likely that a court would find this restriction is
meant to apply to things that are specifically appealing to young persons, not things that
are directed towards adults but could possibly be construed as appealing to young
persons.812 Again, given the low threshold at this stage of the analysis, it is likely that this
specific aspect will pass the rational connection step, with most of the analysis taking
place in the later steps.
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5.5.1.4.

Minimal Impairment

Having determined that all aspects of section 17 will likely pass the rational connection
test, although some more easily than others, the analysis will progress to the minimal
impairment stage. The minimal impairment step requires that the means are carefully
tailored to the objective. Again, deference to Parliament is appropriate when tackling a
complex social problem, and the SCC has held that when tackling complex social issues,
the minimal impairment step will be satisfied where Parliament has chosen one of several
reasonable alternatives, not necessarily the one that is the least impairing.813 As well, the
broad categorization of the objectives of the advertising restrictions will not require as
specific of a response that a narrower objective would, giving Parliament greater latitude
in crafting a legislative response. This section will analyze whether the advertising
restriction scheme contained in section 17 of Bill C-45 would satisfy the minimal
impairment requirement in the Oakes test.
To determine if the regulatory scheme contained in section 17 is a reasonable alternative,
it is worthwhile to canvass alternative options that could have been implemented, or have
been implemented in other jurisdictions. This is particularly important because the crux
of the analysis in RJR-MacDonald was that Parliament failed to explain why they did not
implement a less impairing option.814 There are many other policy options that
Parliament could have chosen to implement to achieve the goals of preventing youth
from being encouraged to use cannabis, and ensuring that Canadians have access to only
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accurate information about cannabis. For example, media literacy education may help to
mitigate the harms of pro-cannabis media messaging. These prevention efforts have had
encouraging results on reducing intentions to use alcohol and tobacco, and have been
recommended by both the Centers for Disease Control and the American Association of
Pediatrics.815 Other options proposed include: denying tax deductions for advertising or
marketing expenses, imposing marketing budget limits or caps, mandatory warnings or
messages in advertisements, advertising review boards, and time and place restrictions.816
All of these, or some combination of them, would likely constitute a reasonable
alternative to the proposed regime.
It is also instructive to see how other jurisdictions have regulated cannabis advertising.817
Courts have considered international examples in other contexts, including tobacco
advertising818, and medical assistance in dying.819 In the Netherlands, the only permitted
form of promotion is the use of Rastafari imagery, palm leaf images, using trade names
such as ‘Grasshopper’, and the words ‘coffee shop’ to identify the cafes.820 In contrast,
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States that have legalized recreational cannabis have taken a much less restrictive
approach. For example, in California, advertising is banned within 1000 feet of where
children congregate, and can only be displayed on broadcast, cable, radio, print, and
digital communications where at least 71.6% or more of the audience is reasonably
expected to be 21 or over.821 In Colorado, advertising is permitted in adult-oriented
newspapers and magazines, while marketing campaigns, including online advertising,
that have a high likelihood of reaching minors are prohibited. Pop-up advertisements are
banned, but banner ads are permitted on adult-oriented websites. Branding on packaging
is permitted, because minors are not permitted in retail outlets, but any health or physical
benefit claims are prohibited in any form of advertising.822 In Washington, retailers may
not display products to the general public, and advertising is prohibited in any form or
through any medium within 1000 feet of school grounds, playgrounds, child care, public
parks, libraries, or game arcades that allow minors to enter. In addition, advertisements
on public transit vehicles or shelters, or any publicly owned or operated property is also
prohibited. Washington has also specifically forbidden promotion that encourages overconsumption of cannabis.823
Another crucial factor at the minimal impairment stage in RJR-Macdonald was that the
TPCA was a total ban on tobacco advertising, not a partial ban. In RJR-MacDonald,
McLachlin J stated that a total ban on expression will be more difficult to justify than a

821

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 26151(b), 26152(g) (Deering, LEXIS through Ch.9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)

822

US, SR, Permanent Rules Related to the Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, 2013, Reg Sess, Colo.

823

Washington Administrative Code, Title 314, chapter 55, section 155

182

partial ban.824 The same sentiment has been expressed in Ramsden825 and Irwin Toy826.
The restrictions contained in Bill C-45 constitute a partial ban, as they contain
exemptions for information and brand-preference advertising in limited circumstances.
Consequently, the bill should be easier to justify as minimally impairing than a total ban.
Indeed, the Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould, stated that “Bill C-45 would allow
cannabis producers to promote their brands and provide information about their products,
but only where young persons would not be exposed to it. These limits are reasonable.
They would allow adult consumers to make informed decisions, but they respond to the
greater risks cannabis poses for young people.”827 Additionally, as discussed in Chapter
4, courts have recognized that legislation rarely has one sole goal, and that impairing a
right minimally may further the achievement of one goal at the expense of another. This
is certainly true of Bill C-45, which has multiple goals that are often contradictory.828
This reality does not relieve Parliament of their obligation to ensure infringements are
minimally impairing, but instead recognizes that minimal impairment, particularly in
complex social contexts, does not require the government to adopt the least impairing
option, but instead one of several reasonable alternatives.
By permitting information and brand-preference advertising aimed at adults, Parliament
has shown that they at least attempted to tailor the legislation to impair the rights of
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Canadians as little as possible. In RJR-MacDonald, the Court stipulated that Parliament
was required to differentiate between harmful advertising and benign advertising,
suggesting that restrictions must be sufficiently specific to prevent the expressed harms,
and no more. 829 It is clear that Parliament has endeavoured to tailor the restrictions to
ensure, as much as possible, that only harmful advertising is prohibited. However, there
are two aspects of section 17 that may be more difficult to justify at the minimal
impairment stage: (1) the vagueness of ‘reasonable steps’ in subsections 17(2) and 17(3),
and (2) the restriction on point of sale promotion in subsection 17(4).

5.5.1.4.1.

Vagueness of Reasonable Steps

At discussed earlier, the vagueness of the phrase ‘reasonable steps’ in subsections 17(2)
and 17(3) may prove problematic at the minimal impairment stage. As shown in section
5.2.2.4., statutory interpretation of the phrase provides little guidance to those expected to
abide by it. Following the two requirements set out in JTI-MacDonald to refute a claim of
vagueness, Parliament may be tasked with proving that the law provides sufficient
guidance to those expected to abide by it, and that he amount of discretion by those who
enforce it is limited. In this case, without further clarification, it is unlikely that
subsections 17(2) and 17(3) provide sufficient guidance to the advertisers expected to
follow it. However, this specific problem provides a unique scenario, because it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to provide specific steps to advertisers for every type of
advertising, while still providing some flexibility to allow for technological advances, or
new evidence on the impacts of cannabis advertising. As it is currently written, the limit
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is vague enough that it may result in those permitted to advertise cannabis refraining from
advertising all together out of fear of infringing the law. Additionally, subsection 111(1)
of Bill C-45 sets out a punishment of up to $1,000,000 for contravention of any
provisions of the Act or the regulations to promote compliance with the Act.830 This
significant penalty, coupled with the inability of those expected to abide by the law to
determine whether they are acting within the confines of the law or not, suggest that these
provisions, as currently written, may be vague to the point of not being minimally
impairing.

5.5.1.4.2.

Point of Sale Promotion

The point of sale promotion prohibits retailers from promoting cannabis products at the
point of sale, with the exception of price and availability. As mentioned earlier, there are
several other pieces of information that may be useful to a potential consumer for making
an educated decision, including but not limited to the cannabinoid content, terpene
content, age, and how/where the product was grown. In fact, prohibiting retailers from
displaying or promoting the cannabinoid content of a cannabis product could even be
counterproductive to the objective of ensuring that Canadians are given enough
information to make safe and educated decisions. While consumers may be able to get
this information in other ways, for example by speaking with an salesperson, it may not
always be possible or realistic (a salesperson would be required to potentially know data
about hundreds of products). Additionally, naïve consumers may not know to ask these
types of questions, and may not understand the importance of being aware of the
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cannabinoid content in particular. Allowing retailers to display this information would
ensure that consumers are aware of the potency of the products that they purchase, and
will help retailers to ensure that consumers are using cannabis as safely as possible.
While it is impossible at this point to predict how the Federal government would justify
not permitting the above information from being promoted at the point of sale, it is
difficult to think of a reason why. Perhaps the concern is that consumers will seek out the
highest potency cannabis products that are available, however, that seems preferable to
consumers potentially having no idea how potent the product they use is. Additionally,
there could be concern that retailers will promote their products via enticing, but
otherwise unproven health benefits. However, there are already provisions in place to
prohibit retailers from promoting cannabis in a way that may create an erroneous
impression about its “design, construction, performance, intended use, characteristics,
value, composition, merit, safety, health effects, or health risks,”831 which would ban
promotion of that type. Additionally, the point of sale restriction becomes more difficult
to rationally connect to the objective of the legislation in consideration of the entire piece
of legislation. By permitting informational and brand-preference advertising in specific
circumstances, Parliament sent a message that it is permissible for adults to hear such
information. It does not follow then that the same messaging would be prohibited in a
space where only adults are permitted.
There is also a slight discrepancy in the advertising provisions. Subsection 17(2)(b)
permits informational and brand-preference promotion in places where minors are not
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allowed by law. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the regulations stipulating the
prescribed places in which cannabis can be sold might include places where minors are
not permitted by law, or the regulations regarding the prescribed manner in which
cannabis can be sold may include a requirement that minors are not permitted in places
where cannabis is sold. If that is the case, then storefronts would be permitted to promote
cannabis products in the store, but only if it is informational or brand-preference
promotion. This results in a slight contradiction in the legislation, as subsection 17(4)
permits point of sale promotion, but only regarding the price and availability, while
subsection 17(2)(b) permits much broader promotion in places where minors are not
allowed. While it would be possible to comply with both by complying with the stricter
restrictions in subsection 17(4), it is unclear whether this was intentional or not. It does
not appear that Parliament has sufficiently drafted these provisions in accordance with the
harm they are trying to prevent, but instead capture more than intended. Therefore, it is
likely that a court may agree that prohibiting informational and brand-preference
promotion at the point of sale is not minimally impairing. The point of sale restriction
could easily be brought into compliance if it permitted information and brand-preference
promotion in addition to price and availability. Rather than striking down the legislation
as unconstitutional, a court may find it more suitable instead to read in an exception for
informational and brand-preference promotion at the point of sale.

5.5.1.5.

Proportionality

Having found that the advertising restrictions minimally impair freedom of expression,
with the exception of the point of sale restrictions, the analysis progresses to the
proportionality stage. This last requirement of the Oakes test asks whether the objective
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of the infringement is proportional to the effect of the infringement. Specifically, it asks
whether the negative effects of the infringement of rights is proportional to the benefits
associated with the legislative goal. In this case, the benefits associated with the
legislative goal are significant. After determining that the reasonable steps requirement in
subsections 17(2) and 17(3), as well as the point of sale exception may fail at the minimal
impairment stage, they will necessarily fail at the proportionality stage, because a
provision that does not minimally impair cannot be proportional to the objective.832
The remainder of the legislation will likely be found to be sufficiently proportional to
pass the last step of the Oakes test. Parliament has clearly made an effort to tailor the
legislation closely to the objectives, including protecting children from promotion that
may entice them to use or misuse cannabis products, while still recognizing that Canadian
adults should be able to gain information necessary to make safe and educated decisions
regarding cannabis use. Though cannabis advertising should be held to a high threshold
of protection, the objectives sought by restricting advertising are equally important,
particularly given the social and political context surrounding cannabis. Preventing
children from being encouraged to use cannabis by restricting advertising will help to
ensure, but not entirely prevent, children from being exposed to the risks associated with
using cannabis in adolescence. The risks of using cannabis as a minor include potential
effects on brain development, the possibility of developing cannabis dependence, and the
onset of psychiatric disorders where already predisposed. While the evidentiary link is
not concrete, the consequences are certainly significant enough to warrant restricting
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rights, and the regulatory scheme of cannabis promotion has sufficiently balanced the
incredibly important objective of protecting youth from enticement, and also protecting
adults from misleading information, while still permitting promotion that will allow legal
cannabis consumers to make educated decisions relating to cannabis consumption.

5.5.2.

Sections 21 and 22

Sections 21 and 22 of Bill C-45 set out the following:
Sponsorship
21 It is prohibited to display, in a promotion that is used, directly or indirectly, in the sponsorship
of a person, entity, event, activity or facility,
(a) a brand element of cannabis, of a cannabis accessory or of a service related to cannabis;
or
(b) the name of a person that
(i)
produces, sells or distributes cannabis,
(ii)
sells or distributes a cannabis accessory, or
(iii)
provides a service related to cannabis.
Name of facility
22 It is prohibited to display on a facility, as part of the name of the facility or otherwise, if the
facility is used for a sports or cultural event or activity,
(a) a brand element of cannabis, a cannabis accessory or a service related to cannabis; or
(b) the name of a person that
(i)
produces, sells or distributes cannabis,
(ii)
sells or distributes a cannabis accessory, or
(iii)
provides a service related to cannabis.833

5.5.2.1.

Pressing and Substantial

Having already determined above in section 5.5.1.1. that the objectives of the legislation,
and the advertising restrictions are very likely to be found to be pressing and substantial,
it is unnecessary to reconsider the pressing and substantial stage of the Oakes test here.
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5.5.2.2.

Rational Connection

Sections 21 and 22 of Bill C-45 prohibit the display of brand elements and the name of
producers, retailers, distributors, or service providers of cannabis or cannabis
accessories834 in the sponsorship of a person, entity, event, activity, or facility, whether it
is displayed on the facility or used in directly or indirectly in promotion of the
sponsorship.835 These sections are analogous to sections 24 and 25 of the Tobacco Act,
which were challenged in JTI-MacDonald.836 One notable difference, however, is that
while the prohibition in the Tobacco Act specifically forbids the display of brand
elements or industry player’s names on permanent facilities, Bill C-45 does not include
the same restriction. In JTI-MacDonald, the Court held that the prohibition of
sponsorship promotion contained in the Tobacco Act was rationally connected to the
legislative goal for the same reasons that the prohibition on lifestyle advertising was
rationally connected, including the evidence establishing the power of lifestyle
advertising to induce non-smokers to smoke and increasing tobacco consumption among
addicted smokers. This was found to be rationally connected to Parliament’s goal of
preventing young persons from taking up smoking and becoming addicted to tobacco.837
Given the low threshold of this step, these sections will likely be found to be rationally
connected to the objective of ensuring that Canadians are only exposed to accurate
information about cannabis, by preventing Canadians from being inundated with positive
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messaging about cannabis use. Additionally, it is likely that they will be found to be
rationally connected to the objective of preventing youth from being encouraged to use
cannabis. Sponsorship of concerts or events with a target audience of young adults or
teenagers would not be consistent with the objective of preventing children from being
encouraged to use cannabis. Again, given the low threshold for this step, it is likely that
this will pass the rational connection test but will be further scrutinized in the minimal
impairment analysis.

5.5.2.3.

Minimal Impairment

These provisions may prove troublesome at the minimal impairment stage, as a literal
reading suggests that it will capture persons and organizations well outside the scope of
the objectives of the legislation, making the provision overbroad. For example, if the
provision is read literally, a lawyer providing commercial legal services to cannabis
producers, distributors, or retailers, this section would prohibit that lawyer from
sponsorship or purchasing the rights to name a facility. It hardly seems within the scope
of this legislation that this was the intended effect, given that the intent was more likely
to prevent minors from being exposed to media imagery that may increase their positive
associations with the substance. Furthermore, this section could also conceivably capture
persons or organizations that are not involved in the cannabis industry at all, but who
have name or brand imagery was related to cannabis. For example, it is unclear whether
hemp products that utilize imagery related to cannabis would be caught by this provision.
Additionally, the prohibition on sponsorship and facility naming rights for persons that
sell or distribute a cannabis accessory could capture persons and organizations outside of
the intended scope, as it is unclear whether this provision applies to persons that sell or
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distribute accessories used solely for cannabis, or accessories that are used for cannabis in
addition to other products. Cannabis accessory is defined in the bill to include a thing that
is represented to be used in the consumption of cannabis or to be used in the production
of cannabis.838 For example, a company that manufactures and sells equipment used by a
variety of agricultural or horticultural organizations, but is also used by cannabis growers,
would be captured by this provision, as they are an organization that “sells or distributes a
cannabis accessory”, as would investors who advise cannabis organizations, or
organizations that offer assistance to persons struggling with cannabis dependence. As
discussed in RJR-MacDonald, this stage requires Parliament to differentiate between
harmful advertising and benign advertising839, which has not been done here.
Referring again to the steps for refuting a claim of overbreadth in JTI-MacDonald, these
provisions do not provide adequate guidance to those who are expected to abide by it. A
person who provides manufacturing equipment to a cannabis producer may refrain from
sponsorship or facility-naming rights opportunities out of fear of penalty, even if such
promotion would not impede the objectives of the provisions. These sections clearly
capture persons and organizations beyond the intent of the provision, including benign
promotion, and as such, is likely to fail at the minimal impairment stage.

5.5.2.4.

Proportionality

Having found that sections 21 and 22 are likely to fail at the minimal impairment stage, it
is not necessary to proceed to the proportionality stage. In the event that the provisions
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are found by a court to be minimally impairing, however, it is also likely that they would
fail at the proportionality step. This step of the Oakes test asks whether the objective is
proportional to the effects of the infringement. For the same reasons expressed in the
minimal impairment analysis, the objective of protecting youth from promotion that
might induce them to use cannabis is not likely to be found to be proportional to the
effects of section 21 and 22, which, if read literally, will prohibit the promotion of
products and services that are unlikely to encourage a youth to use cannabis, such as a
piece of farming or agricultural equipment used to grow cannabis, or a financial manager
who specializes in investing in cannabis companies. The significant implications are not
proportional to the objective.

5.6. Remedies
As discussed in the previous chapter, the general remedy available pursuant to section 52
is a declaration of invalidity of the legislation in question. However, this does not seem
appropriate given that the majority of the provisions will likely be found to be
constitutional. Instead, it may be more appropriate to use a more tailored remedy, such as
striking only the parts of the law that are unconstitutional: sections 17(2), 17(3), 17(4),
21, and 22 with a suspended declaration of invalidity to give Parliament time to draft
more appropriate restrictions. Additionally, reading in may be an appropriate remedy for
the offending provisions. For example, reading in a definition of “reasonable steps” or
further clarification to subsections 17(2) and 17(3) may be sufficient to make those
provisions sufficiently clear so as to no longer be vague. As mentioned earlier, a court
may decide to read in informational and brand-preference advertising as permitted at the
point of sale in section 17(4), which would likely be sufficient to bring it into
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compliance. Regarding sections 21 and 22, a court may find it more appropriate to strike
out only subsection (b) in both sections 21 and 22, which reads: “the name of a person
that (i) produces, sells or distributes cannabis, (ii) sells or distributes a cannabis
accessory, or (iii) provides a service related to cannabis.”840 Doing so would still prohibit
the display of cannabis brand elements in sponsorship or facility naming, which would
achieve the objective of ensuring children are not exposed to advertising. Even striking
out the offending portion would still leave the remainder of the provision, which would
capture a significant amount of the sponsorship and naming that was intended to be
captured, and furthers the objectives of the legislation.

5.7. Conclusion
To conclude, it is likely that most of the advertising restrictions will be found to be a
constitutionally-valid infringement upon the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed
in the Charter. Protecting minors from advertising and imagery that may persuade them
to begin using cannabis, or to use cannabis in an unsafe way is a pressing and substantial
objective. Similarly, ensuring that Canadians are protected from fraudulent or misleading
messaging regarding cannabis is imperative to protecting the health and safety of those
who do decide to use cannabis, and is a pressing and substantial objective. All of the
advertising restrictions in Bill C-45 are rationally connected to at least one of those
objectives, supported either by common sense or scientific evidence. Overall, Parliament
has clearly shown that they attempted to tailor the restrictions to infringe upon the rights
of Canadians as little as possible, evidenced by permitting informational and brand-

840

Supra note 37.

194

preference advertising in limited circumstances, however, subsections 17(2) and 17(3) are
too vague to allow citizens to know whether they are operating within the confines of the
law, and sections 17(4), 21 and 22 are overbroad, capturing some circumstances which
are not related to the objectives. Lastly, the benefits that will be realized by the
implementation of the advertising restrictions is proportional to the infringement upon
freedom of expression.

195

6. Conclusion
Ten years ago, the SCC released its decision of JTI-MacDonald, finding that the federal
government’s restrictions on tobacco advertising were a constitutionally-valid
infringement on freedom of expression. Now, it is likely that Canadian courts will be
tasked with assessing similar prohibitions on cannabis advertising. The purpose of this
thesis was to predict how a court might analyze the proposed restrictions contained in Bill
C-45, knowing that they may change as they are reviewed by the Standing Committee on
Health and then Senate.
After a brief introductory chapter that provided the theoretical framework and
methodology utilized in the project, Chapter 2 provided a discussion on the role that harm
plays in freedom of expression litigation in Canada. The purpose of doing so was to
explain the importance and relevance of categorizing the harms associated with cannabis
use. Four ways in which evidence of harm can impact the constitutional analysis were
identified: in the division of powers analysis; when determining whether 2(b) has been
infringed; in the use of evidence; and, during the Oakes analysis. First, harm is necessary
to permit Parliament to use their criminal law powers, classifying the legislation solely
within Federal jurisdiction. Second, arguments have been raised in the past that
commercial speech that promotes a harmful product or service should not be afforded
protection by the Charter. Despite the fact that this has never been successful, it is
possible it will be raised again by the Attorney General in a challenge against the
cannabis advertising provisions, but it is unlikely to be successful. Third, an inconsistent
pattern of the use scientific evidence in SCC decisions was identified, followed by a
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discussion of how this could impact the analysis of the cannabis advertising provisions.
Lastly, how the degree of harm assigned to cannabis use could impact all four stages of
the Oakes analysis was considered.
Chapter 2 then proceeded to introduce the reader to cannabis and cannabinoids in order to
provide an basic understanding of the substance. Physical components of cannabis,
modes of administration, how cannabis affects users, and other relevant properties of
cannabis were discussed. The relevance of the heterogeneity of cannabis was discussed,
both in reference to how it impacts scientific research, and how it impacts regulation.
Next, a snapshot of cannabis use in Canada was provided, which is necessary to assist in
understanding the scope of population level risks associated with cannabis use.
Specifically, trends in youth use of cannabis and how legalization has affected youth use
rates in other jurisdictions was discussed because preventing youth from using cannabis
is an objective driving the advertising restrictions. This chapter continued to provide
reasons why researching cannabis can be problematic, particularly when it comes to
translating research evidence into generalizable claims. The remainder of the chapter
summarized evidence on the medical uses of cannabis, and the harms and risks associated
with cannabis use. Before providing a summary of the evidence on the risks of cannabis
use, a brief summary of historical attempts to assess the harms of cannabis use is
provided, primarily to highlight the longstanding evidence supporting the relative safety
of cannabis use. The purpose of this chapter was not to provide a thorough summary of
all the evidence on cannabis risks and harms, but rather to provide the reader with
sufficient information to support the argument that while there is certainly sufficient
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evidence that cannabis poses some potential harms, the harm is not as certain, nor as well
understood as the harms of tobacco use are.
In Chapter 3, a brief history of cannabis and the law in Canada was provided, beginning
with how the criminal law in Canada pertaining to cannabis has evolved over the last
century. Next, this chapter followed the legalization of medical cannabis, starting with
the use of section 56 exemptions prior to any formal regulations. The landmark cases that
led to the introduction of the first medical cannabis regulations, the MMAR, were
discussed. Following that, this chapter provides a timeline of challenges to the MMAR,
and each subsequent amendment or new regulatory scheme, namely, the MMPR and the
ACMPR. Next, this chapter looked at prior attempts to legalize recreational cannabis in
Canada, focusing on the Le Dain Commission, the 2002 Senate Report on Cannabis, and
the ‘hollowing out’ that preceded the Federal government’s introduction of Bill C-45.
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the historically complex relationship
between cannabis and the law in Canada, characterized by almost a century of prohibition
and repeated, unsuccessful attempts to liberalize cannabis laws.
Chapter 4 focused on the protection of freedom of expression in Canada, beginning with
the Canadian Bill of Rights, through the introduction of the Charter, and the development
of jurisprudence over the last 40 years. The purpose of this chapter was to provide a
framework outlining how freedom of expression challenges are analyzed by the courts in
order to analyze the relevant provisions of Bill C-45 in the subsequent chapter. Part IV of
this chapter outlined the scope of protection afforded by section 2(b), and the hierarchy of
protection offered to different types of expression. Then, this chapter looked at each
respective step in a freedom of expression challenge, starting with the determination of
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whether the activity that is being infringed upon is activity protected by section 2(b) of
the Charter. This is followed by a discussion of the test for determining whether a
governmental act has infringed upon freedom of expression, either in purpose or effect.
The bulk of the chapter discussed the last part of a freedom of expression challenge, the
section 1 analysis. This section outlined how the courts determine whether a Charter
infringement is justified prior to the development of the Oakes test, before discussing the
four steps of the Oakes test with reference to how each step has been used by the courts.
Next, this chapter explored factors that can influence the section 1 analysis, namely
flexibility, deference, and standard of proof, with discussion of how each factor can have
significant implications for the success or failure of a freedom of expression challenge.
Finally, this chapter outlined what remedies are available in the event that a freedom of
expression challenge is successful, and how courts decide which remedy is most suitable.
Lastly, Chapter 5 provided an analysis of the proposed advertising restrictions on
recreational cannabis contained in Bill C-45, An Act Respecting Cannabis. In this
chapter, two aspects of the legislation were focused on: the general prohibition on
promotion with exceptions, and, the prohibition on sponsorship and facility naming
rights. Based on past jurisprudence, this chapter argued that it is extremely likely that the
objective of the legislation as a whole, in addition to the objective of the advertising
restrictions, will be sufficiently pressing and substantial to satisfy the first stage of the
Oakes test. Additionally, it is also likely that, due to the low threshold required at the
rational connection stage of the Oakes test, there is enough common sense and scientific
evidence to pass this step, though some provisions will do so with more ease than others.
The bulk of this chapter focused on the minimal impairment stage, commensurate with
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the judicial attention given to this stage. It is at this stage where it is argued that three
aspects of the regulations will be particularly vulnerable: the phrase “reasonable steps”;
the restrictions on point of sale advertising; and, the sponsorship and naming-rights. It is
argued that those provisions have not been carefully drafted to achieve the objectives, but
are overbroad or vague, and therefore, are not minimally impairing. This chapter
proceeded to discuss the last step of the Oakes test, both for the provisions found to pass
all the prior stages of the Oakes test, and those argued to not be minimally impairing, in
the event that the two provisions do not fail at the minimal impairment stage. Again, it is
argued that, while the advertising restrictions as a whole are largely proportional, the
same two provisions that would likely fail at the minimal impairment stage would
similarly fail at the proportionality stage. Finally, what remedies would be most
appropriate upon finding that sections 17(2), 17(3), 17(4), 21, and 22 are not a
constitutionally valid infringement upon the guaranteed right to freedom of expression
are discussed.
It is possible that the restrictions on cannabis advertising may change in the months
leading up to legalization. Even if they do, it is likely that the will still be challenged, due
to the high stakes for legal cannabis retailers and producers to get a strong foothold in the
nascent market of recreational cannabis, which is estimated to be worth billions of
dollars. Whichever way the decision falls, it will affect the bottom line of those legally
permitted to produce and sell cannabis in Canada upon legalization, and it will impact the
informational landscape of cannabis in popular media. The outcome will also direct the
future of commercial speech litigation. A finding that the restrictions are unconstitutional
will draw a line in the sand, differentiating tobacco from cannabis and other products that
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do not have a clearly defined risk of harm. On the other hand, a finding that the
provisions are constitutional will open the door for regulating the advertising of other
products and services that pose a possible risk, such as advertising of food and beverages.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Bill C-45
Interpretation
Definitions
2 (1) The following definitions apply in this Act.
brand element includes a brand name, trademark, tradename, distinguishing guise, logo,
graphic arrangement, design or slogan that is reasonably associated with, or that evokes,
(a) cannabis, a cannabis accessory or a service related to cannabis; or
(b) a brand of any cannabis, cannabis accessory or service related to cannabis.
brand-preference promotion means promotion of cannabis by means of its brand
characteristics, promotion of a cannabis accessory by means of its brand characteristics or
promotion of a service related to cannabis by means of the brand characteristics of the
service.
cannabis means a cannabis plant and anything referred to in Schedule 1 but does not
include anything referred to in Schedule 2
cannabis accessory means
(a) a thing, including rolling papers or wraps, holders, pipes, water pipes, bongs
and vaporizers, that is represented to be used in the consumption of cannabis
or a thing that is represented to be used in the production of cannabis; or
(b) a thing that is deemed under subsection (3) to be represented to be used in the
consumption or production of cannabis.
cannabis plant means a plant that belongs to the genus Cannabis.
dried cannabis means any part of a cannabis plant that has been subjected to a drying
process, other than seeds
informational promotion means a promotion by which factual information is provided to
the consumer about
(a) cannabis or its characteristics;
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(b) a cannabis accessory or its characteristics;
(c) a service related to cannabis; or
(d) the availability or price of cannabis, a cannabis accessory or a service related
to cannabis.
person means an individual or organization.
promote, in respect of a thing or service, means to make, for the purpose of selling the
thing or service, a representation — other than a representation on a package or label —
about the thing or service by any means, whether directly or indirectly, that is likely to
influence and shape attitudes, beliefs and behaviours about the thing or service.
young person means
(a) for the purposes of sections 8, 9 and 12, an individual who is 12 years of age
or older but under 18 years of age; and
(b) for the purposes of any other provision of this Act, an individual who is under
18 years of age.
SUBDIVISION A
Promotion
Non-application
16 Subject to the regulations, this Subdivision does not apply
(a) to a literary, dramatic, musical, cinematographic, scientific, educational or artistic
work, production or performance that uses or depicts cannabis, a cannabis
accessory or a service related to cannabis, or a brand element of any of those
things, whatever the mode or form of its expression, if no consideration is given,
directly or indirectly, for that use or depiction in the work, production or
performance;
(b) to a report, commentary or opinion in respect of cannabis, a cannabis accessory or
a service related to cannabis or a brand element of any of those things, if no
consideration is given, directly or indirectly, for the reference to the cannabis,
cannabis accessory, service or brand element in that report, commentary or
opinion;
(c) to a promotion, by a person that is authorized to produce, sell or distribute
cannabis, that is directed at any person that is authorized to produce, sell or
distribute cannabis, but not, either directly or indirectly, at consumers; or
(d) to a promotion, by a person that sells or distributes cannabis accessories or that
provides a service related to cannabis, that is directed at any person that sells or
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distributes cannabis accessories, at any person that is authorized to produce, sell
or distribute cannabis, but not, either directly or indirectly, at consumers.
Promotion
17 (1) Unless authorized under this Act, it is prohibited to promote cannabis or a cannabis
accessory or any service related to cannabis, including
(a) by communicating information about its price or distribution;
(b) by doing so in a manner that there are reasonable grounds to believe could be
appealing to young persons;
(c) by means of a testimonial or endorsement, however displayed or communicated;
(d) by means of the depiction of a person, character or animal, whether real or
fictional; or
(e) by presenting it or any of its brand elements in a manner that associates it or the
brand element with, or evokes a positive or negative emotion about or image of, a
way of life such as one that includes glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk
or daring
Exception — informational promotion — cannabis
(2) Subject to the regulations, a person that is authorized to produce, sell or distribute
cannabis may promote cannabis by means of informational promotion or brandpreference promotion if the promotion is
(a) in a communication that is addressed and sent to an individual who is 18 years of
age or older and is identified by name;
(b) in a place where young persons are not permitted by law;
(c) communicated by means of a telecommunication, where the person responsible
for the content of the promotion has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the
promotion cannot be accessed by a young person;
(d) in a prescribed place; or
(e) done in a prescribed manner.
Exception — informational promotion — cannabis accessories and services
(3) Subject to the regulations, a person may promote a cannabis accessory or a service
related to cannabis by means of informational promotion or brand-preference promotion
if the promotion is
(a) in a communication that is addressed and sent to an individual who is 18 years of
age or older and is identified by name;
(b) in a place where young persons are not permitted by law;
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(c) communicated by means of a telecommunication, where the person responsible
for the content of the promotion has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the
promotion cannot be accessed by a young person;
(d) in a prescribed place; or
(e) done in a prescribed manner.
Exception — point of sale — cannabis
(4) Subject to the regulations, a person that is authorized to sell cannabis may promote it
at the point of sale if the promotion indicates only its availability, its price or its
availability and price.
Exception — point of sale — cannabis accessory and services
(5) Subject to the regulations, a person that sells a cannabis accessory or provides a
service related to cannabis may promote it at the point of sale if the promotion indicates
only its availability, its price or its availability and price.
Exception — brand element on other things
(6) Subject to the regulations, a person may promote cannabis, a cannabis accessory or a
service related to cannabis by displaying a brand element of cannabis, of a cannabis
accessory or of a service related to cannabis on a thing that is not cannabis or a cannabis
accessory, other than
(a) a thing that is associated with young persons;
(b) a thing that there are reasonable grounds to believe could be appealing to young
persons; or
(c) a thing that is associated with a way of life such as one that includes glamour,
recreation, excitement, vitality, risk or daring.
False promotion — cannabis
18 (1) It is prohibited to promote cannabis in a manner that is false, misleading or
deceptive or that is likely to create an erroneous impression about its characteristics,
value, quantity, composition, strength, concentration, potency, purity, quality, merit,
safety, health effects or health risks.
False promotion — cannabis accessory
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(2) It is prohibited to promote a cannabis accessory in a manner that is false, misleading
or deceptive or that is likely to create an erroneous impression about its design,
construction, performance, intended use, characteristics, value, composition, merit,
safety, health effects or health risks.
Use of certain terms, etc.
19 It is prohibited to use any term, expression, logo, symbol or illustration specified in
regulations made under paragraph 139(1)(z.1) in the promotion of cannabis, a cannabis
accessory or a service related to cannabis.
Promotion using foreign media
20 It is prohibited to promote, in a way that is prohibited by this Part, cannabis, a
cannabis accessory, a service related to cannabis or a brand element of any of those
things in a publication that is published outside Canada, a broadcast that originates
outside Canada or any other communication that originates outside Canada.
Sponsorship
21 It is prohibited to display, in a promotion that is used, directly or indirectly, in the
sponsorship of a person, entity, event, activity or facility,
(a) a brand element of cannabis, of a cannabis accessory or of a service related to
cannabis; or
(b) the name of a person that
(i)
produces, sells or distributes cannabis,
(ii)
sells or distributes a cannabis accessory, or
(iii) provides a service related to cannabis.
Name of facility
22 It is prohibited to display on a facility, as part of the name of the facility or otherwise,
if the facility is used for a sports or cultural event or activity,
(a) a brand element of cannabis, a cannabis accessory or a service related to cannabis;
or
(b) the name of a person that
(i)
produces, sells or distributes cannabis,
(ii)
sells or distributes a cannabis accessory, or
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(iii)

provides a service related to cannabis.

Publication, etc. of prohibited promotions
23 (1) It is prohibited to publish, broadcast or otherwise disseminate, on behalf of another
person, with or without consideration, any promotion that is prohibited by any of sections
17 to 22.
Exception
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply
(a) in respect of the distribution for sale of an imported publication;
(b) in respect of broadcasting, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Broadcasting Act,
by a distribution undertaking, as defined in that subsection 2(1), that is lawful
under that Act, other than the broadcasting of a promotion that is inserted by the
distribution undertaking; and
(c) in respect of a person that disseminates a promotion if they did not know, at the
time of the dissemination, that it includes a promotion that is prohibited under any
of sections 17 to 22.
Inducements
24 (1) Unless authorized under this Act, it is prohibited for a person that sells cannabis or
a cannabis accessory
(a) to provide or offer to provide cannabis or a cannabis accessory if it is provided or
offered to be provided without monetary consideration or in consideration of the
purchase of any thing or service or the provision of any service;
(b) to provide or offer to provide any thing that is not cannabis or a cannabis
accessory, including a right to participate in a game, draw, lottery or contest, if it
is provided or offered to be provided as an inducement for the purchase of
cannabis or a cannabis accessory; or
(c) to provide or offer to provide any service if it is provided or offered to be
provided as an inducement for the purchase of cannabis or a cannabis accessory.
Exception — cannabis
(2) Subject to the regulations, subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a person that is
authorized to sell cannabis that provides or offers to provide any thing, including
cannabis or a cannabis accessory, or service referred to in any of paragraphs (1)(a) to (c)
to a person that is authorized to produce, sell or distribute cannabis.
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Exception — cannabis accessory
(3) Subject to the regulations, subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a person that
sells a cannabis accessory that provides or offers to provide any thing, including cannabis
or a cannabis accessory, or service referred to in any of paragraphs (1)(a) to (c) to a
person that is authorized to produce, sell or distribute cannabis.
SUBDIVISION C
Display
Display of cannabis
29 Unless authorized under this Act, it is prohibited for a person that is authorized to sell
cannabis to display it, or any package or label of cannabis, in a manner that may result in
the cannabis, package or label being seen by a young person.
Display of cannabis accessory
30 Unless authorized under this Act, it is prohibited for a person that sells a cannabis
accessory to display it, or any package or label of a cannabis accessory, in a manner that
may result in the cannabis accessory, package or label being seen by a young person.
Promotion-related information — cannabis
43 (1) Every person that is authorized under this Act to produce, sell or distribute
cannabis must provide to the Minister, in the prescribed form and manner and within the
prescribed time, information that is required by the regulations about any promotion of
cannabis that they conduct, including a promotion referred to in paragraph 16(c).
Promotion-related information — cannabis accessories and services
(2) Every person that sells or distributes a cannabis accessory, or that provides a service
related to cannabis, must provide to the Minister, in the prescribed form and manner and
within the prescribed time, information that is required by the regulations about any
promotion of cannabis accessories or their service related to cannabis, as the case may be,
that they conduct, including a promotion referred to in paragraph 16(d).
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